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AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION BULLETIN

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THE CARRIAGE OF PHILANTHROPY

Being

The story of the successful distribution of \$12,000,000 in "Food Remittance" packages in Russia; of the vital relief to the nation's brain workers; and of the resultant earning of funds for the feeding of 3,000,000 children at a critical period.

By

"One Who Served"

Frontispiece
and
Sixteen Illustrations

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
THE CARRIAGE OF PHILANTHROPY

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LEO B. KAMENEV

President of the Moscow Soviet, Acting Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars during Lenin's illness, and at present Chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense. During the period of American Relief Administration work in Russia, Kamenev was particularly responsible for government relations with the organization, and his uniform friendliness had much to do with the successful accomplishment of the Food Remittance operation.

HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN FOOD REMITTANCE DIVISION

The Evolution of the Idea

Chapter I

Three years of continuous operation over the whole of Central Europe and the Balkans had given the American Relief Administration a pretty extensive knowledge of food shortages and famines. During the month of April, 1920 it had supplied meals daily to 3,303,907 children in countries covering the major portion of a continent. After this the organization might justifiably have supposed that it had little to learn of the horrors of starvation on a large scale or of the secrets of relief in proportion. Yet when the 1921 crop failure caused it to carry relief to Russia, the Administration discovered a situation which so far eclipsed anything in its own experience as to belong to another category. Here was not famine as the A.R.A. had known it, affecting a small proportion of the population; here was one of the largest nations in the world isolated and starving, the entire productive forces of the country destroyed, its transport nearly paralyzed. 131,000,000 people were short of food, 15 to 20,000,000 actually threatened by starvation. No wonder that the Administration felt that its plan to feed 1,000,000 children daily would remove but an infinitesimal part of the suffering of the Russian colossus.

Before the war Russia had produced annually 4,000,000,000 poods (1 pood = 37 lbs.) of grain stuffs to feed its population and for export. Government statistics showed the 1921 crop to be only 1,617,000,000 poods. Could this have been equally divided among the entire population each individual would have received 12.2 poods. The normal consumption before the war, arrived at by taking the gross crop less net exports, was 16.3 poods per capita of population and 9.7 per head of cattle and horses, which made the total consumption something like 24 poods per capita. This meant, then, that equal distribution of the crop of 1921 would have given each individual about half of what he had been accustomed to receive before the war.

But equal distribution was out of the question. Acute shortages existed in large compact areas, 20 of the 79 provinces of European and Asiatic Russia being wholly affected. These provinces covered an area nearly half as large as the United States, amounting to 1,271,801 square miles out of a total of 8,069,400 square miles, and a population of 30,000,000 out of 131,526,000. This famine area, which was also the food exporting area of Russia, produced in 1921 a crop of only 172,100,000 poods. That allowed each of the 30,000,000 individuals 5.7 poods, only half the amount needed to sustain life, and leaving nothing for seeding or cattle. From the rest of Russia, which had not enough for its own requirements, these stricken provinces could hope to receive nothing. They had nothing of their own to fall back upon; the requisitions and destructions of revolution had deprived them of reserves. The sole alternative to death was foreign aid. Without that, 15,000,000 people from these provinces alone might perish.

Cities in the Maelstrom

But no part of Russia escaped the hand of hunger. Practically every city in the country had its cases of starvation, both among the thousands of

refugees who poured from the Volga provinces and among its own people. Cities in and out of the famine area suffered. During the revolution the population of Odessa had fallen from 631,000 to 430,000, making it about equal in size with Milwaukee. If one could conceive of the American city with every source of food supply cut off for months, it might be possible to understand the situation which existed in Odessa in 1921-22. Not a shop open, no grain, no milk, no meat, no vegetables, nothing coming in from the country. It was a city of the dead in fact, for hundreds fell in the streets and lay there, unburied. Petrograd, in an area which had not suffered from the drought, endured similar privations. The 700,000 who remained of the city's 2¼ million inhabitants saw their fellow citizens fighting with dogs in the streets over the carcass of a horse. And so throughout all the country.

The particular tragedy of the famine in the cities was that it fell upon the best intelligence and consequently upon the hope of Russia. The struggle for bread had crushed out all thinking, all creating, and was eliminating the individuals who might lead Russia out of its morass when better days came. The officials of the American Relief Administration, as personal contact revealed to them the full terror of the general situation, and of that of the cities in particular, realized that the one hope was to increase the general food supply without distinction as to recipients. Every conceivable source would have to be milked for the benefit of the citizens of the Soviet State. More food, by any means, became the inevitable cry.

A Business for Charity

The Relief Administration had one potential resource which had been tried with great success in Central Europe. It had operated under the name, "American Relief Administration Warehouses", and to the outsider it appeared to be a first class business enterprise, guaranteeing a large and legitimate profit. As a matter of fact, it was, but its very success as a relief operation depended upon its success as a business.

When the A.R.A. went into Central Europe in 1919 it found thousands of people in want who might have been helped by relatives and friends abroad had there been any means of transmitting this personal aid. The war had too completely interrupted the normal channels of transmission to permit of their immediate revival with the armistice. In their stead had sprung up opportunists operating as remittance speculators who made rich capital of the need and impotence of the Central Europeans. Operation was simple. The American correspondent sold to the remitter a money draft on an Austrian remittance speculator for ten dollars, - at the lowest possible exchange, of course. Meanwhile the exchange fell steadily and by the time the mails delivered the draft in Vienna, it might be worth five dollars. Only rarely was it worth more. The speculators split the other five. The abuse was general, it was within the law, and highly profitable. But it was exceedingly hard on the remitter and the remitee.

At the same time that this condition existed, the American Relief Administration had concentrated large stocks of food over and above its regular relief supplies, in the Central European countries. The Governments concerned were in dire need of these surplus stocks but they had nothing except their unstable paper currency with which to pay for them and thus enable the A.R.A. to buy more stocks in America. It occurred to Mr. Hoover that dollar

remittances from American residents to individuals in the Central European countries might be converted to this purpose, and the profiteering operations of the remittance speculators wiped out at the same time.

In brief, his plan was to concentrate by order of the Federal Reserve Board all money remittances from America to the countries of Central Europe through the Relief Administration, the dollars being turned over to the Administration which established an equivalent food credit for the Government concerned, while the Government made payment to remittee in its paper currency at a fixed rate of exchange through a specified bank. The plan was inaugurated on April 15, 1919. It operated for ten weeks, until June 30, 1919, during which time the A.R.A. handled \$7,000,000 worth of remittances. This gave the Governments concerned credit for \$7,000,000 worth of food, an important item in those hungry days. The ten weeks' operation also put an effective blight on the unholy harvest of wild cat speculators, and what is more important it reestablished the reliable pre-war channels of money remittances between the banks of Europe and American banking institutions. The principal reason for bringing it to an end was the A.R.A.'s desire not to interfere with legitimate private business.

Food as Money

The outstanding fact in the A.R.A. money remittance scheme, obviously, was the use of food as the medium of exchange. When the Administration gave place to private business, money again became the medium. However, an increase of money in the hunger stricken countries did not materially relieve the condition of the population. It did not strike at the root of the evil. That root was food shortage. No matter how much money came into the country, without an additional import of food the suffering only augmented; increased money remittances merely encouraged food speculators and jumped prices; supply and demand remained the same.

The A.R.A., which had changed from an official to a private organization, cast about for some means of increasing the food supply, while at the same time making use of the tangible will to help of people in America who were sending money remittances to Central Europeans. Naturally, these people wanted above all to aid their relatives, so that a general appeal for Central Europe as a whole was out of the question. These considerations led Mr. Hoover, with his assistants, Mr. Julius H. Barnes, Mr. Edgar Rickard and Mr. Edward M. Flesh, to the simple but brilliant plan of remitting food instead of money. Where they used to buy money orders, Americans would buy Food Drafts from the A.R.A. and mail them to their relatives. The Administration would establish warehouses at central points with food reserves sent over by the shipload, against which the draft recipient could draw. It was international banking in food instead of money.

Here was a plan of extraordinary promise. Besides increasing the food supply it seemed capable of effecting everything that the Relief Administration had desired when it went into the money remittance business. No falling exchange would permit an agent to shear off a criminally high profit. The purchaser could be certain that what he bought in America would be delivered intact to his friend or relative in Europe. Because of the high cost of food in Central Europe the consignee would receive commodities valued at three times their American purchase price. It seemed certain that were the plan to

succeed at all, that success could not be of small scale. Investigation had discovered that before the war money remittances from America to the countries of Central Europe wherein the Food Draft operation was contemplated had averaged some millions monthly. A goodly portion of this would certainly be converted into Food Drafts.

What the Plan Entailed

In spite of its simplicity, however, the plan offered difficulties. Mr. Hoover presented it to his associates in November, 1919, and they spent three solid months of planning before a wheel was turned. The outstanding problems which this unprecedented idea presented included financing the operation, the sale of Drafts, the make up of the package and its price, the purchase, transportation and maintenance of adequate stocks in countries of operation.

To insure sales the A.R.A. would have to be able to guarantee delivery or refund to purchaser. From the time a deposit for a fixed quantity of food was made in America to the day of delivery of the food over the counter of an American Relief Administration warehouse in Vienna and the return of the receipt to New York, not less than two months would have elapsed. Meanwhile the purchase price must lie untouched in the bank. Absolutely untried as the idea was, the conservative banker must have looked upon it with suspicion. However, post-war conditions made it unnecessary to go to the banks. War-stimulated over-production had glutted the warehouses of America with unmarketable food. The merchants and producers stood to lose everything. It was, then, scarcely a gamble to take a chance on any scheme, and much less so on a scheme with the prestige of the American Relief Administration behind it.

As for sales, the Administration officials felt that if they were to convert a large proportion of money remittances into food remittances they must provide facilities for remitters similar to those at hand for money remittances. The American Bankers Association came to the A.R.A.'s aid to solve this problem, 5,000 banks in all parts of the United States, South America and Canada, selling Food Drafts for the Administration.

The cooperation of these banks brought on the question of the make up and price of the package, for it would be impossible to change either of these once instructions had been sent out and sales begun. This was perhaps the most difficult of the problems which arose. The first half of it involved the reconciliation of the demands of the dietitian, of several different races and two different religions, and of the food dealer. The dietitian required that the package should contain the most nourishing foods which should be at the same time sufficiently varied to appeal to the taste; different nationalities wanted food to which they were accustomed; the Jew had to have special fats; while the limitations of the trade forced the Administration to compose the package of standard units. In addition to all this the reputation of America abroad demanded that the quality of the food should be without a superior.

Two considerations entered in determining the price, the cost of the food and operating costs. The A.R.A. and its officers had gained sufficient experience in transporting two billion dollars worth of foodstuffs abroad to be able to estimate pretty accurately the second of these. The food market, however, was subject to unforeseen variations. To protect itself against

sharp fluctuations the Administration had to fix a price which would leave a contingency margin. This it did, with the advertised provision that any unused portion of the margin, which would be called profit in a commercial enterprise, would be used to feed the needy children of the countries into which the Food Drafts went. How this worked out will justify discussion later.

As a result of their deliberations over these considerations the Administration officials devised four standard packages in two sets, Christian and Jewish, each set containing one ten and one fifty dollar package. A and B were for Christians and C and D for Jews.

A
\$10

24½ lbs. Flour
10 lbs. Rice
8 lbs. Bacon
8 cans Milk

C
\$10

24½ lbs. Flour
10 lbs. Rice
7½ lbs. Cottonseed Oil
12 cans Milk

B
\$50

140 lbs. Flour
50 lbs. Rice
16 lbs. Bacon
15 lbs. Lard
12 lbs. Corned Beef
48 cans Milk

D
\$50

140 lbs. Flour
50 lbs. Rice
45 lbs. Cottonseed Oil
48 cans Milk

The transportation and maintenance of sufficient stocks to meet sales presented the final difficulty. Here was not a business which could be build up slowly and developed experimentally. When it began to operate it must be prepared to meet all demands. Could the A.R.A. count on the timely purchase and transportation, particularly by the war-weakened railways of Central Europe, of adequate stocks? Thanks to its experience with childfeeding supplies, it believed it could.

Many-Sided Success

The New York office sold the first Food Draft on January 23, 1920. It required but a short time thereafter to prove that here was a splendid idea, splendidly worked out. In spite of the fact that food parcels went to people in all degrees of affluence, the operation proved to be an unimpeachable relief scheme, for wherever packages were delivered food prices on the local markets took a significant drop.

The element of specific relief in the scheme gained for it the hearty adherence of the individual American who had relatives abroad in need of help. "Without regard to race, creed or political color" stands as the fundamental condition of humanitarian relief on a big scale. For the philanthropic giver of funds for childfeeding, whose humanity is appealed to impersonally, such a principle is essential, but for the man who has a mother or a wife or a brother in the famished country, general relief is no great comfort. To this man, the Food Draft plan appeared as a Godsend. It was the most intimate form

of personal relief possible. A man could scarcely do more were he, himself, to carry bread and meat to his relatives.

Finally, the plan soon proved to be a substantial source of revenue which went to materially increase the childfeeding work of the Relief Administration. This resulted from the margin of safety referred to above. Of the ten dollars charged for a Food Draft, the wholesale price of the food took up \$6.75, \$1.00 was allowed for overhead, leaving a net balance of \$2.25 per package. (It should be noted that the retail cost of the food over the counter in America never dropped below \$8.00 and that it frequently rose above \$10.00.)

A private organization operating for profit could not have done half so well with a similar package. First, because the initial cost of the food would have been greater, and second, because its overhead would have been three times higher. The American Relief Administration had a perfected organization engaged in childfeeding in all the countries in which it operated its Food Draft scheme; the capable executives who planned and directed the operation gave their services for nothing; and the countries which benefited furnished free services, such as transportation, of great monetary value.

Two and a Half Million for Childfeeding

During the eighteen months of its operation in Hungary, Austria, Germany, Czecho-Slovakia, and Poland, the Food Draft business amounted to \$8,288,848, which left a margin of \$2,506,103. That is a staggering success. A commercial business, the net return of which runs into seven figures in the short period of a year and a half is one of the "upper ten" in the world of investments. The two and a half million dollar margin represented an indirect tax on the remitter for support of the general mass childfeeding operations. It enabled the American Relief Administration to pay all overhead for the entire organization, which meant that every cent collected for charitable relief could be and was expended for the actual purchase of food and supplies to be used for the relief of the starving. This included the heavy items of transportation and all distribution costs, and still left a huge sum for further child relief. The benefit to the American farmer should also be noted.

The American purchaser and Central European beneficiary of the Food Draft were both completely satisfied, the former because the Draft represented about \$10.00 worth of food bought at retail in New York, and the latter because the Draft was worth as much as \$30.00 at point of delivery. It was this fact, of course, which made the operation feasible and insured its success. In fact, it may be stated as a theorem that the success of the Food Draft enterprise is in direct proportion to the extent to which the value of the food at point of delivery exceeds the cost price. As conditions improved in Central Europe and the market price of a package approached the \$10.00 line, the sales decreased. When the package cost less in the countries served than the \$10.00 charged in America, the A.R.A. so informed its clients, and the operation stopped altogether.

With such a record to its credit, the Warehouse plan presented itself as a candidate for the Russian operation in October, 1921. No one questioned the desirability of including it, that is, no one connected with the American Relief Administration. All the reasons which pled for it in the

earlier operations were intensified in Russia to the extent that the need was greater. But the obstacles which confronted it, the opposition, - even ill will, - with which the Russian authorities met the mere suggestion of it, their suspicion of counter revolutionary intent in it, made its inclusion a formidable responsibility and called for a high degree of courage.

"Behind the Seal"

Why courage? Because Russia was a sealed country in which the Government was despotically supreme. Behind that seal was the unknown. It was the high courage of Rolande who advanced on the Dark Tower. What was in Russia? What reception would the Food Draft get? Would its food be confiscated? And an even preceding question, could that food be got in? Had four years of foreign war, followed by four more of revolution and terror, left sufficient transportation in the country to move foodstuffs, - particularly over and above those imported for childfeeding? Reports coming from Russia were dark and forbidding. It is the essence of the Food Draft operation that it shall guarantee delivery to the consignee in person; it is essential that the use of the food shall be assured to him after delivery. But there was no private property in Russia, all wealth had been confiscated. How then could there be any certainty that the consignee would be allowed to benefit by the American food?

There was again the vastness of Russia. If the Food Draft idea were to work at all, it would have to work on a large scale and over a far vaster territory than that covered by famine relief operations, that is, mass child and adult feeding. For instance, the great majority of Russians with relatives abroad lived in the Ukraine, where at the time the Food Draft scheme was in the air, the A.R.A. had neither offices nor operations of any sort, nor did it anticipate opening any. In this region the Food Draft would have to establish offices. Would the government support and protect such isolated branches?

For the operation, the technical operation of the Food Draft work in Russia, skilled clerks, stenographers and bookkeepers would be required. They would for the most part have to speak English, a combination which there was every reason to suspect could not be found, at least not in such out of the way places as Tzaritzin on the lower Volga or Elizabethgrad in the Ukraine. Obviously, restricting the American personnel to the smallest possible number was in every way desirable, and therefore if Russians could not be secured to do this essential clerical work, it would not be done.

Frankly, the Food Draft in Russia seemed a hopeless idea. As a business scheme no bank or banker in America would have financed it. Money would be required for 120 days at the least, - and that on the chance of delivery of food in Russia, with the obstacles of transportation, dangers of requisition and political disturbance, and difficulties of finding consignee to be overcome. That was the hundred to one chance which conservative bankers with the interests of their stockholders to consider, could not take. The situation had changed from the morning after the war, when the Central European Food Draft operation began. Were the scheme to be financed, the A.R.A. would have to do so itself.

Without shutting its eyes to any of these considerations, the officials of the American Relief Administration decided to include the Food Draft operation in the Russian unit. That it was a decision of courage and faith, fraught with good for - even bearing life to - hundreds of thousands of starving Russians, above all of starving Russians of culture and refinement, the history of the operation alone can prove.

A RECRUIT TO THE RELIEF OF RUSSIA

Chapter II

The business of establishing kitchens for the feeding of a million starving children scattered over a million square miles of territory absorbed all the energies and time of the small group of Americans who entered Russia in August and September, 1921. The Food Remittance Division with its complications had to wait until October, at the beginning of which Moscow Headquarters of the A.R.A. began negotiations with the Soviet Government for an agreement which would insure the organization that amount of freedom of operation of the plan which it considered essential and without which it absolutely refused to establish the division.

In addition to inheriting the idea from the Central European Operation, the Russian Unit also inherited the old Food Draft personnel. Mr. Elmer G. Burland had developed and conducted the work of the Vienna office from which over 200,000 packages had been delivered, with a success that had made the Vienna branch a model for the organization. It was, then, highly fortunate that his knowledge of the technical difficulties of Food Draft work should support the Russian negotiations and prevent oversights which later experience might have caused the Americans to regret extremely. Mr. Burland carried on the preliminary negotiations as to the general terms of the agreement with Mr. A. E. Eiduk, Representative Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Government with the A.R.A.

Mr. Eiduk had come to his new position from the Presidium of the Cheka, the all powerful political police of Soviet Russia and a descendant of the secret police of the old regime, known as the "Third Section." As a member of the Chekka's ruling body, the appointment of Mr. Eiduk to be Representative Plenipotentiary to Foreign Relief Organizations rather resembled making the chief of police liaison officer between the Government and a distinguished foreign guest. Mr. Eiduk was not a Russian, a characteristic which he had in common with many members of the Soviet Government. A disproportionately large number of the leading Communists are Poles, Letts and Jews.

The Russian Representative

Mr. Eiduk's race, the Letts, furnished a goodly number of the Red soldiery, and he owed his own high position in the Soviet State to his deeds on the battlefields of the revolution. According to his own statements to Col. Haskell, Mr. Burland and other members of the American Mission, he had first gained prominence during the counter-revolutionary attempts staged in Archangel in 1918. As the head of a machine gun squad his particular task was to discourage possible later attempts on the part of the local Russian population. He fulfilled his mission, so he stated, by lining the local population up along the railroad and using the machine gun. Later, while patrolling the Riga-Moscow railroad with a machine gun mounted on a side car he had been shot and left for dead by a squadron of White cavalry. This fact may have helped to explain his position at the extreme Left-Wing of the Communist Party, the Wing which steadily fought compromise with Capitalist States and which yielded the smallest fraction of the absolute power of the Dictatorship only under compulsion.

To this representative of the Soviet Government, Mr. Burland took the Food Remittance proposal, convinced that it was an opportunity at which the Russians would jump because of its potentialities of great good; convinced also that no one could read into it purposes more hidden than those so simply expressed in its preamble, and certain that what discussion might prefix its acceptance would be limited to minor technicalities of operation. He was young and energetic America charged with a great idea. To him the essential was action. He represented a people whose hero is the man who breaks records, whether on the running track, or on the stock exchange. Accustomed to direct and speedy dealing and conscious of the straightforwardness of his cause, he anticipated immediate agreement. Technical objections he could meet with the quickness of one whose mind is in possession of all the facts. He didn't expect to meet any other. To him the discussion was to be merely a discussion of terms.

Pitfalls

The Russian negotiator required but little time to disillusion him and to make him understand that the negotiation of the Food Remittance agreement was to be anything but clear sailing. Mr. Eiduk met the proposal as if it were a criminal on trial before him, and as if he were a French court which considers the accused guilty until proven innocent. Instead of merely giving an explanation Mr. Burland found himself forced to argue and plead. Arguing with Mr. Eiduk presented difficulties. In the first place everything had to be done through an interpreter. The anomaly of this situation was that Mr. Eiduk could speak quite fluent English in spite of his pretended ignorance. He betrayed himself to Mr. Wilkinson, chief of the A.R.A. Communications Division during a trip to Petrograd in February, 1922, when lack of an interpreter caused him to forget his role for an entire evening, and to Mr. Geo. Barr Baker of New York in January, 1922, when, after talking through an interpreter for two hours he suddenly interrupted the latter, saying, "I understand". Why the Government Representative should have insisted on such a farce is incomprehensible unless one accepts the explanation that the habits of the police officer were too strong for complete discard. In the second place the most intense enthusiasm and energy could produce no answering spark in Mr. Eiduk. He sat through the daily conference with the Americans, always immune from the excitement of the discussion, like a rock on a ruffled beach, shifting his eyes from the American speaker to his interpreter and back again. In the third place the Government Representative could not be brought to state definitely his objection to the Food Remittance idea.

After some days of non-committal disapproval of the plan in general, however, Mr. Eiduk finally offered a specific objection on the ground that the scheme would offer scope for the operations of speculators. The Russian Government, he declared, could not even consider permitting a Food Remittance operation unless it should be allowed to control the distribution of every package; that is before delivery of each package, the Government must give its approval.

Insurance Against Requisition

This, Mr. Burland pointed out, was manifestly out of the question, since the essential condition to the American Relief Administration's going before the American people with appeals for food packages for Russians, was

that it should guarantee delivery except in the case of physical impossibility, due, for instance, to non-existent transport. Furthermore, the A.R.A. was obliged to give the purchaser a receipt from the beneficiary or to return the money without deduction for expenses. Were the package to be subject to requisition or the delivery of it to be subject to the decision of the Government, the scheme could not possibly operate. No purchaser would be willing to add such chances of non-delivery to those which were physically unavoidable. Nor could the A.R.A. risk having to refund money for food over which it had no control. This argument left Mr. Eiduk cold. Mr. Burland understood definitely then that the Soviet Government not only did not favor the Food Remittance scheme but would be quite content to exclude it altogether. The only thing that remained for him to do was to eliminate all arguments which would justify its exclusion. He set out to prove that the danger of speculation did not exist.

The individual in Russia, he argued, who receives a package of food from an individual in America is in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred going to need that food too badly himself to use it for speculative purposes. It will be for him a matter of life and death. Since 30,000,000 Russians are desperately needy, there can be no doubt of this. Therefore, the only cases where speculation is to be feared are those where quantities of food in excess of actual need are received, that is, where one man receives a large number of packages at a single time. In order then for the Government to control speculation, it will only be necessary for it to pass on large single sales of packages.

Mr. Eiduk was eventually and with reluctance brought to agree to this, and so sub-paragraph "g" of the Fifth Section of the Warehouse agreement was written into the proposed pact. This said that in case an individual receives orders for delivery of more than \$50.00 worth of foodstuffs at any one time, or an organization receives orders for delivery of more than \$500.00 worth of foodstuffs at any one time, this must be advised to the Soviet Representative with the A.R.A. who, in case he has evidence that the food will be misused or become the subject of speculation, may determine that the foodstuffs shall not be delivered.

As will be noted, this phrase stated specifically that the reason for non-delivery should be speculation, which implied that there should be no other reason sufficiently good to prevent delivery. Since the whole argument of the Government Representative had been centered around the danger of speculation, the American negotiator wished to have stated in the agreement the fact that reason for non-delivery in any case should be speculation.

"That's not necessary," was the hasty reaction of Mr. Eiduk and he continued to oppose it strenuously for some time.

This incident resulted in bringing to light at last the real basis of the Government's objection to the Food Remittance scheme. They suspected it of being a weapon of their enemies, the Whites, of being a scheme to further counter-revolution. Mr. Eiduk, of course, did not charge the A.R.A. outright with being in league with the Whites. He confined himself to stating his fear that it would be their unconscious tool. If the Government approved the Food Remittance plan, declared the negotiator, foreign enemies of the Soviet State, for example, members of the Russian Cadet party living abroad, would make use

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of it in an attempt to embroil the Soviet with the A.R.A. and thus hinder the childfeeding relief to the Volga provinces, which would in turn help to discredit the Russian Government abroad. This they would do by sending packages to groups in Russia who were manifestly anti-Bolshevik and working against the Government, delivery of which the latter would be forced to prevent.

Again, said the Soviet Representative, suppose the Soviet Trade Commission in London were to buy one hundred thousand dollars worth of food packages for the Red Army? Could you deliver them? Would you deliver them? "Yes," replied Mr. Burland, promptly, to the intense astonishment of Mr. Eiduk. This astonishment left no further doubt that the Government Representative believed the A.R.A. to be definitely and actively against the Soviet State and definitely and actively for its enemies.

To understand such an attitude, it is necessary to know something of the Russian character, particularly as the war and revolution have modified it; of the situation existing in Russia in 1921; and of the highly individual psychology of the Commissar. As for the Russian character, seven years of destitution, hunger and killing have made a mockery of faith in humanity and in the present. Of that the idealism of the country has fewer illusions than ever, and of the future it has only a vague and uncertain hope. Russia's sufferings and the creed of her new masters have turned her to materialism, to the materialism of a land of war and revolution, - hard and irreconcilable and inordinately suspicious.

Commissar Psychology

In so far as Mr. Eiduk's attitude was personal it can be explained better by Commissar psychology than by reference to the Russian situation of 1921. The Political group to which the Government Representative belonged was unable to believe that anything good from its point of view could come from its enemies, the Capitalists. Personal altruism and national generosity being foreign to their experience, these people could not believe that there might be any truth in the avowed purpose of the American Relief Administration, - namely unselfish aid to the starving.

"They suspected the A.R.A.," said a Russian-born American after watching the Administration's relations with the Government for twenty months, "because it made no attempt to disguise itself as a Communistic, Socialistic or labor organization and because a mind trained on Marxian theories cannot reason otherwise than along lines of class distinction."

After three years of preaching and practicing the complete extermination of the bourgeoisie how could they help but be suspicious of an organization which came suddenly from the heart of the bourgeois stronghold with offers of unlimited aid. Mr. Eiduk conducted himself until the end of his relations with the American Relief Administration as a guard over an enemy. He established an organization which paralleled every branch of the A.R.A., ostensibly to facilitate the Administration's relief work, but the activities of his subordinates and frank statements to Americans of some of them, proved conclusively that their main business was espionage and control.

Suspicion of the A.R.A. was not confined to the Government Representative nor to his political group. On August 30, 1921, three days after the

arrival in Russia of the Administration, Mr. Trotsky, then probably the second most important man in the country, speaking before the Plenary Session of the Moscow Soviet, sent out a warning to the Russian proletariat bidding it to keep a watchful eye on the activity of the A.R.A. lest counter-revolutionary intentions should be concealed under the guise of relief work. The leaders of the state knew the type of man they were appointing as Representative Plenipotentiary to Foreign Relief Organizations, which means that they wanted these organizations watched. Had they wished they could have supplied a more capable liaison officer. Mr. Eiduk unquestionably represented the arm and not the brains of the Soviet State; he executed policies, he did not conceive them. It is this suspicion of the A.R.A., harbored by the best brains in the Government, that a knowledge of the political situation of the Soviet State can explain.

A Nervous Government

The Soviet Government was too new to have the confidence which traditional power gives. Bloodshed had borne it to the top, and the four initial years of its existence had been one continuous battle with counter-revolution from without and within. This enemy attacked its life as a Government and the lives of its members as individuals. Its own ruthlessness in gaining its ends assured it that it might expect no mercy from possible conquerors. That fear of the enemy was inevitably the emotion which governed the Soviet Government's every act in 1921. It suspected this enemy in most unlikely places, not without reason. From 1918 on, dozens of organizations within the country had been formed behind the shield of science, philanthropy, economics and what not, for the real purpose of counter-revolution. The Bolshevists had no reason, therefore, for excepting the A.R.A., about the activities of which they knew next to nothing, from the range of their suspicions.

It was the fate of the Food Remittance Division to fall under the particular distrust of the Soviets and Mr. Eiduk, and that because it embodied the principle of specific relief, which means relief to selected individuals. To the American mind this would seem to contain no special danger. If this country were suffering from a famine, it would undoubtedly not matter in the least to the Government whether relief supplies reached bank presidents or blacksmiths, Socialists or Republicans, provided no one received food at the expense of the actual starving. But to the Russian Commissar with his counter-revolutionary complex, specific relief meant the feeding of his enemies. Had the A.R.A. not had the pressure of its childfeeding and medical activities behind it, it is doubtful whether the Soviet Government would have permitted the Food Remittance operation. Even as it was the Government admitted the Division nervously as it might have some beast the potency of whose fangs was unknown. This attitude boded no good to the proposed Division. It foreshadowed constant friction and menaced the success of the operation, but as Mr. Burland finally succeeded in having the agreement worded in a manner satisfactory to the A.R.A., the Warehouse plan was launched in spite of misgivings.

Other Opposition

Other than on this fundamental question of control under the guise of preventing speculation, the Government offered little opposition to the details of the Food Remittance plan. The preamble of the agreement included the clause which was probably decisive in effecting the acceptance of the

scheme, in saying, "It is desirable to increase by every legitimate means possible the resources of the American Relief Administration in order that the volume of foodstuffs for Russia may be increased and a greater number of children provided for."

To demolish any fear on the part of the Government that the import of Food Remittance products would be at the expense of childfeeding stocks, the agreement included this clause: "The Food used for warehouse deliveries will be from additional stocks imported especially for this purpose, which stocks will be in excess of, but interchangeable with those required for childfeeding. This will in no way reduce the amount of food delivered in Russia for childfeeding as provided for in the Riga Agreement, but will on the other hand increase the total amount of foodstuffs delivered in Russia and will increase the number of children that can be cared for." This last, of course, meant that any profits accruing should go to increase childfeeding stocks.

This paragraph met some objection, again, of an enlightening nature from the Soviet Representative. He wanted to eliminate the clause, "but interchangeable with those required for childfeeding." His reason, obviously not stated bluntly, but broadly hinted at, was that the A.R.A. wished to get into Russia, duty free, large stocks of food under the cover of charity and then sell them as Food Remittance packages. Mr. Eiduk could not bring himself to believe in the honesty of the American organization.

The negotiations for the Warehouse Agreement occupied one strenuous and illuminating week. By that time the representatives had arrived at an agreement more or less mutually satisfactory, and on October 19th Colonel William N. Haskell, Director of the Russian Unit, signed the birth certificate of the Food Remittance Division on behalf of the American Relief Administration, while Leo Kamenev, president of the Moscow Soviet, signed for the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. All that the new Division now had to do was to begin running.

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CREATING THE MACHINE

Chapter III

No campaign is the exact duplicate of another, even when fought over the same ground, and the territory of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic was vastly different ground from any other, Central Europe included. The Food Remittance organization in Russia, therefore, was not a replica of its Central European predecessor, and its history repeated little of the history of the earlier effort. The essential difference between the two operations is indicated in their names, "Food Draft" in Central Europe and "Food Remittance" in Russia. In the former, the purchaser bought a draft for a specified quantity of specified commodities, and mailed it privately to the beneficiary who cashed it at an American Relief Administration Warehouse.

Russia offered insurmountable difficulties for this system. The breakdown of its postal system and the interrupted contact with the outside world for five years, during which tremendous shifts in population had taken place, left no doubt that not one-fifth of the drafts sent through the open mails would ever find the addressees. Furthermore, the extremely probable necessity of frequent refunds made it advisable for complete control of notification to be kept in the hands of the A.R.A. Finally, the greater uncertainties of functioning in Russia made it impossible for the Relief Administration to insure delivery of a specific package. It had to reserve the right of decision as to what foods and how much it would deliver, committing itself only as to dollar value of these commodities.

The A.R.A. therefore decided to limit the purchaser's obligation to buying the remittance, while it sent the Food Remittance orders to its central offices in Moscow, which distributed them to the district offices. It fell to the lot of the district offices to notify the beneficiary as well as to deliver the package. The Russian operation was not, therefore, a Food Draft operation, and to distinguish it from the Central European work, the A.R.A. called it Food Remittance. On the next pages are given facsimiles of the Central European Food Draft form and the Russian Food Remittance receipt.

Moscow the Pivot

The added work of notification in the Russian undertaking meant a far more complicated machinery than that which had existed in Central Europe. It also made Moscow the pivot of the operation. The establishment of this office became, as a result, the first essential.

The A.R.A. Russian operation was in the strictest military sense of the word a campaign and like the English at Gallipoli the Administration had to begin firing the moment it landed. The Americans had no time to entrench themselves comfortably in the country, perfect an organization, amass enormous food supplies and carefully work out a plan of attack before facing the enemy. The war was upon them before they had an army and they had to fight, and to build while they fought. It is no simple task to construct an organization capable of efficiently handling and accounting for \$60,000,000 worth of supplies even with a period of years to work in; to accomplish it in a few months requires business genius and a Herculean energy; but when in addition

American Relief Administration

RECEIPT FOR FOOD STATION

RUSSIAN FOOD REMITTANCE

RECEIPT No. 6

MOSCOW 18

Date.....Oct.25-1921

Received from Mrs. John Smith the sum of...twenty.....Dollars (\$20.00...)

(Address—Street)1885 Madison Ave.....

Representing the value of food deliverable for above amount, in accordance with arrangement detailed on back hereof.

(Town and State) ...New York City.....

FOR FOOD TO BE DELIVERED TO:

(Russian)
Г-ну Ивану Петрову
Петровка, 17
МОСКВА

(English)
Mr. Ivan Petroff
Petrovka, 17
MOSCOW
RUSSIA

FOOD RECEIVED (Date) 2 Dec.....

By Ivan Petroff
Temp. Rec. 17. Kb. 48

From Food Station No.....

Delivery No. 31.....

American Relief Administration

HERBERT HOOVER
Chairman

GATES W. MCGARRAH
Treasurer

EDGAR RICKARD
Director

By E. C.

ORIGINAL NOT TRANSFERABLE - GOOD ONLY IF PRESENTED WITHIN 90 DAYS FROM DATE OF ISSUE

No. 101 - Series V-1 FOOD DRAFT

ADMINISTERED BY AND FOR THE PROFIT OF THE EUROPEAN CHILDREN'S FUND

To American Relief Administration Warehouse
Vienna

Date Jan. 23/20

Please deliver on presentation to President Seitz of the Austrian Republic

For delivery consigned representative one hundred Packages

Designated as letter B Hereon, being the equivalent of \$ 5,000.

IN CASE OF EMERGENCY WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO SUBSTITUTE COMMODITIES OF EQUAL FOOD VALUE

A - AUSTRIA			
24 1/2 lbs. Flour	140 lbs. Flour	24 1/2 lbs. Flour	140 lbs. Flour
10 lbs. Beans	50 lbs. Beans	10 lbs. Beans	50 lbs. Beans
8 lbs. Bacon	15 lbs. Bacon	7 1/2 lbs. Ctnseed Oil	45 lbs. Ctnseed Oil
8 cans Milk	15 lbs. Lard	12 cans Milk	48 cans Milk
	12 lbs. Corned Beef		
	48 cans Milk		
\$10	\$50	\$10	\$50

American Relief Administration

Herbert Hoover Chairman Edgar Rickard Director

AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION
COUNTERSIGNING BANK

115 Broadway, New York City.

Gift of American Relief Committee for Sufferers in Austria
Address 37 Wall St., N.Y.C.

Signature Herbert Hoover

THE COST OF THIS FOOD DRAFT AS SHOWN ABOVE COVERS ALL EXPENSE TO PURCHASER INCLUDING ANY BANKING CHARGES

Obverse

Identification papers *Passport No 431*
 Date and place issued *In Petrograd, Janai 1916.*
 By whom issued *Given by the Petrograd County Administration*
 Remarks

The American Relief Administration will endeavor to deliver to the beneficiary an assortment of food from the following or other commodities:

Beans, Cocos, Flour, Hominy, Lard or Vegetable Lard Substitute, Canned Milk, Rice, Sugar, Tea

Such food will have a delivered value equivalent to three-quarters of the total remittance, it being understood that the remaining one-quarter will be used as a contribution to the Administration towards mass Child Feeding in Russia.

If, at the end of 90 days, the local American Relief Administration Warehouse in Russia is unable to locate the beneficiary, it will notify the New York Headquarters, and the original dollar deposit received will be refunded to the donor.

Wherever practicable the Administration will endeavor to make delivery of such food over the counters of its warehouses. To regions inaccessible to these warehouses, the Administration will endeavor to arrange deliveries through the local post office, express company or any other available service, but the Administration will assume no responsibility after the food is turned over to the post office or other agency for delivery.

40 lbs Flour (54¼ фун. муки)
 25 lbs Rice (27¼ фун. риса)
 10 lbs Sugar (11 фун. 730г сахара)
 10 lbs Lard (11 фун. 730г сала)
 3 lbs Tea (3 фун. 2830г чая)
 20 tins milk (20 банок молока)

This FOOD DRAFT must be mailed to the person to whom you wish to give the food. The receiver must present the Draft at the warehouse on which it is drawn within ninety days of the date of issue. If the receiver cannot present it personally delivery will be made to his property constituted representative.

Если вы хотите, чтобы этот документ был доставлен кому-либо, то вы должны отправить его по почте. Получатель должен представить этот документ в склад "Американского Релиеф Вареауза" в течение девяноста дней с даты выдачи. Если получатель не может лично представить документ, то доставка будет сделана по адресу, указанному в документе.

Этот документ не имеет силы, если он не будет представлен в склад. Документ, представленный в склад, должен быть представлен в течение девяноста дней с даты выдачи. Если получатель не может лично представить документ, то доставка будет сделана по адресу, указанному в документе.

Купите этот документ, если вы хотите, чтобы он был доставлен кому-либо. Документ, представленный в склад, должен быть представлен в течение девяноста дней с даты выдачи. Если получатель не может лично представить документ, то доставка будет сделана по адресу, указанному в документе.

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ENDORSEMENT

[Handwritten signature]

Reverse

to limited time, there is no material to work with, the thing might justifiably be considered impossible. The American Relief Administration had neither time nor material; it was 6,000 miles away from its base of supplies, in an isolated and unfriendly country where seven years of uninterrupted and barbaric destruction had completely wiped out the material wealth of the land, including the first essentials of modern commercial civilization; it had to work through employees who spoke another language. And finally, because of the national scale of its undertakings, requiring practically the mobilization of such of the country's resources as its railways, it could do nothing without the constant cooperation of the Government. That meant the cooperation of Mr. Eiduk and his office.

Pine Forests and Buzzsaws

Unfortunately, he and it shared the Russian inability to get things done at once. Whatever his qualities as a leader of machine gunners, Mr. Eiduk was a most inefficient business man. The ordinary merits of promptness, reliability, orderliness and energy, he and his subordinates lacked entirely. "It will be done at once," was a favorite phrase used prodigally but rarely fulfilled. When the irritated American officials became too exasperated and too insistent, Eiduk would begin failing to keep appointments to avoid their wrath. Against this wall of lethargy and irresponsibility the A.R.A. and the Food Remittance Division battered their heads with an uncomprehending violence made all the more futile by their own contrasting energy and deftness in practical things. Henry Adams said that Europe feels about the American as a pine forest feels about a buzzsaw. So the Russian official through whom the Americans had to get things done felt about the A.R.A. In his turn the American regarded the Russian official as a buzzsaw regards a stone wall. The Russian cuts into it, but only ineffectively and after fearful self-punishment.

Such were the handicaps which faced the American Relief Administration and the Food Remittance Division. How they were overcome is worth recording.

Of American personnel available for the service of the Food Remittance Division, there were so few as to suggest that the first business would be the establishing of a school in London or New York, the graduates of which could be sent on to Moscow for service. But schooling would take time and there was no time, so men picked on their general merits, were sent in to Russia as fast as they could be obtained. Meanwhile Mr. Burland with one or two assistants did the work of many men in laying the foundations of the Division.

A Ruined City to Build In

How inadequate was the material that the ruined city of Moscow had to offer them is difficult to imagine. Three years of negative neglect followed by four more of positive destruction had made of the Soviet Capital a tattered shadow. In terms of figures, the report of the Moscow local Board of Health showed that the 27,872 buildings containing 224,622 lodgings suitable for occupancy which the city possessed in 1918 had decreased at the end of 1921 to 24,490 houses containing only 72,680 lodgings suitable for occupancy. In the short space of three years the city had lost 151,942 or 67% of its pre-revolution fit housing facilities. The decadence of equipment of all sorts, - house and office furniture, - was on a par with that of the buildings. Meanwhile the influx of refugees, commercial adventurers, and particularly of government employees, had increased the population of the city from 1,500,000 in

1918 to probably 2,000,000 in 1921, so that the pressure of demand for the little that remained was terrific. Nevertheless the A.R.A. and the Food Remittance Division had to have space and furniture.

The whole of the Relief Administration in all its departments occupied a building at 30 Spiridonivka which had formerly harbored the families of a rich Armenian merchant and his son, and which with the revolution had become a workman's club. While the Americans had cause to be grateful for the old Russian bourgeoisie's grandiose scale of living, they could not overlook the building's shortcomings as an office for an American organization. Besides, the personnel used a goodly section of it as living quarters. With the advent of the Food Remittance Division additional space became imperative and the A.R.A. finally obtained a small adjoining building, at that time in use as a Soviet kindergarten.

Into a corner of this building the new Division squeezed its swelling bulk. Here it began an organization which was to deliver over a million packages in all corners of Russia during the short period of 18 months. It began this organization without typewriters, without files, with almost no paper, pencils, clips and other first essentials of an office. It obtained these simple commodities in inadequate amount only after weeks of curious hunting in odd cachés where the requisitions of the revolution had caused them to be hidden. The Administration regularly employed a staff of buyers whose business it was to work out of their hiding places pre-revolution stocks of typewriters, pencils and paper.

Business in a Tower of Babel

Worst of all, the Food Remittance Division began with an office staff the majority of whom could speak no English. The Russians are rightly praised for their linguistic powers; French, German and to a less degree, English, were widely known in old Russia. When rumor of the arrival of the Relief Administration had spread, many applicants, pretending to a knowledge of English, applied for positions. It might be supposed that these applicants would have settled the question of native personnel. But it is one thing to be fluent in the English of the drawing rooms of the aristocracy and quite another to be fluent in the English of an office. Not that the two vocabularies are so widely different; it is the habits of mind and training that go with them which are unlike. With the best will in the world it is rather difficult for an ex-princess to do cross filing.

But the number of those who spoke English of any sort fell hopelessly below the needs of the organization. Each department of the Moscow office managed to obtain at least one person speaking English to act as an interpreter. Through these interpreters the Americans had to explain with patient labor the intricacies of accounting, the secrets of subject and alphabetical and chronological filing, about which even those Russians with a business training were curiously ignorant. It was a slow and wearing process. More than one American wiped his brow gratefully at the end of a lecture delivered through an interpreter on the A.R.A. commodity accounting sheet, only to discover later that not one-tenth of what he had tried to explain had been correctly understood.

Hidden Dangers in Interpreters

The good interpreter is the rarest of finds. He must combine a superior intelligence which will permit him to grasp immediately the most varied ideas, with the ability to eliminate his own personality and reactions. If he is unable to do this latter thing he will inevitably change the sense of what he is translating. Under the best of circumstances shades of meaning suggested by tone or careful phrasing are lost in translation. This may not appear serious, but many an American found it so when handling delicate questions with Government officials. In January, 1922, the American District Supervisor of the Moscow Area politely requested his Government Representative to call and discuss certain business matters with him. The interpreter translated his request into a command, and a break in relations which threatened to stop the operation resulted. The language handicap increased the Administration's difficulties ten-fold. It cost time, money, temper and efficiency, but it didn't stop the work. As a matter of fact, the situation in Moscow was perfect compared with that of the districts. One of these had not even an English interpreter, let alone capable clerks.

Early Sales Increase the Chaos

On top of all these difficulties New York increased the chaos by beginning sales of Remittances in October immediately upon receipt of the news of the signing of the Warehouse Agreement. This made the question of the arrival of food stocks one of prime importance. Fortunately the Administration had reserves of Food Draft stocks warehoused at Hamburg and Warsaw, the expedition of which to Russia was ordered at once. The one commodity for which special arrangements had to be made was tea, purchases of which were made in London. Since this could not be counted upon to get to Russia in time for first deliveries the Moscow office bought some tea on the local Moscow market. Tea, of course, made up an essential part of the Russian Food Remittance package, because every one in Russia drinks it all day long and all ones life, and because the possession of it was the only means of insuring the drinking of boiled water. In a land so disease ridden as Soviet Russia, this became a prime consideration for reasons of sanitation.

The work that had to be done under these handicaps was enormous and vital. No one could possibly know or even with assurance anticipate the probable magnitude of the operation and so judge the scale upon which to build the organization. As to the distribution of the remittances over Russia, everything argued that the majority would go to the Ukraine, since the Jews, who had many immigrant relatives in America formed a large section of the population there. After the Ukraine would probably come the large cities, Moscow itself and Petrograd. In the tremendous distances of Russia, there could, of course, be no thought of one delivery center. Sub-stations had to be established in every center of large groups of remittances. It became therefore a matter of the first importance to pick sub-stations and arrange for their immediate installation.

Papers, Papers, and Papers

Experience in Central Europe had taught that the office work or "paper work" of a Food Remittance operation is voluminous and complicated; the obligation to give proof of delivery of individual package units rendered that



In the Packing Room at Moscow



inevitable. But in Central Europe the A.R.A. had not had to concern itself with notification of recipients, an addition which immensely increased the detail in the Russian operation. The clerical work loomed, then, very large in prospect. Were the Moscow office to attempt to shoulder all of this for the whole of Russia it could not fail to be swamped, provided the operation succeeded at all. To forestall such a disaster, Mr. Burland and his aides spent night after night of unremitting labor forecasting step by step the journey of a package from Moscow warehouse to consumer and the journey of a Food Remittance Receipt from New York to Moscow to the District, to completion, and back again to Moscow, New York and the purchaser, all with the purpose of distributing the work as much as possible. This journey included registering, routing, shipping, notification, signing and accounting.

The results of this careful planning appeared in Food Remittance Memorandum No. 2, a document whose clearness, all inclusiveness and conciseness nothing proves better than the rarity of additional memoranda. (Cf. Appendix) So was the theory of the operation established. It remained for the arrival of the receipts and food to test its soundness. Meanwhile the plan brought on the question of forms, of which it required dozens of varieties in innumerable quantities, and attendant office supplies.

Agonies Over Mole Hills

The obtaining of printed forms seems no doubt a dry and uninteresting item of organization, and in retrospect it occupied but small place in the achievements of those early days. But conceive of Moscow as the Mount Aetna of the revolution had seared and skeletonized it, business reduced to the essentials of getting food, shops shuttered and nailed, or gaping and empty. In addition this was not New York but Moscow in which minor conveniences and expedition had always been at a premium. In the Soviet Capital it required the permission of the Government, which though young in itself is possessed of a bureaucracy which is as mature in action (or in inaction) as any in Western Europe, before one could start out to find a printing press possessed of Latin characters, paper, and run by workmen of intelligence and good will. The inability of energetic young Americans to adjust themselves to a world where conveniences didn't exist made the task of getting forms printed even more harassing for them. Valuable hours and invaluable nervous energy went to the obtaining of these. Considerations of time and transport, and the general principle that the fewer non-edible supplies imported from abroad the better, prevented falling back on Western Europe. But eventually, like everything else, - for this is a history of success, - the Food Remittance Division obtained forms.

Handling the Food

In addition to accounting for the Remittances, the food itself, its physical handling and delivery, offered problems of no mean proportions. The question of getting the food into the country was one of larger scope than concerned the Food Remittance directly; that question included transportation, purchase and so on, and was inseparable from the same questions for the child-feeding side of the Relief Administration work. But the matter of warehousing, repacking, reshipping and delivery were immediate Food Remittance questions posed for the solution of the Moscow office.

The new organization could be grateful for one thing, namely that previous necessity had forced the childfeeding department to carry on the fight for warehouse space, so that this was the one essential to organization that it found ready to hand for use in its infancy. A section of the "Boinia" warehouse (Boinia means slaughterhouse), excellent, spacious brick buildings with railroad tracks on both sides, was allotted to the Food Remittance Division as a packing house.

The Food Remittance receipts contained the clause that the contents of the package should be left to the decision and convenience of the American Relief Administration within certain general limits. However, the Standard package unit included 49 pounds of flour, 25 pounds of rice, 10 pounds of sugar, 10 pounds of lard, 20 tins of milk and 3 pounds of tea. Variations on this to the number of nineteen were delivered during the course of the operation.

Financial considerations decreed that the flour, rice, sugar and tea components of this package should be shipped into the country in bulk, which meant inevitably repacking into small units in Russia. Whether ultimately to repack in Moscow for all of Russia or to allow each of the future subdistricts to repack for itself seemed a debatable question, but there could be no doubt that the first packages shipped would have to be repacked in Moscow.

Bags out of Newspapers

The problem of repacking meant first of all containers, the warehouse being taken for granted. Simultaneously with the ordering of food into Russia on the signing of the warehouse agreement, Mr. Burland had ordered a large shipment of containers through London. This was in October. The first fruits of this order reached Moscow on the 6th of March, 1922. Evidently if the Food Remittance Division had not known how to shift for itself during these four or five months, the operation must have failed. It did know how, fortunately, but the sledding proved hard. Russia seemed devoid of materials, devoid of machinery for producing them. In their endeavor to be prepared for the arrival of the first shipment of foodstuffs, the Americans had recourse to gunny sacks cut in two and sewed up again or tied; to paper sacks made of old ledger sheets pasted together; to a variety of substitutes, in fact, which bore about as much relation to containers in the accepted sense as the grass and clay bread compounds in use along the Volga bore to food. But with what materials they could gather together, the Food Remittance pioneers established the packing house, hired workmen, girls to sew bags, bought scales for weighing and awaited the food.

THE FIRST THOUSAND

Chapter IV

New York had sold its first remittances at the end of October. They arrived in Moscow on the afternoon of Sunday, November 20th, 1921. Those addressed to recipients in Moscow were picked out and found to number fifteen. On Monday afternoon, November 21, a truck loaded fifteen packages at Boinia and an American with Russian interpreter and workers went out to make the first delivery, some three weeks after the date of sale. That a food package could be delivered in Russia had been proved and the cable raced the news of safe delivery back to New York and the donors. A victory slight in material importance, but not without its moral value. It proved primarily that Food Remittances could come through, a fact proof of which the American and European friend or relative of the Russian very much wanted. On the arrival of this news in New York sales took an upward leap. Meantime, London and other European capitals had opened sales offices, which in November and December alone did \$40,000 worth of business. This gave promise of a big future for the Food Remittance Division.

With the coming of the first Remittances to Moscow, the Division met trouble from a direction which had been for a time forgotten. After signing the Warehouse Agreement the Soviet Government and its representative, Mr. Eiduk, adopted a policy of watchful waiting. They were, in truth, very much in the dark about the Food Remittance. The idea to them was new and on the face of it full of danger, but their complete ignorance of its operation left them no choice but to await developments. On its establishment, Mr. Eiduk assigned to the Food Remittance Division a sub-plenipotentiary, whose purpose no one cared at first to investigate, since for the time being it didn't matter. He was given a desk in Mr. Burland's office, ornamented with all the paraphernalia of candle sticks, pen holders, and mid-Victorian blotters without which the Russian business man seems unable to do business. Mr. Popoff's most useful bit of equipment for the time being was undoubtedly his ash tray.

The Government Representative in Action

Then the Remittances came. Mr. Popoff watched the operation of handling them with much interest and no less suspicion. He seemed to feel that he should have some part in the work. Eventually he came into action. He wished to make a list of all receipts. This was posed in the form of a request, on the face of it, innocent. But in fact it was not so. It raised again the whole question of control which had been supposedly fought out during the drawing up of the Warehouse Agreement. The American Relief Administration felt that it could not permit this review of all Remittances on their arrival in Moscow. To explain why it could not, it is necessary to remember the political situation in Russia, and the attitude of the Government both toward the Food Remittance Division, that is, its suspicion of it as a counter-revolutionary weapon, and its suspicion of the class of people which to a large extent would be the recipient of Food Remittance packages. Were the Administration to subject these people in any way to Government control or surveillance, it felt that it would be betraying the American purchaser and failing in its guarantee that food would be delivered unrestricted to beneficiaries.

Struggle For Control

So when Mr. Popoff demanded that he be shown, and be allowed to make copies of, all remittances, Mr. Burland replied that the A.R.A. could not comply with such a demand and that according to the terms of the Warehouse Agreement, it was under no obligation to do so. In his turn he asked on what grounds Mr. Popoff made such a demand. Mr. Popoff produced his mandate, - from Mr. Eiduk. This read:

"Certificate given to Leonid Leonidovitch Popoff to certify that he is my representative with the A.R.A. Food Remittance Division and is charged with:

1. Registration of the addressees of all packages received by the A.R.A. Food Remittance Division for delivery to persons residing on Russian territory.
2. Maintaining liaison between me and the A.R.A. Food Remittance Division.
3. Watching food parcels coming into the warehouses and those being delivered from the warehouses.
4. Requesting non-delivery of parcels to any persons or institutions he may designate.

I request the chief of the A.R.A. Food Remittance Division to assist Mr. Popoff in every way in fulfilling these duties.

This certificate expires January 1, 1922.

(signed) A. E. Eiduk.

The only two of the four duties assigned Mr. Popoff by Mr. Eiduk which found any justification in the terms of the Warehouse Agreement were the second and the third. The first and the fourth were inventions of the Government Representative, which though consistent with his attitude during the negotiation of the Agreement, the A.R.A. had carefully prevented from becoming a part of that document. The whole spirit of the Agreement both as stated expressly in words and as implied throughout left no doubt that the sole reason for any control on the part of the government and the only basis on which it could halt delivery was speculation.

Mr. Eiduk ignored that fact in the mandate he gave to Mr. Popoff. Number four of the duties mentioned indicated that Mr. Popoff was to have the right to attempt to stop delivery for any reason deemed sufficient by himself, - political or other. Mr. Burland determined if possible to nip this disregard of agreements in the bud. He informed Mr. Popoff that however much he may have been mandated to control any phase of the A.R.A. work, no authority which that organization recognized gave him the right to take action under such a mandate. Mr. Popoff fumed in his own right, but to no purpose. The A.R.A. knew very clearly its own ground and did not intend to cede from that ground. As a result, the Soviet sub-representative returned to his chief to report that he had been balked and his mandate disregarded.

DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, do hereby declare that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the original as the same appears in the records of the Court.

Witness my hand and seal of office at the City of New York, this 1st day of January, 1901.

CLERK OF THE COURT

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal of office at the City of New York, this 1st day of January, 1901.

CLERK OF THE COURT

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal of office at the City of New York, this 1st day of January, 1901.

CLERK OF THE COURT

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal of office at the City of New York, this 1st day of January, 1901.

CLERK OF THE COURT

AMERICAN RELIEF
ADMINISTRATION
42 BROADWAY
NEW YORK CITY

Sample Food Remittance Package



How a Food Remittance Package looked to the Starving Russian



A Tactical Error

Such opposition, apparently, only increased the suspicion of the Government regarding the new Division. Mr. Eiduk reprimanded his subordinate for failing to fulfill his duties and the latter returned to Food Remittance Division to deliver the ultimatum that if permission were not given him to see the remittances he could not continue as representative of the plenipotentiary with the Division. In so doing he committed a grave tactical error. His value to the Division was nil; nothing could please it more than his withdrawal. He did withdraw, - for all of a week.

The victory was not to be won so easily, however, for in spite of its agreements, the Government occupied a position which made the success of the Food Remittance Division dependent on its good will. That that good will was lacking became immediately evident. In addition to the central office, and apart from it, the Food Remittance had to establish a delivery organization for the city of Moscow and the surrounding country, to be known as the Moscow District. The scarcity of personnel forced Mr. Burland to add the establishment of this office to his other duties. He first made request for a suitable building. The Government replied flatly and finally that there was none to be had.

To be or not to be - Housed

The Division met this new attack in the same spirit with which it had met the earlier one. It did not intend to be obstructed, and above all it did not intend to be driven out. When the Food Remittance began operations, childfeeding had already been well established in the city of Moscow. Central offices for the District and the main kitchen were in the "Hermitage", a restaurant whose pre-revolutionary history and reputation gave but little reason to suspect that it would one day be the scene of a great charitable operation. The A.R.A. was thankful for its size and equipment. This was sufficient to satisfy the needs of the District and still leave room for a city Food Remittance delivery station. Accordingly, Mr. Burland prepared to move in. The Government could raise no legitimate objection.

An architect was employed to rearrange rooms suitable for office and storeroom. He drew up an estimate and submitted it to Mr. Burland for approval. Across the face of it in red ink appeared the signature of the Soviet Representative with the A.R.A. Evidently the Division had not yet escaped Government control. The architect explained that it was always necessary to get Government permission for such things. Mr. Burland knew that it wasn't. The new economic policy of permitting private trade proved that. He tore up the estimate and dismissed the architect. Eventually he found another who was made to understand distinctly that he was privately and legitimately employed by the American Relief Administration for work to be paid for from its private funds, which required the consent or approval of no one. He agreed to work under these conditions, and as far as the A.R.A. knew officially, he did, but privately they knew that he met with difficulties. The incident itself scarcely merited so much trouble but it involved a principle which the A.R.A. could not afford to admit.

Successful Strategy

However, with the closest of Government cooperation the Food Remittance Division would have had difficulties enough to carry on. It was essential that at least the active hostility of the former should cease. Mr. Popoff had returned to his desk at Division Headquarters and had renewed in the name of his government his requests to see the Remittances. Mr. Burland reflected on the reason for this desire, namely that the Government feared an attempt of "Whites" outside of Russia to bolster enemies of the Government within, and wanted therefore to assure itself regarding the class of people who were donors of packages. It occurred to Mr. Burland that if he could prove to it the innocence of this class many of his troubles with the Government would be solved. Furthermore little harm could come from letting the Government see one group of Remittances.

Sales were at this time being made in New York and Europe and in addition by the Joint Distribution Committee wherever they chose. Consequently Remittances ran in three series, a New York, a European and a J.D.C. series. Of possible donors, those who lived in America would be less likely to arouse suspicion since they were for the large part old established residents and not fugitives from the revolution. Faced with the need of satisfying an over-suspicious government Mr. Burland decided on a subterfuge, simple, but admirably effective. He determined to show the Government Representative the complete series of New York Remittances, which ran consecutively. The chances were that the Government would be wholly satisfied with these and its good will won, or ill will broken. The scheme worked. Mr. Eiduk took the New York Remittances, looked them over and returned them without comment, apparently quite satisfied. On this score, the Food Remittance had no further trouble.

Pioneers to the Ukraine

Each mail after that of November 27th brought increasing piles of Remittances. New York sold a total of 2,655 during the month of October, which jumped to 14,932 in November. As the Administration had foreseen, the majority of these were addressed to people living in the Ukraine. This made the opening of offices in that region imperative. Accordingly, ten days after the arrival of the first Remittances, Mr. John Hynes and Mr. Kenneth MacPherson, accompanied by two secretaries, left for Odessa and Kiev, respectively. In the private car furnished them to make this trip - private cars were not a luxury in Soviet Russia in the winter of 1921-22, typhus lice helped to make them a necessity - these pioneers of the out-stations of Food Remittance work loaded some skeleton office equipment, their personal luggage, food for the trip and a small reserve for eventualities in a hunger stricken land. The train combined freight and passenger service and included two carloads of food packages, each containing three hundred complete standard packages, meant for the new stations.

A Lost Car

In the old days an express train made the run from Moscow to Kiev in twenty-one hours. It took these early representatives of the American Relief Administration to the Ukraine four days. Mr. MacPherson and his car of food packages dropped off at Kiev, while Mr. Hynes continued the journey to Odessa - but without his car of packages. The loss of this car had been the

first tragedy of the Moscow-Kiev journey. On the third or fourth morning out Mr. Hynes discovered that it was no longer on the train. Inquiry revealed that it had been cut off in the night; why, no one at first seemed particularly to know; perhaps a hot box. But this vague Russian explanation did not satisfy the very much perturbed and very much irritated American, and the conductor was finally brought to make the definite statement that railway officialdom had decreed that no freight for Odessa should pass through Kiev since Bakmatch-Odessa was a shorter route. Being shorter, declared the conductor, the package car would certainly be in Odessa before the Tavarish American himself, and so he need not worry. With this dubious assurance Mr. Hynes was forced to go on alone to Odessa. He arrived there on December 10th six days after leaving Moscow and discovered immediately that the car of packages had not preceded him.

It was not till December 31 that the lost packages came to light. On that day Mr. MacPherson found them by accident reposing in the railroad warehouse at Kiev, - Kiev, the very city through which according to officials they should not have passed. It appeared that the car containing them had arrived in Kiev on December 12th, that it had lain in the yards till the 18th, when it had been unloaded in the railroad warehouse as an unclaimed shipment. During the process of unloading and the period of storage the major portion of 30 package units, one-tenth of the total, had been stolen.

A Bad Omen

How complete was the disorganization of the Russian railroads at this period, this incident proves conclusively. Mr. MacPherson had made repeated attempts to trace the car through the officials of the railroad at Kiev. They had been unable to find any trace of it, and apparently no record of the arrival of and discharge of the car at Kiev had been made. When the car was found, however, these same officials informed Mr. MacPherson that it was inevitable that the car should have arrived at Kiev, since that point was the control center for all food entering the Ukraine, and all food cars had to pass through there. Mr. MacPherson remembered the conductor's explanation that all cars from Moscow for Odessa were detached at Bakmatch since it was a shorter route, and said nothing. The packages finally arrived at Odessa on the eleventh of January, just one month behind schedule.

THE ENTRY INTO THE UKRAINE

Chapter V

The Revolution had made Russia as a whole a land of the unknown, but three months of childfeeding along the Volga and in the capitals of the north had acquainted the A.R.A. with things as they were in these sections. The entry into the Ukraine, however, was a leap in the dark. Wrangel and the Poles and the Ukrainian nationals had made it the scene of their shifting fortunes for so long a period as to hedge it off from the rest of the world in the same manner that a free for all dog fight repels entry on the part of passive observers. During the three years from the middle of 1917 to the fall of 1920 eleven belligerent and more or less mutually inimical powers had proclaimed their mastery of the territory and maintained that mastery for periods varying from three weeks to three months, so that the majority of the inhabitants were seldom sure to whom they actually owed allegiance, and were never sure to whom it was most profitable to owe allegiance. The peace of Riga with Poland in November, 1920, and the victory of the Red army over Wrangel in the Crimea at the same time had supposedly left the Bolsheviks definitely masters.

The American Relief Administration imagined the Ukraine to be, in like condition with the Tartar Republic, a federated state of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic and consequently thought that agreements made with the latter were binding on the former. The Moscow Government led them on in this belief by agreeing to the opening of Food Stations in the Ukraine and by aiding the shipment of the first supplies to the south.

Advance Runners

For the double purpose of notifying the Ukraine of the pending invasion of the A.R.A. and making a survey of the economic situation, Professor Lincoln Hutchinson, economic expert, and Professor Frank Golder, historian, both members of the A.R.A., left Moscow on November 24th for Kiev and points south. After the customary moments of doubt and suspicion of all things foreign and "capitalistic", Kiev and its Governor warmed to the Administration representatives, promised cordial assistance to the coming Food Remittance emissaries, and gave significance to their promises by taking such tangible advance steps as the registering of the telegraphic address of the A.R.A. in Russia, "Childfund".

The seat of the Ukrainian Government was at Kharkov and thither the two emissaries went from Kiev, made confident of the success of their mission by their satisfactory reception at Kiev. Events proved that confidence to be misplaced. Following the formula used in Kiev, Professors Hutchinson and Golder called on the Governor of Kharkov Gubernia, whom a meeting prevented them from seeing in person. Instead they were turned over to the Governor's secretary. The Americans stated the object of their visit called attention to the A.R.A. agreements, and asked that preparations be made for the procuring of residence, office, and other facilities for the coming Food Remittance men.

A Mystifying Reception

The secretary's attitude was decidedly puzzling. He gave neither cordial cooperation nor flat refusal of cooperation. The Americans left him, dissatisfied and uncertain, but with the promise of a conference with a Central Ukrainian Government Representative for the following day. The President of the council of Commissars (ministers) of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, Dr. Rakovsky, was out of town, and Professors Hutchinson and Golder were received by the vice-president, who was also Commissar of Internal Affairs.

This meeting, while it did not satisfy the Americans, at least solved their puzzle. The Ukrainian Government wished the A.R.A. to extend its relief to the Ukraine, said its vice-president, and wanted very much to cooperate with the Administration. The only thing required to permit the work to begin was the signing of agreements similar to the Riga and Warehouse agreements with the R.S.F.S.R. This meant, and the Ukrainian official said so frankly, that the Ukraine considered itself sufficiently independent not to be bound by any agreements made by the Moscow Government. The Americans pointed out that they had no authority to make agreements, that they had understood that the agreements already made were sufficient, and that such also was the understanding between the A.R.A. and the Moscow authorities. They therefore put flatly the question as to whether the Ukrainian Government was willing or not willing that the A.R.A. should carry on its work in the Ukraine. The Commissar begged to be allowed to confer with his colleagues on this important point and a final meeting was arranged for December third.

Diplomatic Jockeying

At this meeting the Commissar of Internal Affairs greeted the Americans with a long prelude of welcome to the A.R.A. and promise of fullest cooperation. A few practical details of the cooperation, he said, were yet to be arranged between the Ukrainian Government and the Relief Administration, such as the question of warehouses, quarters, guarantees, but just as soon as these minor matters had been disposed of, the A.R.A. could commence its great humanitarian work. In addition, he pointed out the independence of the U.S.S.R. and hinted constantly at a separate agreement, without, however, coming to the point.

The Americans eventually interrupted him to express their belief that no guarantees other than those mentioned in the agreement already made with the R.S.F.S.R. would be necessary. This brought on again the declaration that the Ukraine, since it was not a party to these agreements, could not be bound by them. When the Americans pointed out that they could not discuss the political relations between the two Republics, that their function was merely to feed the hungry, the Commissar for Internal Affairs insisted that the A.R.A. was mixing in politics when it made an agreement with one Republic and refused to make it with the other; when it treated one as a sovereign state and the other as a subject state, as he put it.

Professors Hutchinson and Golder demurred from this interpretation, declined to discuss these juridic questions, and asked for a definite statement as to whether the A.R.A. could work in the Ukraine under the agreements which it had already concluded with the R.S.F.S.R., adding that if it could not, their duty would be to report the matter to Moscow for consideration, and

that until the question was definitely settled, it did not seem probable that any relief work in the Ukraine could be done. At this the Commissar attempted to shift the responsibility to the shoulders of the Administration by charging it with refusing to help the suffering people of the Ukraine. The Americans replied that their presence there proved the A.R.A.'s willingness to help, but that they had no authority to make agreements, a question which would have to be referred to Moscow and possibly also to America.

A Suggested Compromise

"Very good," said the Russian, "you will write to Hoover that the A.R.A. should make a formal agreement with the U.S.S.R. and he will write back authorizing you to conclude such an agreement. All this writing will take time, and in the meantime many will die of hunger. I propose that we come to a temporary agreement at once, to remain in force until the official understanding later."

Again he was told that the American emissaries had no authority to consider that step. "I do not understand you," he said. "You come here of your own initiative to work in the Ukraine and by addressing yourselves to the officers of the state you ipso facto recognize the U.S.S.R. as a separate government, and yet you are not willing to treat us as such."

This argument forced Professors Hutchinson and Golder to go into the history of the A.R.A. in Russia. They pointed out that the Administration had been asked to come in; that certain promises and guarantees had been made to it by the R.S.F.S.R. which were believed to be as binding for the south as for the north of Russia; that in virtue of these assurances, they had been sent to the Ukraine; that they had called on the officers of the government to pay their respects, to inform them of the immediate plans of the A.R.A. and to ask them to make arrangements about warehouses, offices, and quarters for the personnel of the A.R.A. which under the agreement they were expected to do. The Americans reiterated their opinion that the new development would force them to return to Moscow. The Commissar returned once more to the suggestion that a temporary agreement be made to remain in force until the matter had been formally acted upon. He was again assured that the two representatives of the Administration had no authority to do as he requested.

Using the A.R.A. for Political Ends

It had by this time become perfectly obvious to Professors Hutchinson and Golder that the Ukrainian Republic was trying to gain for itself the prestige of independent recognition by a foreign organization, which though absolutely private, by the facts of its importance, the vastness of its operations, and the official position of its director had almost an official standing. The new Republic wished in short to use the A.R.A. for its political ends.

The situation was delicate and difficult - how delicate and difficult would depend on the attitude of the Moscow authorities, who were almost certain to look with disfavor on any action which would tend to weaken their prestige. Nothing remained for the two scouts of the Relief Administration to do but to return and lay the case before Moscow headquarters. Mails and the wires could not be relied upon to do this for them. They left Kharkov for

Moscow on December fifth, their train passing that of Hynes and MacPherson who had left Moscow on the fourth.

Assurances from Moscow

Arriving in Moscow on the seventh, Professors Hutchinson and Golder made a full report to Colonel Haskell. In view of the fact that during the discussions with Mr. Kamenev and Mr. Eiduk about the opening of food stations in the Ukraine neither of these gentlemen had suggested for a moment that any previous consultation with the Ukrainian authorities would be necessary, Colonel Haskell was extremely surprised at the report of what had passed at Kharkov. He took the matter up at once with Mr. Eiduk, who declared that the trouble was all due to a mistake, "a little family misunderstanding", and that it would not have happened had Mr. Rakovsky not been absent from Kharkov at the time. Mr. Eiduk added that when he learned the news, he had seen Tchitcherin, Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Moscow Government, who, he said, had at once sent a telegram to Kharkov, which would unquestionably straighten out the matter.

That so unequivocal an assurance should satisfy the American Relief Administration is not to be wondered at. Accepting it with what proved to be a foolish faith, Dr. Hutchinson prepared to return to the Ukraine to carry on his investigations of famine conditions there, and at the same time Mr. Philip Mathews went down to open at Kharkov the third Food Remittance station in the Ukraine.

The Reception at Odessa

Meanwhile Mr. Hynes and his secretary had arrived at Odessa to find that their coming was wholly unexpected and their presence regarded with such suspicion that the local government shifted the responsibility of them to the shoulders of the Foreign Office representative of the Central Ukrainian Government in Odessa. This official, a Mr. Uzhny, required a four-hour resumé of the history of the American Relief Administration and a detailed explanation of the technique of its operation. Mr. Hynes found that his labor proved profitable, however, for Mr. Uzhny promised immediate and full support of the A.R.A., and provided suitable living quarters at once in the Soviet Hotel maintained by the Foreign Office. With characteristic American impetus Mr. Hynes prevailed upon the official to arrange for an inspection of suitable warehouses and offices for the following day, though that was a Sunday. With characteristic Russian inability to keep an appointment, the warehouses were not inspected on Sunday, but Mr. Uzhny's attitude had so improved as to raise Mr. Hynes' hopes for the future.

The Odessa Food Remittance "Office" felt, in fact, that it had but one worry of any moment and that concerned the whereabouts of the car of packages which "efficiency" had caused to be detached from its train on the way down and which it was told it would find waiting on its arrival in Odessa. As has been seen, the Americans did not find it, nor any news of it, and they began wiring all way stations between Bakmatch and Odessa for trace of it.

Political Echoes

Monday the twelfth, however, brought the echo of the Ukrainian Government's stand for political integrity and national dignity to Odessa, and Mr. Hynes found himself in an impasse and the Foreign Office representative, - suddenly grown forbidding, - withholding permission to begin package distribution until the Kharkov Government sent word, which would be, he explained, when the A.R.A. signed a separate agreement with the Ukrainian Government. Mr. Hynes hoped that this was an overstatement of the case, and anticipated a special arrangement by which package distribution could go on pending a definite settlement. A week of inactivity pretty well shattered his hopes, however, but since his cars of food packages had not yet shown up, waiting cost him nothing, and he waited. Not, however, in passivity, for he sent urgent and important telegrams to every possible point of authority for permission to begin delivery of packages as soon as they should arrive.

His position was by no means easy. This was in late December; first package sales, many of them for the Ukraine, had taken place a good two months before; letters had come through the slow open post to people in Odessa from American relatives informing them that packages had been sent through the A.R.A. These people began daily pilgrimages to the offices which the Food Remittance Division had set up, inquiring anxiously, suspiciously and angrily for their packages. Hunger of a very pressing kind, - for the southern Ukraine was even at that early date suffering from want of food, - made these people irritable; totally unable to visualize the tremendous difficulties, they felt that the A.R.A. was only another of the organizations established to cheat them. As the American representative, this delay did not help to make Mr. Hynes' personal position comfortable; but what made it really serious was the possible effect on the whole Food Remittance operation should rumors get to the outside world, that the A.R.A. could not or would not deliver packages in Russia. Sales depended wholly and entirely on deliveries, and unless deliveries were made at once, sales would stop. Mr. Hynes merely echoed the fears which Moscow felt in all their acuteness.

Bolstering Failing Confidence

The New Year approached without bringing trace of the lost car. Mr. Hynes' "chaser" wires grew more and more insistent; the daily voyages of investigation to the railroad yards tried his temper and that of the station master increasingly; affairs were reaching a crisis. In order to restore the rapidly waning confidence of the increasing number of prospective recipients of food packages, he wired Kiev asking for a few packages to be sent down by special courier. A dozen arrived on December 23 and a dozen Odessa families were rendered unspeakably happy. This infinitesimal distribution at least proved that the A.R.A. was not a complete hoax. To further establish confidence Mr. Hynes conceived the idea of borrowing the equivalent of 200 packages from the local food commissariat. In response to his request, the Commissariat informed him it did not have the food.

A Happy Disappointment

The Kiev pioneers of the Food Remittance Division fared better than the young Odessa office in one respect, though in theory their reception could

hardly have been more inauspicious than it was. Not only did the local Government fight shy of them, but it was apparently scarcely deemed safe to entrust them to the Kiev representative of the Ukrainian Foreign Office. They fell into the hands of the Military Governor of the city. Whether this can be taken as an indication of how dangerous they were considered to be, no one knows, but contrary to all expectations the personality of the Military Governor made it most fortunate. In the expressive phraseology of Mr. MacPherson, the General "tried to fulfill our needs in the best American style, - and is a champion in knocking down the difficulties raised by the various local committees."

But military Governor or no military Governor, Kiev was still but a part of the independent Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic as a peremptory telegram from Kharkov informed it, and could not recognize the A.R.A. until Kharkov recognized that organization. Nevertheless, the Kiev Military Governor continued his full support of Mr. MacPherson in his efforts to get established, and even permitted him to make an initial delivery of packages. Freight, whether belonging to relief organizations or others, had to be paid for, so the Kiev authorities said, but they allowed Mr. MacPherson to open his car of packages, take out twelve and reseal the car, in order that he might make his first deliveries at once. He did this on December 10th, to the great satisfaction of twelve families in Kiev, although some of them "expressed regret that the package contained no chocolate."

This act of good will on the part of the local Kiev authorities did not, of course, permanently solve the difficulty. Though bad communications cut off all daily touch between the various offices, the Kiev Food Remittance Division supposed that Moscow would rapidly arrange that, while Moscow, as we have seen, supposed that it had already done so and had sent Dr. Hutchinson and Dr. Mathews back to Kharkov on the strength of that supposition.

AN AMICABLE SOLUTION

Chapter VI

The American emissaries arrived at the Ukrainian capital on Thursday, December 15th. That evening they received an invitation to call upon the President of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Republic, Rakovsky. In the course of a conference that lasted till midnight they learned to their bewilderment that no telegram or other information had been received from Moscow, and that the situation was exactly where Professor Hutchinson and Professor Golder had left it when they returned to Moscow on December fifth. That is, First Minister Rakovsky, while thanking the A.R.A. for its intention of bringing relief to the Ukraine and dilating on the great and growing need for that relief, devoted some time to an explicit account of the independent status of the Ukraine, which would necessitate the signing of a separate agreement before the A.R.A. could operate in its territory.

From Moscow, the Minister stated positively no word had come concerning the status of the A.R.A. However, he would get in immediate touch by direct wire with the central authorities of the Federated Soviet Republics, and wished Professor Hutchinson and Mr. Mathews to call at 10:30 the following morning. They did this only to learn that Mr. Rakovsky's attempt to wire Moscow, although he had sat up till 5 A.M. at the telegraph office, he declared, had failed. He gave permission, however, to the A.R.A. to go ahead with the distribution of packages already in the Ukraine, emphasizing the fact that the permission was but temporary and that a separate agreement would be necessary. Rakovsky sent wires and letters to local officials at Kiev, Odessa and Kharkov directing that they permit distribution and that they make every effort to co-operate and assist in the relief work.

Temporary Relief

This act lowered the barriers raised by official discountenance in the Ukraine, for the time being at all events, and distribution of packages - where there were packages to be distributed - could be proceeded with. However, there remained a spirit of passive resistance which for want of a better explanation, the American District Supervisors attributed to the fact that Ukrainian National dignity had not yet been vindicated by a separate agreement with the A.R.A. Minister Rakovsky went to Moscow at the end of December for the double purpose of attending the Soviet Congress and of coming to a definite settlement with the chiefs of the American Relief Administration in Russia.

The Soviet Congress apparently occupied all his energies and time for the first several days, and it was not until December 30th that Mr. Eiduk informed Colonel Lonergan, who was acting for Colonel Haskell during the latter's absence, that Mr. Rakovsky desired an interview for that afternoon. Mr. Eiduk further stated that it was Rakovsky's purpose to ask that the A.R.A. sign an agreement identical with the Riga agreement, and surprised Colonel Lonergan by adding his own hope that this might be done at once.

The Mistakes of Ignorance

Mr. Eiduk accompanied Colonel Lonergan and Professor Archibald C. Coolidge to see Mr. Rakovsky, and sat in silent embarrassment while the latter declared

in the most explicit manner that the Ukraine was not a mere autonomous Republic, but an independent state, which had some departments in common with R.S.F.S.R., but with its own foreign representation and its own right of concluding treaties. He charitably attributed the ignorance of this fact displayed by the American Relief Administration to the fact that it came from far away.

Mr. Rakovsky then went on to say that the Ukraine was therefore in no way a party to the Riga agreement and that it was only by special favor that the agents of the A.R.A. were then being allowed to distribute food packages there. He proposed to regularize the situation by having the Relief Administration sign an agreement with the Ukraine that should be identical with the Riga pact. In fact it is more than probable that he had such an agreement already for signature hoping that the thing might be done on the spot. At any rate he seemed in a great hurry and there was a distinctly implied threat that if the A.R.A. did not immediately meet his wishes there might be difficulty about the further distribution of food packages. The American Representatives contented themselves with pointing out that the Riga agreement had been signed by the chief of the American Relief Administration in Europe and that Colonel Loneragan did not feel competent to sign a similar agreement then and there with another independent state but would report the matter to his superiors. This did not meet Prime Minister Rakovsky's approval, but after some demur he accepted the solution.

This conference, while not entirely satisfactory to the A.R.A. solved its main difficulty in so far as Mr. Eiduk's statement and general attitude indicated that the Moscow government was willing that the A.R.A. should sign a separate agreement with the Ukraine. Before entering on negotiations to this end, however, the Americans suggested that the Ukraine simply ratify the Riga agreement. But Rakovsky stuck by his demand for a separate agreement or no agreement at all, so a separate agreement was drawn up.

Dignity Saved

The dignity of the Ukrainian state which had been so costly in trouble to the American Relief Administration, found entire satisfaction in this clause which appears in the preamble of the new agreement:

"Whereas the Ukraine Soviet Republic declares itself not a party to nor obligated by the agreement referred to above and the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic concurs in this declaration of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic --."

The main points of the Riga agreement appear verbatim in the Ukrainian document. The A.R.A. was concerned to have two principles definitely accepted by the Ukrainians in addition to those included in the Riga agreement. One of these dealt with the right of the A.R.A. to transport famine relief products intended for other parts of the country across the Ukraine, free of charge, which was agreed to. The other concerned the disposal of profits of the Food Remittance operation.

The Ukrainians did not sign a separate Food Remittance agreement, a paragraph inserted in the general agreement sufficing. This paragraph reads:

"The agreement of October nineteenth, 1921, between the American Relief Administration and the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic covering the operations of the American Relief Administration Warehouses in Russia, is accepted by the Ukrainian authorities, with all its privileges and assistance to the A.R.A. and its mutual guarantees, as covering the operation of the American Relief Administration Warehouses in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The Ukrainian authorities agree that the net profits accruing from the operation may be used, at the discretion of the A.R.A. for the feeding of children in the famine areas of Russia."

The last sentence covers the point which the A.R.A. wished particularly to make.

A Separate Agreement

With Colonel Haskell signing for the American Relief Administration and Mr. Rakovsky for the Ukrainian Soviet Republic the agreement went into effect on January 10th, 1922. Telegrams carried the news of the signing of the peace to the Ukrainian districts at once, and indicated Moscow's faith that with the disappearance of the *causus belli*, full cooperation from the Ukrainian government would be the order of the day.

Events, however, did not justify this faith. Neither in Kharkov nor Odessa, did the conclusion of the agreement produce any material change in the attitude of the authorities towards the A.R.A. In fact, Mr. Uzhny in Odessa denied any knowledge of the signing of the agreement with the Ukraine as late as January 25th. That is, he did not flatly deny it; he admitted that such an agreement might have been signed, but he declared that he had never received official notice to this effect nor a copy of the agreement, and that therefore he could not look upon the A.R.A. as other than an organization present in Odessa on sufferance and entitled to no special consideration.

Opposition in Odessa

This might not have been so serious had Mr. Hynes not been forced to obtain supplies and assistance through Mr. Uzhny, and had Mr. Uzhny not openly interfered in every independent step of the most trivial nature that Mr. Hynes took. Foreseeing the very considerable Food Remittance Business which would eventually be done through Odessa with its large Jewish population, Mr. Hynes began in December careful selection of a large body of employees. Within short order he received word from Uzhny that as a foreign organization with no definite standing the A.R.A. would be required to obtain all its employees through the Foreign Office. Mr. Hynes went to the mat on this matter, not primarily because he doubted the ability of the Foreign Office to provide efficient employees, but because of the principle of control of the A.R.A. operation which the dispute involved. One of the main tenets of the Riga Agreement was, of course, the right of the A.R.A. to choose its employees with absolute freedom.

Again, when Mr. Hynes had finally obtained offices, Mr. Uzhny forbade him to put up an American Relief Administration sign over the door; when he wished to have rubber stamps made of the most innocuous sort for use in the

office, the Government Representative refused to give the necessary order.
(See foot note)

An Ultimatum in Kharkov

Kharkov, the center of the Ukrainian national government, could not of course deny knowledge of the signing of the agreement with the American Relief Administration. The officials there, however, continued apathetic to the demands and needs of the A.R.A. Arriving there on December 15, 1921, Mr. Mathews had begun at once his quest for offices, warehouses and quarters. Exactly 45 days passed in endless scouting, interviews, vague promises and light skirmishes, and at the end of that time the district A.R.A. found itself no better off than the day it had arrived, except for a warehouse at the station. On January 29, Mr. Mathews addressed a polite ultimatum to the President of the Council of Peoples Commissars, a position recently vacated by Mr. Rakovsky in favor of a Mr. Manuelauskyy, stating that if the demands of the A.R.A. for a certain building were not met by February 1, he would be forced to advise his headquarters at Moscow to withdraw the Relief Administration from Kharkov.

In theory the A.R.A. was supposed to deal with the Kharkov Gubernia Government, the Gubispolkom, but since this body was not composed of men of any particular force of character it gladly turned the A.R.A. over to the Ukrainian foreign office. As a consequence Mr. Mathews had dealt mainly with a Mr. Yakaloff, Rakovsky's assistant in the foreign office. This young man of twenty-three had proved a most unsatisfactory source of help, confining his activity as far as the A.R.A. was concerned, to repeatedly pointing out to Mr. Mathews that since the Administration was in no sense a diplomatic mission, it had no claim to any special consideration.

Satisfaction in Short Order

When Mr. Manuelauskyy received Mr. Mathews' ultimatum, he at once invited him to a conference in the presence of Mr. Yakoloff. Terseness and effectiveness characterized Mr. Manuelauskyy's remarks during this conference. Beyond a short apology to the American for the sorry cooperation he had hitherto received from the Kharkov government, the President addressed himself entirely to Yakoloff. He ordered him under penalty of severe punishment to have the building in question completely ready for American occupancy by 7 o'clock on the morning of February first, - that is to say, thoroughly cleaned, the walls tempered, the plumbing and heating arrangements repaired. At 7 A.M., February

(Note: To understand such an action as this about a simple rubber stamp, one must appreciate the position and power of the rubber stamp in Russia. A signature or a document of any sort in the land of the Soviets which is not authenticated by a stamp of some sort has as much value as a check without a signature would have in America. The rubber-stamp is omnipotent; careful use of it will obtain most anything; without it the most powerful official is helpless. Consequently the manufacture of stamps is prohibited without permit from the government.)

1st the building was ready. Thereafter the Kharkov District A.R.A. had much smoother sailing.

These details are recorded as indicating the seemingly incomprehensible attitude of Government officials to a foreign relief organization. But before they had spent much time in the Ukraine, the Americans learned that a very real reason existed for this attitude. In short, the Kharkov government did not consider the Food Remittance operation famine relief. It wanted child-feeding and medical relief. Mr. Rakovsky once said so frankly in a conversation with Mr. Mathews. Had the Soviet Governments, both of the Ukraine and of the R.S.F.S.R., been less suspicious of the A.R.A. as a dangerous capitalistic organization with counter-revolutionary tendencies and intentions, they might have cooperated more heartily with the Food Remittance Division. However, their instinctive attitude in those early days was uniformly inimical, and so, seeing nothing to be gained by cooperation, they showed themselves more or less openly hostile. Later, of course, the American Relief Administration in conjunction with the Joint Distribution Committee undertook an enormous child, adult and medical relief program throughout the Ukraine and the Crimea, thus reducing the difficulties of the Food Remittance operation immeasurably.

The early history of the Food Remittance station established at Ekaterinoslav in the first days of January did not differ greatly from the histories of the Odessa, Kiev and Kharkov stations. Due to the inability of the Americans in charge to obtain suitable quarters, warehouses, et cetera, it was nearly a month before they were able to begin deliveries of food packages.

The Eve of a Crisis

But these obstacles which lack of hearty cooperation on the part of the government put in the way of the Ukrainian Food Remittance stations were not insurmountable; similar difficulties were the lot of practically every district in Russia at one time or another. They were being experienced in an acute form by the new stations opened in the cities of Minsk and Vitebsk of the White Russian Soviet Republic during the first week in January, and for the same reasons which operated in the Ukraine, namely that the local authorities were not in sympathy with the Food Remittance plan and wanted childfeeding. Nevertheless, the stations could and did carry on.

In the meantime, however, a situation had arisen at Moscow which threatened with a complete paralysis the entire Food Remittance operation, which made the position of the districts practically untenable, which brought clamorous cables daily from New York and from every sales point for Food Remittances in Europe outside of Russia, and which led to all the preparatory steps being taken for the liquidation of the food package operation. The circulation of the Food Remittance organism had stopped; it had become a body without blood.

A BODY WITHOUT BLOOD

Chapter VII

When the first remittances arrived in Moscow at the end of November, they were at once distributed to the districts and the necessary number of packages, complete and ready for delivery, were shipped by freight on December 5th. It took these shipments periods varying from three to six weeks to get to the Volga stations of Kazan, Simbirsk, Samara, Saratov and Tzaritzin, to Orenburg, Ufa and Petrograd. Samara made its first delivery on December 28th, Saratov on December 31st, Kazan on January 3rd, and Tzaritzin on January 10th. Though the passenger run to Petrograd is made now in fourteen hours, the first car of food packages spent twenty-eight days on the road from Moscow.

The Ukraine Food Remittance men had taken cars of packages with them, as had the Minsk and Vitebsk representatives, who departed from Moscow by special train on January 8th. The fact that they left Moscow prepared to make deliveries did not at all mean that they would arrive at their destinations equally prepared, as the experience of Mr. Hynes at Odessa proved. Mr. Donald E. Hardy, who went to open a delivery station at Minsk, began his journey with ten cars and arrived at his destination with eight. The two lost en route contained lard, and during the month required to locate them, beneficiaries received packages shy of the lard component. The accounting difficulties which this caused as well as the necessity of completing delivery later and of pacifying beneficiaries added considerably to the District's early trials. However, most stations succeeded in getting enough initial deliveries accomplished so that Moscow could notify sales offices abroad that deliveries were being made all over Russia. Sales leaped up in consequence.

In December the flood of Remittances into Moscow increased with each courier. The delivery of these in the districts soon brought an end to their meagre reserves and left them only empty warehouses to show clamorous prospective recipients of food packages.

No Help from Moscow

Meanwhile Food Remittance Headquarters at Moscow gave no sign that further stocks were coming. As a matter of fact, Moscow could ship nothing. Lack of containers for repacking bulk supplies into the package units furnished the first reason for this. Nothing came through from abroad and the Russian market could supply but little. The situation verged on the catastrophic and created in Moscow Headquarters a degree of nervous excitement so intense as to result in the sending of the following tart telegram to London in response to complaints of non-delivery. It was dated from Moscow, January 20th.

"Childfund, London. Your 607. Fact that you 'are becoming overwhelmed with inquiries and complaints re non-delivery' is only part of and we hope will help complete 'whole picture' for you. We add following as additional help: our 321 dated November 21 called attention to the serious container situation. Our 347, December 15, requested immediate action and told the truth. Your 441 December 28 was first indication of



Crowds waiting for their Packages in front of the Odessa Delivery
Station, Summer of 1922

relief. To date January 20 no containers advised from Riga. Local container market now exhausted and packing operations and evacuations have about ceased. Even though ninety days have not elapsed from date of first sales made around November first, time will soon be up and we suggest you brace yourself because you are going to be further overwhelmed. Childfund."

This telegram meant that lack of containers had practically put an end to deliveries and threatened the entire operation with failure. The reference to ninety days concerned the A.R.A.'s agreement with purchaser to refund his money if package had not been delivered in three months. The necessity of refunding on a large scale would be equivalent to a confession of failure. The Administration either had to avoid that or liquidate its Food Remittance operation. Had the Russian office resigned itself to wait for containers from abroad, large scale refunds followed by complete liquidation would have been the inevitable sequel. Fortunately the Moscow office did not wait, but by manful efforts on the local market and by the invention of desperate stratagems it mastered the container problem so that the harm done on this score was restricted to loss of time.

In fairness to the London office of the A.R.A. it must be stated that the failure of containers to reach Moscow was due to causes beyond its control, as the following answers to Moscow's telegram quoted above, indicates. This wire left the London office January 26th.

"Black 675. We do not quite grasp spirit of your Black 749 and put the following before you as evidence of our endeavours to meet your requirements. In earliest days of operations we shipped you containers from old warehouse operation in following approximate commodities: 12,000 container sacks, 4,000 flour a, 25,000 bean a, and 33,000 bean b. On receipt of your Black 321 we went over container problem here and Hamburg and in early December purchased 10,000 25 lbs. burlaps 20,000 25 lbs. cottons and 40,000 12½ lbs. burlaps one which we got immediate delivery. Due to infrequent winter sailings to Baltic, accidents to ship and other causes entirely out of our control these only sailed from London January 11th by SS. Saturn. Since then we have purchased and will ship you within 2 weeks: 110,000 25 lbs. burlaps 60,000 12½ lbs. burlaps 20,000 12½ lbs. cottons and 60,000 paper sacks for tea. AMRELIEFA"

No Cars

However, another reason existed to account for Moscow's failure to keep the districts supplied with food packages, a reason which all the Herculean efforts in the world on the part of the Americans could not remove, and which therefore was infinitely more serious. The Food Remittance Division could obtain no transportation. The Packing House at Boinia held comparatively large numbers of package units waiting for freight cars to take them to the provinces. No cars appeared. Day after day the Food Remittance Division sent requisitions to the Supply Division for cars to be shipped to every station in Russia. Day after day the Supply Division repeated these requisitions to the office of Mr. Eiduk, Representative Plenipotentiary, one of whose duties it was to supply the A.R.A. with necessary transportation. His office failed even to acknowledge the requisitions. Letters, increasingly sharp in tone, began ac-

companying the requisitions. These met with no greater success. Nothing moved.

December passed and January crept on into February. The districts grew querulous. The relief which the belated arrival of its car of packages afforded the Odessa district proved momentary. It took but part of a week to exhaust this slight reserve, and the station was again faced with the unpleasant necessity of pacifying the hungry whose relatives had informed them that packages had been sent them, and who found that though the order had arrived they could get no packages.

Tragic Delivery Stations

The foodless District Delivery stations of the Food Remittance Division offered a tragic and harassing picture during the months of January and February, 1922. Rumor had trumpeted their arrival to a despondent and sinking people; hope grown desperate for lack of foothold had seized upon them as a saviour. They had established themselves in ample offices, hired many employees, breathed, in short the promise of great help. And now their empty warehouses made all this a tragic farce. After the largeness of their preparations, they had no food to deliver.

It was no easy task facing the starving Russian world which descended upon the district offices the moment they put out their signs. They came from every class, profession, age, reduced to one by the common leveller--hunger and the fear of it. Most of them knew that packages had been sent them from abroad, many only hoped, and others knew merely that "A.R.A." meant food. The peasant from the village came sewed up in his bulky, mud-colored, sheepskin great coat, long bearded, gaunt, with the heavy movements of toilers of the soil, bewildered in the commotion. The former bourgeoisie came, men who had been generals, governors, professors, lawyers, doctors; and the wives of these people, drawn-faced women marked by a threadbare cleanliness. Jewish rabbis elbowed the priests of Russia's church; the secret speculator fought for a place in line with the completely destitute, tied up in dirty rags.

Disappointing the Starving

These masses came to the Food Remittance offices with hope made certain by the sight of the initial deliveries all of the districts were able to make. Then deliveries stopped. The office manager announced that food had run out and that no more packages could be given out until stocks came from Moscow. In the slow Russian way the crowd failed to react immediately to this. It realized only that it would have to wait,-- how long it did not know. There was no thought of going away and returning. The office remained jammed and the overflow piled up on the street outside. Some who had come from the country even slept there at night in order to be first in the morning. People continued to fight to reach the desk. If they could only reach the desk! It became for these people, half crazed by starvation and suffering, an altar of miracles.

The Birth of Suspicion

Quickly suspicion began to arise. Even the intelligent individual who learned at the information desk that an order had come for him, refused

to understand why his package shouldn't be delivered at once. The clerks repeated a thousand times a day the excuses, "that the A.R.A. had just opened and that it could not be expected to make deliveries so early in the game; that shipments in Russia were slow and uncertain." These excuses soon wore out. Harassed by waiting, people grew suspicious, querulous, excited, angry; from time to time a spirit of frenzy would drive them into a small riot. In order to prevent jamming of the offices, guards were stationed to let one person in at a time. When the door opened everyone tried to push in at once; every conceivable trick to enter out of turn was played. Three times the crowd broke down the doors of the Kiev office. They rushed into the rooms screaming and shouting for their packages. The terrible fear that they were to be cheated had seized them. They accused the Russian employees of stealing their packages. They could not be reasoned with and refused to listen to explanations; they had only one desire, - to receive the package from America.

On January 22, Kiev District wired Moscow that it had orders for thirty cars of food packages and not a package in the warehouse. It kept eight clerks busy explaining to the mobs that stormed the office why they could not receive their food. Suspicion of the A.R.A.'s honesty spread. A local Jewish newspaper took up the cry of disappointed individuals that the Administration was a fraud. The railway authorities requested on January 28th that the warehouse which they had turned over to the Food Remittance Division be returned to them "since the A.R.A. was no longer storing commodities there."

Moscow the Target

The nervousness which such a situation engendered in the districts found its way at once to Moscow. In addition, headquarters began receiving telegrams of complaint from New York, from London, from Riga, Vienna, Warsaw, wherever Food Remittance sales were made. The fears of Americans in Russia that disappointed beneficiaries would advise their friends of the A.R.A.'s inability to make deliveries were realized in full. Purchasers of remittances flocked to the sales offices of the Administration everywhere bearing letters from their friends in Russia stating that the latter could not get their food packages. Elements hostile to Russia who were anxious to prove the impossibility of doing business in the Soviet State seized upon the apparent failure of the Food Remittance operation, and the press threatened publicly and privately to demand an investigation. As a result of this, the New York office wired Moscow, "The reputation of the A.R.A. is at stake," and again, "Only the reputation of the A.R.A. for integrity prevents violent protests."

How nearly catastrophic the situation became may be seen from a comparison of sales by months in New York and Europe, and by the J.D.C., with deliveries by months by districts. It is to be noticed also how sales failed to advance between November and March, that is during the period of non-delivery.

Sales


(Does not include Bulk or Local Sales)

	<u>New York.</u>	<u>Europe.</u>	<u>J.D.C.</u>	<u>Total.</u>
October	2,655	--	--	2,655
November	14,932	523	--	15,455
December	14,748	3,388	14,147	32,273
January	13,609	7,130	5,847	26,586
February	17,600	7,337	5,344	30,281
March	28,019	19,478	8,700	56,197
April	41,899	18,790	12,044	72,733
				<hr/>
				236,180

It will be remembered that the A.R.A. had guaranteed refund if the package was not delivered in 90 days. That meant that the first refunds were liable to be made at the end of January. Had the purchasers not been willing to grant an extension of time, the A.R.A. would have been forced to return more than 50% of the first month's sales by the end of February.

Deliveries by Districts by months.

	<u>November</u>	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>
Kazan	--	--	102	22	405	283
Simbirsk	--	8	17	70	199	144
Samara	--	2	11	172	482	971
Saratov	--	--	357	499	2,089	2,679
Tzaritzin	--	--	84	64	186	415
Ufa	--	--	35	90	292	241
Orenburg	--	--	--	--	46	141
Moscow	49	807	1,748	3,462	6,398	8,616
Petrograd	--	--	823	2,314	4,385	5,020
Kiev	--	12	267	2,417	2,985	2,803
Odessa	--	12	257	833	4,631	4,054
Kharkov	--	--	330	713	1,889	1,192
Ekaterinoslav	--	--	--	284	1,507	1,604
Minsk	--	--	41	504	2,784	3,881
Vitebsk	--	--	18	490	2,860	894
Rostov	--	--	--	--	949	512
Gomel	--	--	--	--	146	1,553
<hr/>						
Total	49	841	4,090	11,934	32,233	35,023



Nothing would seem capable of denying in the face of these figures the failure of the American Relief Administration's Food Remittance operation. It looked as if this phase of the relief work would have to be given up. All because the Division could not get its stocks moved.

Double Cause of Paralysis

There were two reasons for this paralysis of transportation of Food Remittance commodities in Russia; first, the disorganization and demoralization of the Russian railroads; second, and even more important, the inefficient cooperation, which amounted almost to obstruction, of the office of the Representative Plenipotentiary, through which the A.R.A. had to deal with the railways.

The Russian transportation system had reached the brink of complete ruin. An enormous percentage of the pre-revolution rolling stock and equipment had passed out of existence altogether, and complete demoralization prevented adequate use being made of what remained. For a year or more the railways had moved practically nothing; now with this sudden influx of relief supplies and of government seed grain, they could not readily overcome the inertia of stagnation. Their lines were bad, locomotives "sick" as the Russian described them, and freight cars destroyed and damaged; they lacked fuel; the train crews and employees generally were unpaid, hungry and dispirited and all discipline had gone to pot. In short the situation of the Russian railways in 1921-22 threatened at any moment to prove fatal to the entire A.R.A. operation in Russia.

Spreading Shipments

The Americans did what they could to help the railroads by dividing their food shipments among every possible Russian port, including Riga, Libau, Reval, Windau, Petrograd and Danzig in the north, and Odessa, Novorossisk and Theodosia in the south, thus spreading the strain over the maximum number of lines of railway transportation. In January, as soon as it was decided to make use of Odessa as a port, the Food Remittance officers saw a ray of hope for their Ukrainian delivery stations and ordered 60,000 complete food packages with containers to be shipped from America to Odessa by boat. Mr. Burland hoped that these would reach Odessa not later than March 1. They actually arrived a month and a half later, that is, on April 15th.

A Useless Intermediary

However, in spite of their general demoralization, the railways could have handled a fair share at least of the cars necessary to keep the districts supplied with Food Remittance packages during December and January. Mr. Eiduk made no effort to see that they did. The Representative Plenipotentiary to Foreign Relief Organizations had succeeded in making himself sole channel through which the A.R.A. could deal with any department of the Government. He had even succeeded in having a decree passed making it a punishable crime for any Government official to do business directly with the A.R.A. Two reasons accounted for this step: first, the personal ambition to control so important an organization as the Relief Administration; second, the suspicion that it was counter-revolutionary in purpose and that any freedom of action allowed it imperilled the Soviet Government.

As a result of this situation the A.R.A. had to obtain cars through Mr. Eiduk. Fortunately childfeeding supplies could be transshipped at Moscow without being unloaded, but food package stocks had to be repacked at Moscow. Empties for the shipment of completed package units Mr. Eiduk failed to obtain.

He failed for a variety of reasons, of which characteristic Russian inability to get things done held a prominent place. Also his particular suspicion of the Food Remittance Division as a counter-revolutionary weapon of the Whites made him inevitably an obstructionist. Had he succeeded in completely controlling the Division's operation as he wished, he might perhaps not have resorted to such indirect opposition. Failure to supply freight cars was only one of the evidences of his antagonism to the Food Remittance; he discriminated against the Russian employees of the Division by refusing to supply them with street car tickets, by refusing to allot lodgings to those who had none, and by withholding from them the Government ration issued to other A.R.A. employees. This inimical attitude was not purely personal with Mr. Eiduk; to a large extent it was undoubtedly inspired by his superiors. However, the third and perhaps most important reason for Eiduk's failure to obtain cars for food packages was his general inability to grasp the vastness and importance of the Administration's work in general and of the Food Remittance operation in particular.

THE WORST MOMENTS

Chapter VIII

The situation reached a crisis in January. Spurred on by the increasing volume of complaints from abroad, Colonel Haskell dropped the unsatisfactory method of written requests for transportation and held daily personal conferences with the Russian Representative. These conferences continued far into the night. The American reviewed the history of the Food Remittance Division's attempts to obtain cars for its packages. He enumerated the unbroken series of failures which had met these attempts; he pointed out the causes thereof: inefficient organization in Mr. Eiduk's transportation department, the obstructive spirit of Mr. Eiduk's subordinates. He emphasized the increasing difficulties which each day's delay meant, the piling up of stocks in the Moscow Warehouse and the influx of orders from abroad. He reminded the Government Representative of the hundreds of thousands of tons of United States Government corn even then speeding across the Atlantic for the relief of adults in Russia, and of the great burden which the handling of this corn, simultaneously with A.R.A. childfeeding products, medical supplies, Food Remittance commodities, and Soviet Government seed would put upon the enfeebled Russian railways. Finally, he pointed out the disastrous effect on American public opinion which would be produced by the failure of the Food Remittance Division to deliver packages.

Generous Promises

Mr. Eiduk promised everything. He assured Colonel Haskell that what inefficiency had existed in his office would be done away with; that his own and the desire of his subordinates has never been other than to give the A.R.A. every aid; that the Russian railways were perfectly able to handle every ton of supplies coming into the country, and that they would maintain unlimited supplies of empties at the ports.

But he did nothing. During the very period of these conferences, cars of food packages packed for delivery remained day after day, - on one occasion for seven days, - at the Moscow Warehouse merely because no one would give the final orders to send them out; all work in the packing house stopped for days at a time because no switch engine could be obtained to shift cars in the yard.

Liquidation of Food Remittance Foreseen

Meanwhile Mr. George Barr Baker, of the New York office, had arrived to investigate the failure of the Food Remittance Division to deliver packages. He attended the Haskell-Eiduk conferences, as a silent witness for four days. At the end of that time, and two days before his departure from Moscow convinced of the emptiness of Mr. Eiduk's promises, he issued an ultimatum.

"Mr. Eiduk," he said, "I am leaving Moscow on January 23. I shall be in London on the 28th; I shall sail for New York on February 8th, and on February 16th, the New York office of the A.R.A. will issue a statement to the press that deliveries of Food Remittance packages in Russia cannot be made; that sales will cease and money for undelivered packages returned."

There was a moment's pause. Then the interpreter began to translate to Mr. Eiduk.

"I understand," interrupted Mr. Eiduk, sharply, in perfect English. He recovered himself immediately, however, and in rapid, excited Russian directed the interpreter to ask if the A.R.A. would continue its Food Remittance operation provided he dispatched a special train of packages to run on passenger schedule.

"We'll have to see it start first," Mr. Baker replied.

The morning succeeding this conference Mr. Trotsky asked for a conference with Mr. Baker. It was evident that Mr. Eiduk had communicated the A.R.A. ultimatum to his superiors, and that the latter wished at all costs to prevent the liquidation of the Food Remittance Division. In the event of such a step the A.R.A. would have had no alternative but to lay the blame where it belonged, - on the Soviet Government and railroads. The Government, it must be understood, was extremely desirous of preventing the impression from getting abroad that the Russian railways had collapsed.

Liquidation Forestalled

Mr. Baker left Moscow per schedule on January 23, prepared to follow the course he had outlined to Mr. Eiduk. On January 27, three trains consisting of fifty-seven freight cars containing 17,100 Food Remittance packages left Moscow for seven districts. The three trains were ordered out on passenger schedule and had the right of way over everything on the road. Of the fifty-seven cars, fourteen were consigned to Odessa, eleven to Kiev, nine to Kharkov, eight to Minsk, six to Vitebsk, six to Ekaterinoslav and three to Rostov. Mr. Baker found the telegram giving word of the dispatch of these trains awaiting him in London. The notice of liquidation of the Food Remittance Division was shelved, temporarily, at least.

The despatch of these cars did not very materially relieve the districts' difficulties. By the time Odessa received its fourteen cars, the District had on hand orders calling for 15,000 packages. The fourteen cars represented only 4,200. Even these could not be delivered at once, since the A.R.A. could notify only 4,200 beneficiaries. Notification inevitably failed to reach some of this number, so that packages remained in the warehouse while thousands of beneficiaries waited. On the other hand, the District did not dare send cards to more consignees than it had packages because of the possibility of people spending their money to come long distances to Odessa only to find no foodstuffs there. Besides the injustice of this, it would have been fatal to the A.R.A.'s reputation. Innumerable such quandaries confronted the districts in the early days of imperfect organization and inadequate transport.

Moscow, of course, knew full well to just what extent each District lacked protection, since it controlled the distribution of Remittances and shipment of food packages. It knew that 4,200 packages were only a drop in the bucket of Odessa's need. It knew also that since shipments ordinarily took one month to reach Odessa, protections must be started on their way at once to prevent another fatal gap in district deliveries. And yet Mr. Eiduk's office gave no sign of maintaining the spurt which had produced the 57 cars. On the contrary, the Food Remittance had almost as much difficulty as ever in obtaining adequate transportation.

Supplies Bury the Railroads

This was the flood tide of the arrival of the \$20,000,000 worth of corn which the American Congress had donated for relief of Russia's starving adult population. With the Russian freight car capable of handling only fifteen tons, the corn required not less than 20,000 cars to take it from the ports to districts. At the same time the childfeeding program was soaring past the initial figure of 1,000,000 children daily to a new figure of 4,000,000, the Medical Division had \$8,000,000 worth of supplies coming in, while the Soviet Government had \$10,000,000 worth of seed to handle. With the best will in the world, Mr. Eiduk would have been incapable of securing the number of cars needed at the ports. Colonel Haskell had given him ample warning of what was coming, had plead with him to prepare for it, had even suggested a tangible plan. But the task asked too much of Mr. Eiduk's energies and abilities.

During the months of February and March the A.R.A. underwent the curious experience of fighting with the Government Representative to get its thousands of tons of relief supplies from the ports to the Districts in the shortest possible time. The failure of cooperation began at the ports where the number of empties supplied daily averaged for a week at a time fifteen instead of the promised eighty at the Latvian ports, and fifty-eight instead of 236 at the Black Sea ports. Even the trains which started inland fell off en route. When the A.R.A. wished to send its own controllers to junctions, Mr. Eiduk objected; when it wished to deal directly with the responsible railroad authorities, Mr. Eiduk interfered; when it complained of the inefficiency and officiousness of incapable subordinates in the Government Representative's office, Mr. Eiduk showed how this was impossible. By the middle of March carloads of relief supplies in hundreds were piled up at junction points throughout the country, with no hope of being moved. Many of them had to be unloaded to clear the tracks.

Fighting to Keep its Head Up

The Food Remittance Division suffered inevitably with the rest of the A.R.A. The meagre number of cars allotted fell far below the need of the District Delivery stations, and crippled the evacuation of packages so seriously that failure hung constantly, like the sword of Damocles, over the Division's head. Although Eiduk's obstructive tactics had ceased to be directed particularly against the Food Remittance in the matter of transportation, the Division suffered in competition with the other activities of the A.R.A. In the rush and roar of handling the tremendous mass relief programs the Division was menaced with complete burial unless its independence as to protection and warehousing was assured it.

Therefore, when the most panic-inspiring cable arrived from New York, Mr. Burland went to Colonel Haskell and laid his cards on the table. He declared that he could not carry the responsibility of the Food Remittance Division unless he were given complete freedom of action. He demanded a separate warehouse, a separate supply of commodities, and the right to obtain cars from the traffic division on his own account. He also insisted that he must have forthwith the large building at 17 Spiridonifka in place of the cramped quarters in 32 Spiridonifka where he then was; and that he should have complete freedom in obtaining personnel and office supplies locally.

"Very well, I'll give you a free hand for two weeks," said the Colonel, "and if you don't make good, God help you."

Mr. Burland made the most of his two weeks. He obtained and fitted out his warehouse with repacking machinery, he employed a sufficient number of personnel, he detailed an American to take charge of the work. This was the beginning of March. Fortunately several things came together to give the newly organized division an auspicious christening. On March 6 the first shipment of containers, ordered from London on November 18th, which had left Riga on February 2, made their belated arrival in Moscow. At the same time the districts were telegraphing large numbers of deliveries made from the fifty-seven carloads dispatched on January 27th. Moscow repeated this good news over the cable to New York immediately. Inspired to optimism by the concurrence of so many more cheerful events, Mr. Burland also cabled a general message of good cheer, the first since the inception of the operation

A Last Minute Rescue

In the history of the Russian Food Remittance operation this wire was as fateful as the coming of the Campbells to Lucknow in the Indian mutiny. It saved a sinking cause. Besieged by complaining purchasers who were beginning to suspect the good faith of the Administration, and with no hope held out by Moscow of an improvement in the delivery situation, the Directors of the A.R.A. in New York had prepared a notice announcing the liquidation of the Food Remittance operation and the refund of all undelivered Remittances. This notice lay on Mr. Edgar Rickard's desk in New York on the evening of March 9th ready to be broadcast the following morning. That very evening Western Union delivered Mr. Burland's cheering Moscow cable indicating that things were moving at last. The liquidation announcement went into the dead file of historic documents instead of into the public press whence its message would have been irretrievable.

But the transportation problem still hung over the Division. Practically every district was thousands of packages behind on its deliveries. This time, however, the Division shared its difficulties with all the other A.R.A. activities; disaster threatened them all alike. Nothing short of a revolution in policy and a rebirth of the Russian railroads would forestall failure.

As the result of his failure to see one of the Russian Government heads after ten days of trying, the Director of the A.R.A. in Russia wired Mr. Hoover, advising that all further relief shipments from America be stopped, because of the non-cooperation of the Soviet Government and the inability of the Railroads to handle supplies. This cable put the Communist authorities into a panic. A meeting was immediately arranged between Mr. Kamenev and Mr. Djerjinsky, Commissar of Railroads, representing the Government, and Colonel Haskell and Mr. Cyril J. C. Quinn, representing the A.R.A. The meeting took place on April 12. It broke Mr. Eiduk as intermediary and arranged that the A.R.A. should deal directly with the railroads in all matters concerning transportation. The spirit of the Soviet representatives could not have been finer nor more cooperative, and their sincerity received abundant proof in the subsequent handling of the vast quantity of A.R.A. supplies which streamed into the country in the spring of 1922.

The Food Remittance benefited with the whole of the A.R.A. and the problem thereafter shifted from one of getting cars to one of getting enough

foodstuffs to put in them. Trainloads of food packages rolled off daily to every district in Russia, and, with the passing of the snows, began arriving in record time and in record condition.

Soon the effects of this began to be felt in the Districts and they wired Moscow daily of thousands of deliveries accomplished. Moscow in its turn cabled this on to New York. A glance through the telegraph files for the months of March and April, 1922, show page after page of monotonous remittance numbers, which, though they have little interest now, meant relief to worried purchasers in thousands abroad, and incalculable relief to a terribly worried American Relief Administration Directorate.

Once over the crisis, the Food Remittance Division had no further trouble with transportation, except in the matter of payment of freight. According to the Warehouse Agreement the Soviet Government bound itself to furnish free transportation for Food Remittance supplies. The internal economy of the Government was so arranged that the Government Representative had to pay the Commissariat of Railroads for relief shipments. The Government Representative was frequently out of funds, however, and during the last six months of the operation, the Food Remittance Division suffered monthly from the railroads' refusal to handle its freight unless they received payment on back bills due. This meant a monthly conference with the Government Representative and a monthly wire to all railroad stations. But the situation, though annoying, never became critical.

REMITTANCES BY PARCEL POST

Chapter IX

Considerations of overhead necessarily limited the number of delivery points which the Food Remittance Division could establish in Russia. Twenty-five thousand dollars worth of business a month stood as the minimum figure which would justify the organization of a separate station with an American in charge in regions where no childfeeding or medical relief was being carried on. Obviously where A.R.A. offices already existed, the addition of a Food Remittance department meant so slight an increase in overhead as to permit of it, even though the volume of business might be very minor. Few Remittances were sold for Simbirsk, Ufa, and Orenburg, yet these districts delivered packages throughout the operation.


Never more than twenty independent delivery stations existed in Russia at one time. Had sales and deliveries been limited to residents of these twenty centers, the Remittance business must have been but a shadow of the vast operation it developed into eventually. The directors of the Relief Administration saw clearly from the beginning the necessity of being able to make deliveries to every point in European Russia. Sales depended on this ability. If it was to win the interest of the entire mass of potential purchasers abroad, the A.R.A. must advertise its competency to reach beneficiaries in every corner of the country.

Caught thus between the necessity of unlimited delivery and the impossibility of maintaining unlimited delivery points, the Food Remittance Division saw but one salvation, - the use of the Russian parcel post. To this it turned, not without reluctance. The Soviet Commissariat of Post shared the demoralization and disorganization common to all public utilities in 1921. Whether it would be able to make deliveries rapidly and safely seemed highly doubtful; whether it would undertake to make them at all on conditions satisfactory to the American Relief Administration was, for a considerable period of negotiation, in question.

Shortly after the signing of the Warehouse Agreement on October 25, Mr. Burland took steps to negotiate with the postal authorities on the conditions under which they would accept A.R.A. food packages for shipment. At this period Mr. Eiduk had promulgated his edict forbidding government departments or officials to have any direct dealings with the A.R.A. Mr. Burland, however, did not relish the waste of time and the inefficiency which dealing with the postal authorities through Mr. Eiduk involved. He therefore attempted to dispense with the intermediary's services.

An Attempt At Direct Negotiation

"This business of effecting an agreement with the post office is a purely technical affair," he said to Mr. Eiduk. "You know nothing about the mechanism of the post nor do you know what the American Relief Administration wants. Why, therefore, should I have to waste all the time and energy which dealing through you would mean? Why can't I deal directly with the Commissariat?"



To which Mr. Eiduk responded that his and the entire Soviet Government's sole care was to make the work of the A.R.A. as easy as possible, and that the only reason for using him as an intermediary in any dealings with the Government was to obtain more rapid results. He declared himself quite willing that Mr. Burland should negotiate directly with the officials of the Post Office. "But", he added, "In case you encounter any difficulties, remember that I am always here to aid you". Nothing could be more satisfactory than this, thought the Chief of the Food Remittance Division, and he and his interpreter went off to interview the Commissar of Posts and Telegraph. This gentleman met Mr. Burland with the most complete cordiality. It developed that he had held the same position under the Tzar and consequently knew better than anyone else what the Post could or could not do in the way of parcel deliveries. He expressed his desire to give every aid to the A.R.A.

Mr. Burland had three points on which he wished to come to an understanding with the department. The standard package weighed roughly 117 pounds; it was possible that with various substitutions which might become necessary the remittance would weigh as much as 130 or 140 pounds. Experience in Austria had taught Mr. Burland that it would not be practical to divide this package in more than two unit boxes for post shipment. This meant that his Division must have the right to ship parcels weighing not less than two poods - roughly seventy-two pounds. One of the regulations contributed by the revolution to the Postal Department limited the weight of a parcel which could be shipped by post to one pood. The labor unions had fathered this regulation on the principle that to ask employees to handle packages weighing more than a pood savored of tyranny. With such a history, making an exception to the rule in favor of the A.R.A. promised difficulties.

Mr. Burland's second point concerned the rate to be charged the Food Remittance Division. A minimum tariff of three hundred versts existed for all parcel post shipments. Actuated by the fear that the payment of postal charges would eat up a large slice of Food Remittance profits, the A.R.A. asked that it be given a flat rate on all shipments, which should be the minimum three hundred verst rate, no matter what distance they might be sent.

Finally, the Administration insisted that the Post Office insure the packages in gold. Since it guaranteed that consignee would receive the package or its value in gold, the A.R.A. could not compromise on this point. It was willing to agree to payment being made in Soviet rubles, but the rate of exchange must be that current on day of payment. In its turn the A.R.A. offered to pay the insurance premiums in gold in order that the Post Office might have a reserve to meet possible compensations for undelivered packages. The Administration stated its willingness to pay a 2 per cent premium on the cost price of the package, namely \$7.50.

Mr. Burland talked these three points over with the Commissar of Posts at the first meeting and induced him to consider them favorably. The official foresaw some difficulties in getting the Unions to consent to an exception in the matter of weight, but he gave Mr. Burland an assurance that even this obstacle would be surmounted. He asked for time to make the necessary arrangements and invited Mr. Burland to return a few days later. That was the last as well as the first time that the American saw the Commissar.

Misplaced Confidence

The Chief of the Food Remittance Division departed from this interview feeling comfortably certain that a satisfactory contract with the Post was as good as signed. He returned to the Commissariat two days later. Instead of gaining immediate admission to the office of the Commissar, he found himself being passed from minor official to minor official, none of whom was more gracious than necessary. From none of them could he obtain any satisfaction. Decidedly, the whole atmosphere of the Department had changed, to the complete mystification of Mr. Burland. Eventually an official informed him frankly that the Commissariat could do nothing for him, could, in fact, have no dealings with him on any point, and that any communication he might desire to hold with it would have to be through the Representative Plenipotentiary to Foreign Relief Organizations, viz., Mr. Eiduk.

Mr. Burland saw the light. He remembered the Representative Plenipotentiary's proffer of assistance in the event of his meeting any difficulties. It was evident that Mr. Eiduk meant to force this "assistance" upon him by arranging the difficulties, which put it in a much less gracious light. Mr. Burland referred the matter to Colonel Haskell who saw nothing for it but to deal through the Government Representative. So the Chief of the Food Remittance Division swallowed his irritation and returned to Mr. Eiduk to inform him of the obstructions he had met on his second visit to the Postal headquarters. The Russian expressed great surprise at this and promised all possible aid in obtaining agreement to the wishes of the A.R.A.

Negotiations, however, dragged. Mr. Burland wrote careful letters to the Government Representative explaining the A.R.A.'s position and stipulating the concessions it wanted from the Post. Mr. Eiduk supposedly transmitted these to the Post people. After the lapse of some weeks, Mr. Burland received an unsatisfactory answer from them through the Government Representative. It was evident that if anything was to be done it would have to be done in person. Mr. Burland, therefore offered to propitiate Mr. Eiduk by conducting all negotiations in the presence of the latter's representative, Mr. Popoff. To this he agreed, and the American began more or less satisfactory discussions with minor officials of the Post Office. They balked considerably over the two pood concession, but Mr. Burland pointed out that lack of containers and packing difficulties put smaller shipments definitely out of the question.

When they objected to the 300 verst flat rate for all packages, Mr. Burland drew circles of 300 versts radii around all delivery centers in Russia to demonstrate that not more than 2 per cent of all packages shipped by post would travel farther than 300 versts. He also kept insisting that the A.R.A. was not a commercial organization and that all profits of the Food Remittance business went to childfeeding, wherefore any special favors were for the general good of Russia.

Insurance on a gold or dollar basis stung the national pride of the Russians. They felt the slur to their paper currency to be an indignity. Mr. Burland pointed out that it wasn't a question of national dignity but of impersonal business. The A.R.A.'s obligation to the purchaser could not permit insurance on other than a gold basis.



Packing shipments for Post, Moscow

Informal Agreement

It was not until December 15th that Mr. Burland received word from Mr. Eiduk that the postal authorities had agreed to his points and would notify all branches in Russia of the conditions under which they should accept food packages for shipment. Curiously enough, Mr. Eiduk absolutely refused to sign a written agreement giving the A.R.A. these parcel post rights, and the Postal Commissariat could not do so without his permission. In December the Department sent out a circular telegram to its branches explaining the understanding with the A.R.A., and copies of these wires with letters of transmission and confirmation from Mr. Eiduk were the nearest the Administration came to a formal agreement.

Though the main points had been gained, one question remained to be settled, namely the time of payment to consignee in case of loss of package. It took a month of negotiations to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement of this matter, but the Post showed a very good will and finally made the generous concession that undelivered packages en route for two months were to be considered lost and compensation should be made before the expiration of the third month, - that is to say within ninety days from the date of leaving the warehouse. Again the Russians refused to sign a written agreement but contented themselves with sending out a second circular telegram to district post offices, the date of this being January 30.

The Moscow District Food Remittance station sent the first packages by post during the first week in February. The officials showed every desire to cooperate and particularly to ensure the safe delivery of the shipments. They examined each package with the utmost care to see that it was solidly and properly packed, insisted on wire stripping being used to reinforce the boxes, sealed them, and generally indicated that they had received orders from above to take particular care of A.R.A. consignments. Every district in Russia had the same experience in dealing with the local post authorities.

Shifting Tariffs

Fortunately the percentage of deliveries made by parcel post fell below the early anticipations of the Americans, for frequent increases in the tariff ate up profit on each package pretty completely to the loss of hungry Russian children. At the beginning of the postal understanding the rate of exchange brought the cost of shipment for the 300 verst flat rate down to 35¢. Between the first and second shipments made by the Moscow District, however, the tariff had nearly trebled so that it cost \$1.00 to ship the second consignments. In a short period further increases brought the tariff up to the prohibitive sum of \$3.50. This was in April when the ruble reached 4,000,000 to a dollar. It stayed at this level till September when a very rapid fall occurred which tumbled the tariff on A.R.A. packages down to 90¢. The Post Office reacted at once, however, to this blow to its income and raised its rates again, so that the Food Remittance had to pay \$3.25 per package shipped.

The average postal tariff paid by the Administration on Food Remittance shipments was about \$2.00. Add to this the cost of crating parcel post consignments, - about 60¢, - the cost of insurance, - 15¢ per package - and the laboring costs of packing and sealing, and it becomes evident that the expense of



Caravan of Peasants in the Saratov District returning to Villages with
Food Remittance Packages

parcel post shipments averaged approximately \$3.00, which made in theory a slight loss on each package. Had the number of remittances shipped by post come up to early anticipations, this cost might have proved prohibitive. Instead of the estimated 35 per cent, however, only 1.7 per cent of recipients asked for delivery by post. Out of a total of 1,200,000 packages delivered, only 19,213 were shipped by post.

Sacrifices for the Food Package

This slight use of the parcel post does not at all mean that the great majority or even the majority of Food Remittance beneficiaries lived in delivery centers. What it does mean is that until the harvest of 1922 the starving Russian would rather have risked losing his home than the life saving gift from America. Where railroad service existed to take them to Food Remittance Delivery Stations, prospective consignees made use of them. For the most part they were too poor to pay, so they joined the mobs of refugees who covered the trains of Russia as thickly as vermin covered themselves. They clung to the iced roofs in weather many degrees below freezing; they huddled down on the buffers and clutched the rocking iron with bare hands. Scores of their "fellow passengers" were thrown off as frozen corpses as the train crawled from station to station according to no time table. And yet the terrors of these voyages were not confined to freezing or accident. Dangers threatened the packages gained with such difficulty.

On January 2, 1922, Aron and Ilia Scheftel, father and son, travelled to Moscow from Kostroma to take delivery of seven packages consigned to them from America. On returning to Kostroma with their food, the railroad division of the Chekka (political police) arrested them at Jaroslav, charging them with profiteering in foodstuffs. Their food was confiscated, their money taken from them, and they were thrown into prison at Jaroslav. There they remained without a hearing for two weeks. Meanwhile the son contracted typhus. On January 15 the Chekka wired the Moscow A.R.A. asking whether the organization existed by authority of the Soviet Government, and whether it had furnished the food taken from the Scheftels. Several days later, an old woman, sobbing, appeared at the Food Remittance office with a note from the Jaroslav Chekka putting the same questions as the telegram, and asking for documents to prove that the old woman's husband and son had come by the food honestly. The A.R.A. took immediate steps, of course, to effect the release of the unfortunate pair, but they did not leave prison till January 26th.

Caravans of Food Remittances

Frequently no railroad existed, and thousands of peasant consignees travelled to district A.R.A. stations from villages hundreds of versts away to collect their food. Some of them came on foot, some had a horse or a camel or bullock; often a whole village would pool its meagre transportation resources to take delivery of all packages due the village. Such stations as that at Saratov, which catered mainly to beneficiaries from the country, had a permanent but ever changing gypsy camp of peasant sleds, and the shabby remains of old troikas clustered before its doors. Pitiful horses drew these sleds, gaunt and emaciated, with ribs sticking out like the strawless rafters of their village huts. There were bullocks and even cows in ludicrous combinations with camels, vicious and noisy and adding to the sour odor common to Russian refugee crowds. Frequently the peasants camped over night to get an early morning

start back or for the sake of travelling in caravan style for protection. These peasants ran the risk of thieves and starving peasants turned into bandit gangs. In March, 1922, three German-Russians from the colony of Goloi Karamish were attacked and killed by bandits who took their packages, clothes and horses and left them naked in the snow. Such cases were fortunately rare.

Beside the anxiety of the beneficiary to take delivery of the package from America in person, the A.R.A. invented various schemes to reduce the call for postal shipments while at the same time increasing service to the beneficiary. Kiev District, for instance, shipped carloads of packages to Jitomir, where an American established a temporary delivery station to serve all consignees living in the neighborhood. Districts doing child and adult feeding made use of its sub-district warehouses to deliver Remittances to distant consignees, thus saving them a long, expensive and perilous journey.

Increase in Postal Shipments

After the fall of 1922 the situation of postal shipments changed. The harvest reduced the price of bread to a tenth of what it had been and dropped the local value of the food package from thirty and forty dollars to five and seven. At the same time the reviving railroads put an end to free and miscellaneous travelling and charged prohibitive sums for passenger tickets. Consequently the demand for shipments of Remittances by post went up.

Post Withdraws Privileges

Coincident with this increased demand occurred the first break in the smooth relations which had obtained between the Food Remittance and the Post Office. This proved of so serious a nature as to threaten to put an end to postal shipments altogether and actually did hold them up for two months. The occasion of it was the publication on December 8, 1922 of the "Bulletin of the People's Commissariat of Post and Telegraph", showing a new minimum rate of 500 versts tariff and an insurance tax of 3 per cent instead of the former 2 per cent. The Commissariat informed the Representative Plenipotentiary to foreign Relief Organizations that the A.R.A. would have to adjust itself to these changes.

The Administration at once took up the discussion amicably on the ground that the same principles which had given it the privileges obtained in the negotiations a year earlier still held good. It then suffered considerable chagrin to learn that it had been paying tariff on packages at the 500 verst flat rate since the preceding July, - a fact of which it had been entirely ignorant. Apparently the minimum rate had been shifted from 300 to 500 versts in that month and the various post offices had automatically figured the tariffs on A.R.A. packages at the new rate without notifying the District Supervisors, who, because of the constant shifts in tariffs, had imagined increased costs of shipment to be due to these and not to increases in the flat rate.

The Food Remittance Division felt this unnotified raise in the flat rate to be a breach of the understanding arrived at with the Postal authorities and protested it - though perhaps not so vigorously as it might had the Russians not so blandly informed it, "But you've been paying on this basis since July". In fact the A.R.A. aimed its strongest protests against the 3 per cent insurance rate which the Post Office wished to impose upon it.

Packages continued to be shipped during the month of January on the 500 verst rate with insurance at 2 per cent. A few days after the first of February telegrams began to arrive from one district after another complaining of the unexpected refusal of the local Post Offices to accept A.R.A. packages weighing over one pood or to continue to give the Administration shipments even the benefits of the 500 verst flat rate. In short, all its special privileges were denied the A.R.A. It developed that the Commissariat had sent the following circular telegram to the provinces on February 1st:

Circular wire No. 15

"Privileges admitted by circular wires of 1922, Nos. 34-10550 and 34-10565, as to forwarding A.R.A. packages, relative to weight and payment, are being cancelled. With receipt of the present please be advised that A.R.A. packages will be accepted according to general rules - up to 1 pood weight, and payment in accordance with distance dispatched at the place of dispatch.

(Signed) Acting Peoples Commissar Liubovitch."

The Commissariat had given A.R.A. Moscow Headquarters no notice of this step whatsoever, and it was only through the district complaints that it learned of the cancellation of the privileges. Aside from the natural indignation which so flagrant a breach of contract - as the Administration considered it - inspired, considerable alarm was felt at the possible reaction on purchasers in America to whom the A.R.A. would be forced to make refunds after pledging itself to deliver. This new step of the Post Office meant nothing less than a cessation of deliveries by post which would inevitably result in many cancellations.

Renewing the Fight for Privileges

To avoid these the Food Remittance Division took up the battle hammer and tongs through the Government Representative's office. It charged the postal authorities with a breach of contract, to which they replied that there had been no contract, but that they had merely made concessions which they were entitled to revoke at will. The action, however, had not been taken willfully or without reason. It was part of a policy of strict retrenchment; the Commissariat had not made ends meet in the past but meant to do so in the future, and everything which appeared to hinder that went by the boards ruthlessly.

The concessions as a whole made to the A.R.A. were exceptions to the general regulations of the parcel posts division, argued the Commissariat, and like all exceptions, they increased the overhead of the service. Individually, the extension of the weight limit to two poods involved the Post Office in disputes with the unions; the 2 per cent insurance premium caused the service to lose money; the fact of insurance in dollars or gold was an insult to Russian pride and cast a slur on the solvency of the Soviet Government. And furthermore, why make these concessions to an ordinary commercial business like the A.R.A. Food Remittance Division, under any conditions. It was a profit making, capitalistic enterprise and as such should be treated like any other business.

The A.R.A. met these arguments by those which it had used in making the first agreement a year earlier. It stressed the fact that whether or not

a formal contract had been signed, letters from the Post Office and the Government Representative, the circular wires of the Post to the districts, and the enjoyment of the concessions for a year, certainly constituted an agreement in fact if not in name and the A.R.A. had undertaken obligations to American purchasers with the understanding that such an agreement existed. The Administration stood out irreconcilably for the two pood weight limit, expressed its willingness to discuss the 500 verst flat rate minimum, argued that 3 per cent was higher than the premium charged by any other post office in the world, and declared that its responsibility to American purchasers could not allow it to accept anything but payment of insurance in gold.

The A.R.A. did not, in spite of its opposition, fail to see some reasonableness and justice in the Postal attitude, except on the non-existence of any agreement. Certainly, exceptions of any sort did increase overhead, and the trouble of handling A.R.A. packages cost the post more than it gained from them; furthermore no insurance company would take a risk on the Russian revolutionary parcel post service for a 2 per cent premium; they would be more like to want 10 per cent; and finally, it was degrading to ask a government office to pay insurance to its own citizens on a foreign currency basis.

The best that a strenuous month of arguing, ably abetted though he was this time by the assistant from the Government Representative's office, could obtain for Mr. Burland was a temporary extension of the two pood weight limit. More than that, nothing. His pleas for an extension of 150 days in order that the A.R.A. might meet existing obligations fell on heedless ears. Some few packages were shipped uninsured during the months February-March, but only on receipt of special written authorization from the recipient, who accepted responsibility in spite of non-insurance. All people who had asked for delivery by post during this period received letters from the Administration explaining the case fully. This did not prevent complaints from flooding the districts, the echo of which even reached America.

Appeal to Higher Authorities

At the end of a month of fruitless bickering, Mr. Burland reported his non-success to Colonel Haskell and requested the latter to take the case up with Mr. Kamenev. The two Americans called on the head of the Moscow Soviet together. The latter declared his inability to believe that the Commissariat of Post had taken such a step, but if it had he could assure Colonel Haskell and Mr. Burland that the matter would be taken up at once and solved to their satisfaction. "At once" dragged out into a month, but by the end of March a new agreement had been reached, differing from the earlier one only in that the A.R.A. was to pay tariff on the distance shipped with a 500 verst minimum. Again no agreement was signed, the Post sending a circular wire to its provincial branches.

Thereafter until the end of the operation, no further postal difficulties were encountered. The American Relief Administration felt that the Russian Post Office acquitted itself admirably in the handling of Food Remittance and Clothing shipments. Though it balked over making concessions, once made these were scrupulously observed, and every precaution was taken to insure safe and speedy delivery. The best proof of the post's efficiency is that not a single case of non-delivery was brought to the attention of the Administration.

In the understanding arrived at with the Post Office in January, 1922, it had been agreed that payments of insurance premiums were to be made by A.R.A. headquarters for all districts in Russia on the tenth of each month for the preceding month. However, the extreme press of affairs in establishing new food stations, shipping food out, and teaching the Russians the paper work of the Remittance business prevented the Administration from gathering a complete record of deliveries by post through the month of March, before May. The Food Remittance submitted its first record of postal shipments for approval of the Commissariat on May 5th. The Department did not return these approved until August. In all the Relief Administration paid a total of \$2881.95 for insurance premiums. There were never any disagreements on the payment of premiums, the Post invariably accepting A.R.A. figures.

PUBLICITY

Chapter X

One characteristic fact strikes out like a spark from hammered iron wherever one taps the story of the Food Remittance Division in Russia. It was conducted in the manner of a commercial operation. However philanthropic may have been the purpose of its originators, however vital may have been its contribution to the saving of Russian life, and particularly Russian culture and education, it functioned on the strictest of business principles and it succeeded in proportion to the thoroughness with which it made use of all the facilities of big business. Americans sensitive to the criticism of the commercialism of our civilization might find the operation and achievements of the Food Remittance Division a valuable weapon of defense. At all events it is a particularly American invention to harness the horses of commerce to the carriage of philanthropy.

In view of the commercial method of the operation, it is not surprising to find publicity playing a prominent part. As a matter of fact, publicity was a duty which the Relief Administration owed to the thousands of American residents who were seeking a safe means of aiding their hard hit relatives in Russia. Many of the people were wasting their money in vain and pitiful attempts to send food to Russia through the open post. They were scattered all through the country, many of them in remote districts where their chances of learning of the A.R.A. Food Remittance operation were practically nil, unless the A.R.A. brought news of it to them. To do this required the cooperation of Americans and Russians, and the story consequently has two phases.

Support of the American Press

The American Relief Administration carried no paid advertisements, and yet its activities were as widely known to the American public as those of our large humanitarian organizations during the war. It achieved this result thanks to the generosity of the press of the country which gave its operations and appeals the greatest and most constant publicity. In addition to the newspapers and the weekly and monthly magazines, numerous philanthropic organizations established on racial or religious lines advertised the A.R.A. and particularly the Food Remittance operation in connection with their campaigns for funds for Russian relief. The most important of these in point of volume was the Joint Distribution Committee which alone sold more than \$2,000,000 worth of Food Remittances for the A.R.A. In addition, the American Volga Relief Society with its branches, and the National Lutheran Council, the Mennonite Central Committee, the American Federation of Ukrainian Jews, various Landsmannschaften, and the Y.M.C.A. either participated directly in the sale of Food Remittances or advertised them to potential buyers.

It may be mentioned here that the Food Remittance Division performed for these organizations the very considerable service of enabling them to relieve effectively groups in distant parts of Russia without incurring any expenses for overhead. The organizations purchased so called "Bulk Sales", that is large lots of packages not addressed to a specific beneficiary, and consigned them to a particular group in a particular region, care of the American

District Supervisor of the area concerned. The organizations amply repaid this service by the support of Food Remittance sales.

Bankers' Association Lends Aid

To return to publicity for the Warehouse plan, 1200 members of the American Bankers Association, chosen because of their position in the center of potential buyers, carried placards announcing the sale of Food Remittances to Russia, a service of the greatest value to local foreign elements of the population, and one of the most important factors in increasing the volume of food package business. Thanks to the newspapers, the banks and affiliated philanthropic organizations, the A.R.A. succeeded in getting in touch with practically every person in America who might prove a purchaser of food packages.

Soviet Government Helps Publicity

What is of particular interest to this story, however, concerns the part that Russia played in the publicity campaign. Both the Riga and Warehouse Agreements contained clauses enlisting the Russian Government to do all in its power to give suitable publicity to the operations of the Relief Administration. To give potential Food Remittance purchasers in America the assurance that the Soviet Government supported the Warehouse operation, Moscow headquarters obtained an official statement from Mr. Eiduk in December, 1921. In his covering letter, Mr. Eiduk expressed the hope that the A.R.A. would use the statement "in the American press and elsewhere, in order to achieve the utmost results in the matter of the delivery of food parcels from America in Russia."

The statement read:

The Soviet Government warmly hails the organization of Food Warehouses by the American Relief Administration in Russia, and invites the people in America to take advantage of the A.R.A. Food Remittance in the interests of their friends and relatives in Russia.

The Soviet Government proclaims that it will do everything possible to carry through the Food Remittance scheme and will regard foodstuffs brought into Russia on this plan as additional supplies not subject to requisition or distribution among the population by the Government or its agents.

Russia is confronting famine and must lay in a supply of foodstuffs in order to pull through the winter."

Appeal Card Campaign

So much the Russian Government contributed. The Russian people however, furnished the grand stroke to the Food Remittance Publicity Campaign. They sent through the A.R.A., to relatives and friends abroad, individual appeal cards asking for food. The Division borrowed the idea from the Central European Warehouse operation where it had proved by all odds the most effective weapon of publicity. It was the perfect advertisement, for it not only reached the individual abroad but came as a personal appeal from a relative or friend in need. Everything argued that the response to such publicity would

be almost one hundred percent. In the case of Russia, which had been so long isolated from the world, the Relief Administration hoped as well that the appeal card plan would help to restore the broken family contacts, - a hope which seems to have been justified.

Moscow would have liked to begin the publicity campaign immediately after the signing of the Agreement in October, but New York had jumped the gun on sales, facilities and personnel were inadequate, so all effort had to be concentrated on the establishment of the first delivery stations. Mr. Burland, however, made early attempts to have posters and appeal cards printed in Moscow. As usual everything had to be done through the Government Representative. While offering no objection in principle, Mr. Eiduk offered the very substantial objection in fact, of doing nothing about it. His procrastination finally forced the Americans to the conclusion that he had a real objection to the publicity campaign in Russia. It afterwards developed that his objection had a twofold base: his suspicion of the Food Remittance Division increased the inevitable Commissar's horror of any direct appeal to the people which does not originate with the Chekka or the Vtzik (The Central Executive Committee); and secondly, he and his Government heartily disliked advertising to the Russian people an organization which came from the land of their enemies with material aid. It cannot be denied that the obvious, large scaled and impartial philanthropy of the American Relief Administration put the anti-capitalistic propaganda of the Soviet Government in an awkward position.

However, whatever the reasons, the fact remained that Mr. Eiduk failed to get cards and posters printed. Mr. Burland turned to Riga for help and in a short time received a large supply of the needed materials. He distributed these to the districts and then applied to the Government Representative for permission to put the posters up in Moscow. It took six weeks of constant agitation to obtain this permission. The posters were innocent enough in spite of their glaring red, white and blue faces. "Do you want a food package from America?" they asked the Russians. "If so, send a card to your relatives and friends through the A.R.A." The basis of Mr. Eiduk's objection to their being posted in Moscow seemed to be his belief that their appearance was intended as the signal for a counter-revolutionary outbreak. To understand such a fear one must have had acquaintance with the extraordinary nervousness which three years of fighting counter-revolution had imposed upon the Communists.

Posters for Cigarette Papers

As a result of this delay, the end of January had come before the placards appeared on the signboards of Moscow. Very few of them enjoyed more than a day or two of glory. Their desirability as souvenirs, as cigarette papers in a country suffering from a paper as well as a food famine, and the general spirit of destruction rampant in Russia, caused their speedy removal, in whole or in part. However the rumor of the appeal card passed rapidly from mouth to mouth among the hungry Russians, and long lines waiting for an opportunity to sign and address a card indicated the offices of the A.R.A.

Handling the Illiterate

The handling of these lines did not lighten the burden of the over-taxed district Food Remittance stations. They overcrowded the none-too-ample

offices and the mechanism of signing, addressing and stamping the card so confused the simple Russian peasant as to require a large staff of clerks to guide him through the process. In the first place it was practically essential that the address should be written in Latin characters. Many of the thousands who sent cards could either not write at all or were limited to Russian or Hebraic script. In such cases the clerks had to do the work. Many applicants had no more exact idea of the address of their relative in America than that he was in New York, Chicago, or St. Louis, and they charged the A.R.A. with ill-will, misrepresentation and what-not, if it refused to accept a card so indefinitely addressed.

So eager were the Russians to clutch at the slightest hope that many believed that the writing of a card gave them an immediate claim on a food package. Even when the Americans succeeded in making them understand that the card was merely an appeal which would have to go abroad and be acted upon by the recipient, some of these people felt that the A.R.A. should advance them a package pending such action. Great need made everyone impatient and illogical and many began inquiring for their package even before the card had had time to reach America. They called periodically. For most of them a day came which announced that their appeal had borne fruit, but for some this day never arrived and on these fell a type of suffering which few Americans have had the experience to understand.

"Con" Men and Appeal Cards

The Russians put an extraordinary faith in the appeal card. It offered them the first sure opportunity to get in touch with relatives abroad, which they had had for years, and they knew that getting in touch would insure them help. They believed so much that swindlers in Odessa had no trouble in selling cards to the ignorant for 50,000 rubles (about 5 cents) each in February, 1922.

Obviously only those Russians who had relatives or friends abroad could send appeals. Consequently centers from which emigration had been slight in pre-revolution days, such as the Upper Volga Districts, received but few applications. The Ukrainian offices, thanks to the large Jewish population, practically every family of which had some relative outside of Russia, sent by far the largest number of appeals abroad. After the Ukraine came White Russia, also a Jewish center, Saratov, from whence had emigrated thousands of German colonists, and the capitals of Petrograd and Moscow. Refugees from the revolution made up the majority of those to whom the residence of these last two cities appealed.

Altogether, Moscow had printed and distributed among the districts a million and a half cards. These began coming into Moscow ready to be sent abroad near the end of January. The volume increased so rapidly, once the campaign had been properly launched, that the Food Remittance Division kept twenty clerks sorting and preparing them for transmission to London and New York. In all, Moscow forwarded between 600,000 and 700,000 appeals. Many thousands more went through the open post. The reason many Russians preferred the uncertainties of the Russian mail to the sure A.R.A. courier illustrates the unconquerable suspicion which constant tricking has developed in the Russian character. They believed that the A.R.A. meant to keep the package, once it had obtained their signature to an appeal card. Just how they hoped to

foil the Administration's wicked intentions by sending the card by the open post is not clear, but many did send through the open post for that reason.

Government Aid in Mailing

From the beginning, the Russian Government had made no objection in principle to the forwarding of these cards, and it even agreed to allow the A.R.A. to send them out in bulk in its private pouches, to insure their safe and immediate transmission. On the other hand, the A.R.A. felt that it should not deprive the Russian Government of legitimate postal revenue, and it felt that the presence of a cancelled Russian stamp on the cards would increase the confidence of the recipient in the authenticity of its origin. How to stamp the cards, have them cancelled, and forward them in bulk in the A.R.A. courier pouches presented difficulties. In the first place, the postage increased with a rapidity which rendered the Government printing press unable to issue single stamps of commensurate denominations. Thus, at the time when a card required a 6000 ruble stamp the post office in Odessa had no denominations higher than 100 rubles. The sixty stamps which one card required effectively covered the card and hung over the edges. This stamp trouble continued during the first four months of the appeal campaign and ate up so much space on the cards that the New York office had to employ clerks to remove some of them in order to find blank space to put an American stamp. As to cancelling the stamps, the Post Office showed its good will by agreeing to do this in bulk lots of several thousand and returning them to the Food Remittance Division for transmission abroad.

The problem then became one of distribution in America and Europe. During the Austrian appeal campaign, British and American postal authorities, as a measure to assist relief, had agreed to recognize Austrian stamps. A similar courtesy was too much to ask of them for the Russian operation. All concerned finally agreed, however, to allow the Russian stamps to remain, provided an American or English stamp was placed in some blank space on the card.

The receipt of appeal cards abroad produced an instant effect on sales. It is perhaps not too much to say that 80 per cent of those which reached their destination met an immediate response. They assured many potential purchasers who had failed to send remittances because of ignorance of whereabouts of their relatives and they awoke others to the need of sending remittances. What they meant to the destitute Russian is illustrated by a story of an old woman, which the Russian Manager of the Food Remittance Office at Petrograd recorded.

Uniting a Mother and her Son

"She came into our office in February, clad in something which may have been clothes in the far off past, with rags on her feet. She was pale and sick and she trembled as she advanced to the information desk. Can we do anything to find her son in America? All she knows is that he lives somewhere there and is a violinist. She, herself, is a war-victim. She comes from a little place near Vilna; she had a store of her own and was well off, when the war came and drove her from her home. She drifted from town to town in increasing misery. She arrived a short while ago in Petrograd; she has no one here; she is beginning to starve. People told her that the A.R.A. is doing wonders to help. Perhaps kind heaven would send her a miracle also through A.R.A.

"We made out several appeal cards at once and addressed them to different musical organizations in the largest American cities. A couple of months pass. Again appears the same old woman; but she is hardly to be recognized; great happiness has changed her gait and appearance. Our communication reached her son, who is a famous musician in America. He had sent her packages and money. All this thanks to the A.R.A. All attempts on the part of the son to locate his mother in the course of some years, these attempts even including sending a special searcher from America, had been in vain."

In April, 1922, New York considered it possible that the Russian operation might come to an end with the 1922 harvest. As a result the Directors planned to stop Food Remittance sales some time in May. Moscow sent telegrams to all the districts ordering that an end be put to the issuing of appeal cards. Odessa telegraphed a reply which typified the reaction of the districts to this order. "Announcement suspension post-card distribution has aroused howl disapproval. During past week our office has been besieged by persons requesting opportunity send one card America before distribution discontinued." Later when Moscow ordered the sending of appeal cards resumed, Odessa reacted as follows: "This very good news as food situation Odessa extremely critical and suspension post card so far has resulted considerable dissatisfaction. So far distribution cards practically confined city Odessa and resumption campaign will enable us proceed our plan include Nikolaeff, Kherson and other districts where food shortage as great or greater than in Odessa."

Appeal cards continued to be sent until March, 1923, when sales stopped in New York. The greatest number passed through Moscow in July, 1922, and after that the quantity transmitted fell off, particularly when the 1922 harvest came to relieve the food shortage.

MAINTAINING STOCKS IN RUSSIA

Chapter XI

The early history of the Food Remittance Division bore a certain resemblance to a steeplechase in which the horsemen advance from barrier to barrier, taking each leap with the knowledge that it may end in a bad fall. One crisis seemed, during those first months, to follow on the heels of another. The Division had scarcely begun to stretch itself after leaping the transportation deadlock when it reared before an obstacle which the preceding barriers had hidden. It faced a shortage of food stocks. The incoming thousands of orders were unaccompanied by incoming trainloads of supplies.

Consider the situation in which the Food Remittance found itself on the day of its birth in October, 1921: No one had the slightest idea of how many ten dollar Remittances would be sold; nor whether all or a majority would be deliverable. Could the A.R.A. undertake to ship into Russia large quantities of special products without some assurance that orders enough would be sold to consume them? At the same time, the purchaser demanded, justly or not, speed in delivery. He gave the Administration ninety days, but he expected it to get the package to the beneficiary in much shorter time, and if the Administration failed of his expectations, he seldom paused to consider the reasons. Rendered illogical by complaining letters from his relatives in Russia, he charged the Administration with inefficiency, and worse. The New York office sent many cables ordering Moscow to expedite delivery of such and such an order to soothe indignant purchasers. The Administration could not, therefore, wait until the Remittance had been sold, before purchasing and forwarding the food package which it called for. This consideration dictated the initial purchase of \$1,000,000 worth of food, the equivalent of 100,000 packages, simultaneously with the signing of the Warehouse Agreement. Early sales soon demonstrated the justice of the investment of this sum, and the leap upward which began in March after delivery seemed assured, and continued until September, shifted the problem to one of shipping not too much, but enough, food to cover sales.

The buying and shipping into Russia of the first million dollars worth and subsequent lots of Food Remittance commodities was no overnight task. Such enormous quantities of supplies cannot be purchased casually as one buys sugar at the corner grocery. It is essential to be able to pick and choose, to be in a position to refuse an offer which seems unreasonable. Once bought, bottoms for shipping supplies have to be secured, and the chance of their being held up by strikes, or lack of fuel, or ice, taken into consideration. Keeping stocks balanced so that a relief mission will not have too much flour and no sugar, or insufficient milk and overstocks of lard, requires the best of organization and constant alertness.

Forced to Fight for Attention and Space

Moreover, the Food Remittance Division in Russia had other problems to contend with. However much the Division may have been beholden to the other A.R.A. activities for prestige and certain essentials of organization, the child, adult and medical programs were not an unmixed blessing. The constant increase in these programs proved such a strain both on the Purchasing and

Shipping departments of the Relief Administration, and - what is more important - on the Russian ports and railroads, as to force the Food Remittance to fight for attention and space and to be content with a protection which for only two short periods in the history of the operation would have permitted immediate delivery of all sales. During the first seven months of the operation the Division found it simply impossible to keep food enough in Russia to meet orders.


The chart on the next page tells the story of Food Remittance protection throughout the Russian operation. (Protection in the A.R.A. vernacular means the business of keeping a relief mission supplied with stocks sufficient to meet coming demands.) It fell hopelessly below requirements in February, March, April and May, largely as a result of the severity of the winter in the Baltic. The Kiel canal froze, holding up several relief ships; Riga closed on January 18th to remain ice bound until April 29th; the other Baltic ports of Windau, Libau and Reval began receiving A.R.A. ships only in March, and what with childfeeding and medical supplies, adult corn and Soviet Government seed they were hopelessly overtaxed. The story of the Food Remittance shipment which should have arrived in Odessa March 1, and actually reached that port April 15th, has already been told.

Delayed Protection

Food Remittance protection began to approach orders only in June, 1922. As usual the districts took the brunt of the trouble which this position caused. The checked line on the chart doesn't show food in the districts, but food en route to the districts from Moscow. Since freights took sometimes two months to reach Odessa from the Soviet Capital the situation of the delivery stations was even worse than the checked line would indicate.

Shortage Crises

Mr. Burland's plan of making the Food Remittance a separate and independent unit in the matters of protection, warehousing and transportation, probably saved the Division from complete suffocation under the landslide of other activities. However, even that method did not deliver it from shortage crises. In the middle of April the Food Remittance Division found itself completely out of tea, with none in sight from abroad. It looked as if evacuations would have to cease. To meet the first deliveries in November, 1921, as already stated, Mr. Burland had bought a small quantity of tea in Moscow. The purchase there of the large amount now needed to prevent a tie up was out of the question, but nothing forbade borrowing from the Russian Tea Trust, a state organization. The trust agreed readily on condition that the A.R.A. should return from its own stock the amount borrowed immediately on their arrival. In connection with the negotiations for the loan, which Mr. Burland carried on inevitably through Mr. Eiduk, an amusing minor incident arose. The officials of the Tea Trust requested that Mr. Burland should call in person, "We want to see one of these energetic Americans and find out how they do business." It may be that the influence of American business methods as exemplified by the A.R.A. will be traced in Russian economic life long after the lives the Administration saved have gone out of memory.



Borrowing tea saved the situation on one occasion, but it was a make-shift rather than a permanent solution. Besides, other shortages occurred which did not submit to such easy treatment. To overcome inadequate protection for Food Remittance required the more drastic remedy of changing the make-up of the package. A clause in the Warehouse Agreement made all A.R.A. stocks interchangeable. Consequently the possibility of transferring surplus childfeeding stocks to the Food Remittance repeatedly came up for consideration during the hectic early months. Childfeeding commodities did not coincide exactly with those selected to comprise the first lot of packages. Flour, rice, sugar and milk were common to both, but the Food Remittance used tea and tinned lard instead of cocoa and bulk lard. The A.R.A. was under no obligation to deliver specific commodities in set proportions. In its contract with the purchaser it expressly reserved the right as previously stated, to deliver what foodstuffs it wished in what proportion it wished, so long as the approximate value of the package reached ten dollars.

Substitutions as a Remedy

This freedom in delivery which the A.R.A. reserved to itself in the Russian Food Remittance operation justified it in changing the package as it saw fit so long as the delivered dollar value of commodities remained the same. From that point of view, then, it might have borrowed from surplus childfeeding stocks. For the first months of the operation, however, another consideration restrained it from doing this; it feared to unbalance childfeeding supplies, that is, throwing them out of the proportion necessary for use in the kitchens. In June, 1922, however, the Directors of the New York and London offices of the A.R.A., Mr. Edgar Rickard and Mr. Walter Lyman Brown, visited Russia. Smarting from the incessant complaints of purchasers abroad, they authorized any step which would facilitate deliveries without menacing the feeding of children. This authorization gave birth to a package which the Food Remittance christened "Substitute D". It was a child of necessity and thanks to a variety of unfortunate circumstances, it fell upon an unappreciative world.

The use of childfeeding stocks, of course, meant the elimination of the tea and tinned lard commodities from the food package. To bring its value up to par the Administration doubled the quantity of flour, so that Substitute D consisted of:

Flour	- 98 lbs.
Rice	- 25 lbs.
Sugar	- 10 lbs.
Milk	- 20 tins

Had this package been delivered in the winter and spring of 1922, it would undoubtedly have been a signal success. The caloric value of 49 lbs. of flour was greater than that of 10 lbs. of lard and 3 lbs. of tea, and to people concerned with having enough food to keep alive rather than with having their palates flattered by variety, the extra flour was much more desirable. Furthermore, from the point of view of the A.R.A., the substitution was perfectly proper, since the cost in America of 49 lbs. of flour equalled that of the lard and tea. Unfortunately, however, the Russian beneficiary saw it from a different angle. The delivery of the "D" package came simultaneously with the 1922 harvest, which sent the price of cereals crashing down. Tea and lard, specialized commodities which Soviet Russia did not produce, remained

up and even climbed higher. In short the value of the new package fell 20 per cent below the value of the standard package on the Russian market. No longer faced with the extreme of hunger, and desirous of using part of his American food package as a medium of exchange, the beneficiary complained. He wrote to his relatives in America and his relatives wrote to New York headquarters. Instead of putting an end to complaints, Substitute "D" had merely supplied a new target.

During August and September all districts issued the new package to the exclusion of all others and it continued to be used from time to time till January, 1923. Meanwhile, however, the Food Remittance Division evolved a new substitute calculated to surpass even the standard package in popularity among beneficiaries. It was called Substitute "E" and differed from the standard package in that it contained 15 instead of 10 lbs. of sugar and 1 instead of 3 lbs. of tea. Sufficient protection to permit of delivery of "E" packages to the exclusion of all others did not arrive until January, 1923, from which time on all districts issued them.

Catering to Varied Tastes

Between August and January alone, the Food Remittance evolved no fewer than eleven temporary substitutes, while during the entire operation the Division delivered nineteen variations on the standard package. Though none of these met with so great disfavor as Substitute "D", the Russians showed marked preference for certain commodities over others. Whenever possible, the Administration issued rice as the feculant in the parcel, but when this developed a shortage, corngrits replaced it. The great American cereal proved an entirely new dish to the Volga and northern Russians, where corn products were unfamiliar. They didn't like it, and when the harvest of 1922 had eased the grip which famine had on them, they complained. Also, from time to time beneficiaries asked for cocoa instead of tea. The Administration would have been glad to make this substitution, particularly as cocoa made part of the child-feeding ration. The problem of containers, however, prohibited its use in the food package. The commodity was too fine to stand transportation in paper sacks, while cost and availability put metal containers out of the question.

At the beginning of the operation the A.R.A. shipped in large stocks of eight pound packages of bacon to be used as the fat component in the package. These met a warm reception from the Russians, but drew nothing but complaints from the Jews, who made up a large percentage of Food Remittance beneficiaries. The substitution of vegetable lard pacified the latter without arousing the particular ire of the former. Unquestionably the package in use at the end of the operation, Substitute "E", proved the most satisfactory.

As the protection chart shows, in August and again in October and November food stocks were either in or en route to districts in sufficient quantities to more than permit of delivery of all remittances on hand. The checked line takes a sharp drop below the solid line for a short period in September, during which month the Joint Distribution Committee established a credit for several hundreds of thousands of dollars. This, however, the J.D.C. did not intend to draw upon all at once, so that the chart does not present a true indication of danger. Neither does it when the check line drops again in December and stays below the solid line until March, for this represents the receipt of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund donations totalling \$830,000, on which packages were to be delivered until June.

Containers for Repacking

Importing enough food into Russia to cover orders presented the main difficulties in the protection problem, of course, but the subsidiary problem of obtaining containers to hold package units yielded but little to it in importance or in difficulties. The crisis which lack of containers produced has been referred to in chapters III and V, as well as the cause of their failure to arrive from abroad. When nothing came through from abroad, the Moscow office raked the Russian market in an effort to make up the deficiency, but the Russian market had little to offer. Since production of the fundamentals of existence in the country had stopped, Russia naturally wasted no effort in producing something in which to put them. As for reserve stocks, the revolution had used up everything left over from the old regime, - including sacks.

Although demands for postal shipments fell far below original expectations, a considerable number of crates for packing such shipments were needed. To supply these, Mr. Burland pressed into service a box factory which had been lying idle for three years. After it had been put in running order lack of materials regularly halted its output.

Stove Pipe into Lard Tins

The lack of ten pound tins of lard, due to shipping difficulties constantly interrupted delivery of the package unit in the early stages of the operation. This was one of the main reasons for the institution of Substitute "D" package. Mr. Burland attempted to buy tins in Russia. In June he succeeded in finding a manufacturer who had a supply of stove piping material which could be used for this purpose and he eagerly presented this man a contract engaging him to deliver so many per month at a fixed rate. The manufacturer replied that he couldn't do this even if the rate were fixed and payment made in dollars. He explained that he had no idea one week how much it would cost him to produce tins the next.

"It all depends on my employees," he said. "If they want to raise wages, they hold a meeting with that end in view and I have no choice but to abide by the result."

Consequently Mr. Burland had to pay for each consignment as it was made. The initial price was eighteen cents per tin. Within three months this had jumped to twenty-eight, which was prohibitive, and the local purchase of lard containers ceased.

The first order of containers from abroad, given in November, 1921, reached Moscow in March, 1922. They were hopelessly inadequate to meet the need. Mr. Burland had no alternative but to ship in bulk to the districts and depend upon them to repack into delivery size. This seemed a foolhardy manner of shifting the responsibility, for if Moscow suffered from a container shortage, what would the situation in the provinces be? However, there was nothing for it, and Moscow began making bulk shipments to the districts. Large cities like Petrograd, Odessa and Saratov had some success in obtaining containers locally. Minsk wired for permission to import containers from Vilna. Other districts complained and did the best they could with what Moscow sent them and with revamped childfeeding containers. All in all the situation was impossible.

Putting Containers to Double Shifts

At last, necessity found a way out. Since the Food Remittance could obtain sufficient containers neither from abroad nor on the local market, it hit upon the plan of using the same containers for more than one delivery. As beneficiaries received their packages the District Delivery Stations had them sign receipts for the cloth sacks issued and imposed upon them the moral obligation of returning these. Compulsion, of course, was out of the question, but the beneficiary who expected more packages later took care not to ignore this obligation. The system succeeded in bringing back about 30 per cent of the containers issued. It failed of greater success largely due to the fact that many beneficiaries did not reside at delivery points. However, the Districts abandoned it, not because of its inefficiency, but because it developed a serious defect, namely the deterioration of containers returned.

Instead of asking beneficiaries to return containers, the Food Remittance asked them to bring their own. On the notification card sent to each consignee the District stamped the request, "Please bring sacks for flour, rice and sugar." This plan proved admirable from every point of view. It caused the beneficiary less trouble, and forestalled his complaints. It insured uninterrupted evacuation of packages even though shipped to delivery stations in bulk. Its sole drawback from the beneficiary's point of view was that it decreased his supply of raw material for clothing.

Under no condition, of course, did the districts refuse delivery to out of town beneficiaries who failed to bring their own containers. Unbending adherence to rules at no time characterized the Food Remittance Stations, whose operations were catch-as-catch-can combats with unnatural circumstances, the prize being the life or freedom from suffering of a famished Russian beneficiary.

GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE DISTRICTS

Chapter XII

The five thousand miles that separated Moscow from New York were less formidable during the winter 1921-22 than the hundreds which divided A.R.A. headquarters from districts such as Orenburg, Ufa, Tzaritzin and Odessa. The isolation of these districts was not a matter of miles but of broken down railroads, locomotives without fuel, crews without food, and trains snowbound, of interrupted telegraph wires and inefficient operators. It required days for passenger travel which had previously been a matter of hours, and freight trains spent weeks on journeys which should have been made in days. Consequently the American who carried the A.R.A. standard to a new district in 1921-22 had to answer for his own salvation. He was cut adrift in an uncharted and sometimes none too friendly world and he had to feel his own way into port.

Moscow A.R.A. headquarters leaned heavily on the Russian Government for support, but the Districts could do nothing without Soviet cooperation. From the day of his arrival till the liquidation of the work the Supervisor had need of the aid of the local authorities, and his relations with them colored the whole of his activities.

Credit to the Government

In discussing this subject it must be borne in mind that the Food Remittance operation did carry on to a successful end, which means that by and large the Soviets kept their agreement with the Administration. It also means that the A.R.A. kept its agreement. The friction that existed never proved fatal as it would inevitably have done had the Government been intransigent in its opposition. A mutual and fundamental desire to get along piloted the two parties over the crises that arose. Furthermore the worst crises and the most severe friction could trace their origin to the personal ill-will or deficiencies of individuals, and the removal of these individuals proved the good will of Government and A.R.A. alike.

The problem of cooperation differed in different districts, of course. The local government at Uralsk, for instance, worked hand in hand with the Americans to make the relief work a brilliant success. But friction of some sort did exist in practically every district, and since this, like bad transportation, presented a problem to be overcome and played a most important part, it must be dealt with in any complete history of the Food Remittance Division.

Inauspicious Beginnings

Cooperation was at its worst at the beginning of a district's activities, when suspicion and ignorance were universal. The initial samples offered to pioneers of the Food Remittance Division did not always inspire optimism. Mr. J. H. Aicher and his secretary, who opened the station at Vitebsk arrived at their destination in the afternoon and floundered their way through the snow to government headquarters, only to find them closed for the day. Eventually they succeeded in routing out the secretary of the Gubispolkom, from whom they learned that they might find rooms at the Second Soviet Hotel. "One

breath in the corridor, one glance at the room, decided us to return immediately to our car in the railroad yards," wrote the Supervisor. Here they abode ten days while the mercury congealed at 30 degrees below zero. At the end of that time they obtained a small room which eventually developed into an apartment. But it was three weeks before electric lights were installed and two months before the apartment had dishes, table-ware and furniture. The obtaining of suitable warehouses and offices proceeded in an equally half hearted fashion.

Conservatism of the Provinces

At the bottom of this failure to cooperate efficiently probably lay indifference to and even suspicion of the Food Remittance operation, but those were not the only reasons. District Supervisors generally discovered that the severity of the revolutionary dictatorship increased in proportion to the distance they travelled from Moscow. The Kremlin issued a decree in June, 1921, which established the right of free trade, and immediately thereafter shops began opening in Moscow. The provincial merchant, however, waited in some places six months before he chanced opening a timid door. The bourgeoisie in the capital were breathing comparatively freely at a time when their fellows in Orenburg were still haunted by the nightly fear of arrest. That is to say that the provinces hung from three to eight months behind the capital in its march toward liberalism and away from revolutionary despotism. While the impulse and activity of reconstruction liberalized the men in the Kremlin, the communists of the country continued swinging the sword of revolution, an activity which absorbed them to the exclusion of all other interests and ideas and kept the head of new life and movement from showing itself. This revolutionary stagnation rendered the provincial judgment of the A.R.A. unintelligent and provincial cooperation inefficient.

The Handicaps of Inexperience

The local governments were often ultra-conservative revolutionists. They were without exception unversed in the mechanism of government and in the ways of business. When the A.R.A. went to Ufa in November, 1921, it found as President of the Gubispolkom, an officer who corresponded to the Governor under the Czar, a man who could neither read nor write. He was a tailor by profession. A veterinary surgeon held the post of Gubernia health officer, a position which a barber occupied in the neighboring province of Ekaterinburg. The secretary of the Ufa Gubernia Executive Committee and Chairman of the Gubernia Famine Relief Committee was one Savaliev, a former telegraph operator who had risen to the rank of regimental commander in the Red Army. He proved to be the outstanding figure in the provincial government and he accordingly became liaison officer with the Relief Administration. The head of Ekaterinoslav province in the Ukraine had been a bricklayer before the revolution, while a laborer ruled in Orenburg. Everywhere new men were in control, men new to the ways of government and without experience. Bad organization was the inevitable result and explained much of the difficulty experienced by A.R.A. districts in their efforts to get started.

The A.R.A. District Supervisor at Kiev wrote in December, 1921:

"If Russia issues an order, the Ukraine refuses to admit it; if the Town Commandant issues an order, the Railway authorities laugh at it; if the Communotdel issues an order; people just fail to execute it. That means that

if one office gives cooperation there are all its co-ordinates and subordinates to refuse to acknowledge any authority but their own, or simply to fail to fulfill their superior's orders."

"Our objective is to establish a rush business organization on American lines; the terrain is the tortuous one of bureaucracy, with commissars, military law, red ink visas, stamps and bitter poverty thrown in."

It took twice as long in the districts as in Moscow to have a window pane fixed or a telephone installed, simply because of the inefficiency of the local officials through whom such things had to be done. "By experience," says the history of the Kiev district, "we had learned that the only way to get anything from the government was to bother them until they had produced action in order to get rid of us, so part of our daily routine consisted in going to the Gubispolkom to ask for offices, warehouses and other equipment." "Every advance step is a fight and nothing is accomplished unless an American follows it through inch by inch," wrote the District Supervisor at Vitebsk. He was fighting not so much ill-will as inefficiency and inertia.

Where the Americans Failed

He and his colleagues were also, though they didn't realize it at the time, fighting their own ignorance of Russian mental processes and habits and of the revolutionary attitude. They had gone into Russia "to tackle a big job", the nature of which led them to expect the most complete cooperation from government and people. The messenger of international altruism, they expected to meet a spirit of altruism in the Russian people. They expected Russians to work as volunteers in helping them for the good of other Russians. Instead they met almost everywhere the hand held out surreptitiously for the bribe. The station master who ordered the train of relief supplies moved, the official who allocated a warehouse, the peasant who transported food which was to feed his own children, all expected payment, and if they didn't get it they asked for it.

Here was a trait in the Russian character magnified by the direness of the universal need. Bribe taking had become a tradition in Russia long before the revolution. In 1921 destitution extended it to include practically everyone. The threat of hunger made no exemptions; ethical considerations went down before the immediate need. The Russians saw the A.R.A. distributing tremendous quantities of food to people who did nothing for it. Why, said they, should not we who help these Americans get something, too? When we consider their destitution, it is not easy to blame them. Had the A.R.A. District Supervisors been willing to bow to this situation, they would undoubtedly have oiled the machinery of cooperation appreciably and thus greatly simplified their problems. The judicious distribution of a few tins of milk would frequently have saved a delay of weeks in getting a warehouse or obtaining office furniture. But the American had a moral responsibility to distribute his supplies to certain groups, and his training and experience made him balk at the idea of having to buy aid for a relief operation from the people aided. He generally preferred the rougher route of fighting it out on principle. Besides, he knew that once started on the path of irregularity, the demands upon him might grow beyond all control.

Types of District Representatives

Racial inertia the American could to a large extent counteract with his own native energy. Suspicion, however, and its expression in active or passive obstruction, irritated and antagonized him and produced friction. In the majority of instances District Supervisors met such obstruction, not from the local governments, but from the representatives of the Plenipotentiary Representative's office in Moscow, who eventually appeared in every district. These men were the personal appointees of Mr. Eiduk, and reflected faithfully his attitude toward the Relief Administration. They all claimed active membership in the Communist Party and boasted a fighting record in the Revolution. It is not unfair to say that they were chosen on the strength of their political integrity rather than on their qualifications as liaison officers.

The original representative to Orenburg District had been a tailor's helper before the revolution, and at the time of his appointment to the A.R.A., headed the Chekka (political police) of the Khirgez Republic. Mr. Eiduk's first appointee to the A.R.A. District in the Crimea introduced himself to the American Supervisor with the announcement that he was first, a member of the Party; second, a General in the Red Army; and third a member of the Russian Central Famine Relief Committee. He had three successors within seven months, one of whom, Karpov, at a meeting of the Crimean Relief Committee held July 26, 1922, made certain remarks which throw an interesting light on the mentality of the lesser Commissar. "We can easily kick out the American crowd," he said; "we have only to order our heroic Red Army to do it and it shall be done." At that time the total American personnel in all Russia numbered 260, of whom five were in the Crimea.

Ruffled Relations

All too frequently, friction ruffled the relations of the District Americans with these delegates of Mr. Eiduk. However much they may have been enjoined to disassociate personal prejudices from their dealings with the Government Representatives, the Americans could not but feel and react to the enmity and suspicion with which the Russian agents treated them. The personnel of the Administration were for the most part young men with the natural enthusiasm and occasional rudeness of American youth. Unversed in the guile of the diplomat, they bristled at the first sign of enmity. They were so certain of the straightforwardness of their purpose that they failed to understand how the communist might not be equally certain. They could not realize that four years of fighting capitalism in all its expressions made the Communists regard them inevitably with suspicion. Instead of disarming this suspicion they raged at it and at the ineffective cooperation it produced. In many cases, also the Americans demanded cooperation in too brusque and highhanded a manner, for the Russian temperament. A manner that will do between an American and a Briton will not do from an Englishman or an American to a Russian. All this the A.R.A. personnel had to learn.

In one or two districts the relations of the Americans with the Government Representatives developed into open hostility, where the Americans gained nothing except by the most violent and exasperating effort and where the Russians solaced their wounded pride of position and race by sowing innumerable petty and unnecessary obstacles to the work and well being of the A.R.A. men.

However, to be perfectly just, the instructions with which the Russian officials came from Moscow to the District offices to a large extent would have nullified the diplomacy of the Americans even had that been irreproachable. In theory they were supposed to facilitate the Relief operation; it soon became evident that their main business was to control that operation. In endeavoring to do this they frequently hindered it. On June 14, 1922, the American in charge of the Food Remittance Delivery Station at Gomel wrote the following letter to Moscow headquarters:

"After a month of inefficiency and inactivity except the activity of obstruction, on the part of the Soviet representative in this office, I yesterday wrote to the President of the Gubispolkom that it would be impossible to continue longer in Gomel on our present basis.

"The present representative, Mr. Dragunsky, is absolutely worthless. In the month or more that he has been connected with this office he has not done one single thing we have requested, except that during the visit of Mr. Blecher, of the Minsk Soviet representative's office, he obtained guards for our warehouse. His entire attention and activity has been directed against the A.R.A. He has even wilfully garbled translations during conferences between myself and the President of the Gubispolkom with the direct intention of destroying our relations.

"Every request that is made to him is met by some argument to prove that we do not require the thing requested, or the blank statement made on his own authority that the thing is impossible.

"When Mr. Blecher, the Soviet representative in Minsk, was here, he picked out a house for the use of the Americans, and also some furniture. Since he returned to Minsk, Mr. Dragunsky has messed the matter up until now we have neither house nor furniture.

"Our requests that guards must be placed at the warehouse were met by the childish argument that as we had not had anything stolen, the Soviet representative failed to see the necessity of guards.

"He has complained to the President of the Gubispolkom that repatriation is not covered by the Riga agreement, and that we are sending out of Russia men necessary for the Red Army.

"These are only two or three of a number of cases that have arisen during his period of connection with this office, and not one single instance, with the exception of the one above quoted, of anything accomplished.

"In a conference with the President of the Gubispolkom this morning, it was decided to temporarily suspend Mr. Dragunsky and everything is to be taken up with the President himself until some suitable arrangements are made.

"Dragunsky has continually requested records, et cetera, for the purpose of holding down speculation. These have been supplied but apparently nothing has been done, as the shops and market are choked with American goods displayed openly for sale.

"In his spare time he continually regales Mr. Ramsay and myself with his childish prattle about his personal dignity as the Soviet representative in this office.

"I am sorry to have to make this report, but my patience and diplomacy are absolutely exhausted. I would suggest that a letter be forwarded from Mr. Eiduk's office to the President of the Gubispolkom outlining exactly their relations with us."

An Individual at Fault

The Russian Representative to Gomel seems to have been primarily an obstructionist, which was probably due to his incorrect interpretation of his instructions to control the operation. The majority of Mr. Eiduk's district delegates displayed much greater intelligence, and contented themselves in a passive cooperation in material matters. They did not blindly balk the operation; they attempted to direct it. Manoeuvres to this end were various but in nearly every district the Government Representatives attempted to gain it through mastery of the Russian personnel of the A.R.A.

Russian Personnel

What success attended the operations of any delivery station depended, of course, largely on the loyalty and ability of its Russian personnel. Good workmen meant good results. Cosmopolitan centers such as Petrograd and Odessa offered District Supervisors a wealth of human material to choose from, but cities like Gomel and Tzaritzin suffered from a serious dearth.

"The scarcity of good and courageous executive material was appalling," wrote the District Supervisor of Ekaterinoslav. "The intensity of the political and civil wars had completely wiped out of every community the best element."

As an organization run on business lines, the A.R.A. required employees with business training; yet in the large majority of districts the Russian personnel of the Food Remittance offices had never had any commercial experience. The Americans took what they could get. Consequently the manager of Vitebsk station warehouse was a singer who had formerly appeared in Grand Opera in America, and he divided his time in Vitebsk between directing the unloading of A.R.A. freight cars and teaching the students at the Conservatory of Music. A mechanic who had picked up a little English in America directed the business end of the Moscow District office at the beginning of the operation, while a General's daughter headed the clerical staff in Saratov. University students and two professors made up the gang of laborers who unloaded incoming freights at the latter station.

Misjudging Standards of Selection

A classification according to profession and training of the A.R.A. Russian personnel would undoubtedly have produced the strangest picture in the history of labour. The essential fact in the Government's eyes, however, was that the large majority came from the educated classes, the ex-bourgeoisie. Only one consideration influenced the A.R.A. in making these selections, - efficiency, which of course implies education and loyalty. Inspired as they were by suspicion of the Administration, the Government Representatives misunderstood this and looked upon the A.R.A. personnel as a justification of their suspicions. This redoubled their desire to bring the Administration's employees under their control.

Intimidating Personnel

In some cases, Odessa, for example, the Government wished to appoint the Administration's staff outright. In Kazan, Ufa, Saratov, Samara, Tzaritzin and Orenburg cases of arrest of personnel on charges afterwards proved to have

been trumped up, occurred. The arrests could have had no other purpose than intimidation. The Government Representative in Simbirsk, Mr. Tchernik, endeavored to establish himself as a sort of father confessor for the employees, calling them into his office for interviews, reprimanding them, and generally giving them to understand that the Soviet Government in his person had its eye on them. He reminded them that whatever the Americans might say about lines of responsibility it was the Russian Government to which in the long run they were going to be answerable. To the terrorized victims of revolution such a talk could not but weaken loyal adherence to the A.R.A. work.

A.R.A. District Supervisors fought stubbornly for their right to select needed personnel independently and to control exclusively their activities. The issue, like many others, gradually ceased to be an issue in proportion as the Administration succeeded in convincing all but the most obtuse Communists that its purposes were honest and innocent of enmity towards the Soviet Government. Time also weeded out some of the more irreconcilable of the Government Representatives as well as the less adaptable members of the American personnel. In addition, the withdrawal of Mr. Eiduk from the office of Representative Plenipotentiary to Foreign Relief Organizations and the appointment of Mr. Karl Lander did much to smooth relations all down the line.

Control of Distribution

As the operation progressed causes of friction diminished in number, but some delivery stations could never rid themselves of the burden of undue interference on the part of the Government Representative in the distribution of packages. On June 10, 1922 the Government Representative at Orenburg informed the District Supervisor that he must submit all orders to the representative before making delivery. The American protested that the Warehouse Agreement put him under no such obligation and refused to accept it. To this the Russian replied that he could not touch the A.R.A., but that he could and would arrest all beneficiaries who received packages without his express sanction. A word from Moscow, however prevented him from putting this threat into execution.

Even as late as March, 1923, this question of control of distribution arose in the districts. In that month the Government Representative with the A.R.A. in Ekaterinoslav, Schwartzoff, with whom the Americans had had a series of misunderstandings relative to the distribution of food packages demanded that he be furnished with a list of all consignees. The Americans refused to do this. One day an unknown man stationed himself at the door of the delivery room and took down the name and address of each beneficiary. Upon inquiry it developed that the man was a delegate from Mr. Schwartzoff's office. The American in charge ordered him off the premises. Within an hour Mr. Schwartzoff had commanded the arrest of the American, on the charge of offering violence to a Government agent and insulting the authority of the Soviet Government in his person. The District Supervisor refused to permit the jailing of his assistant, naturally enough, but for two days the latter remained in the personnel house. At the end of that time a wire from Ukrainian headquarters at Kharkov recalled Schwartzoff and proffered the apologies of the State to the Relief Administration.

Perfect Cooperation Impossible

The unusualness of the political situation, the inexperience of the Soviet rulers, the extreme difference in temperament and psychology between the Russian and the American put perfect cooperation between the A.R.A. and the Communists out of the question. As a Russian the Government official could never quite forget that circumstances had made him the object of charity; as a Communist he could never quite forgive the A.R.A. for bringing relief on so large a scale in the face of his own bitter enmity and denunciation of the institutions which he believed the A.R.A. represented. In his turn the American could never quite forgive the official for adding to the load on his back while he dug to save the fellow countrymen of that official from the avalanche of famine. Old diplomats would have undoubtedly worked more smoothly with the Government officials, but old diplomats would have been incapable of the dynamic energy which overcame the inertia of a dispirited nation. The American Relief operation in all its phases demanded youth.

THE JOB IN THE DISTRICTS

Chapter XIII

Obtaining officers, warehouses and personnel were only the preliminaries; the real problems of a district arose when it was prepared to make deliveries. It had first of all to find the beneficiary. In its theoretical forecast of the operation, Food Remittance Memorandum No. 2 had disposed of this difficulty by putting the burden on the Russian post, and Moscow headquarters had supplied each district with several thousand notification post cards to be addressed to consignees. Had the districts placed their reliance entirely on the badly shaken postal service, however, it is certain that thirty or forty per cent of beneficiaries would never have known that a food package from America awaited them. Like every other public service utility the Post Office had long ceased to function with anything like normal efficiency; delivery of mail in the big cities was half hearted and uncertain; in the provinces, war, revolution and famine had practically destroyed the service. During the month of April, 1922, Moscow District Delivery Station sent out an inspector to hunt up 100 beneficiaries in the city who had failed to acknowledge repeated notice by post. He found 50 per cent of them the first day, none of whom had received the mailed cards.

Even had the post been up to standard, the wholesale uprooting of families by the revolution and famine had so shifted the population as to preclude the possibility of their being hunted down by a government department. The figures for Petrograd already referred to portray vividly the extent of the displacement of population in Russia between the years 1917 and 1921. Before the revolution the capital city of the Czars contained two and a quarter million souls; by 1921 the two million had dropped to seven hundred and fifty thousand. That is to say, nearly one and a half million people had fled from a single Russian city, - fled often secretly and with intent to hide their whereabouts.

Donors of food packages in America generally knew addresses several years old. It was in part the purpose of the Appeal Card campaign to reestablish touch between Russians and their people abroad and it did this in thousands of cases. But many purchasers sent packages to old addresses whence consignees had fled, and it devolved, therefore, upon the A.R.A. to add that of research bureau to its other activities.

Finding the Lost

In the larger centers of population Delivery Stations usually sent an initial notice by post, and in cases of failure to acknowledge, followed up with a second at the end of a month. After the lapse of another period a Russian inspector made a personal investigation of missing beneficiaries with city addresses. To solve the mystery of those who still remained unearthed, the Districts fell back on their specialized research machinery. Along with other habits of the ancient regime in Russia the Soviet Government kept that of registering its citizens with the police. The Anglo-Saxon registers only his criminals in this fashion; not so with the Russian and the Frenchman. The penalty of arrest was the least of those which faced the Russian who did not have proper documents from the police headquarters of his district. He could obtain



Peasants waiting for Packages at Simbirsk

no employment, he had no right to a lodging and legally he was an outlaw. Consequently, provided a missing beneficiary was still in the neighborhood and not in hiding, reference to the local police was sure to dig him out.

The Districts also called in publicity to aid their researches. They published names of the missing in the newspapers and posted lists in prominent places about the A.R.A. offices in the hope that these would meet the eyes of friends of the beneficiary. It must not be forgotten that people were looking for packages, not half heartedly, but with the anxiety of those whose life is at stake. All Russia riveted her attention on every act of the American Relief Administration, so that a list of unfound consignees attracted as much attention as the publication of a Soviet ukase.

A Nation Mobilized to Serve a Private Organization

Delivery Stations such as that at Saratov, the majority of whose customers lived in the country, never used the post at all. Neither did Kiev, which delivered more packages than any other single A.R.A. station. It mobilized the remnants of a Boy Scout troop into a postal service, and so not only insured finding consignees who were to be found, but did so from a week to ten days more quickly than the regular mail service would have done. Saratov and other Volga districts which maintained childfeeding kitchens in nearly every village made use of its local committees to deliver notification cards. In fact the ease with which the A.R.A. succeeded in mobilizing throughout Russia its own public service utility without expense is a striking commentary on the vastness of the American operation, the profundity of its probe into Russian life.

The figures on refunds made necessary by inability to find a beneficiary make satisfying reading. Out of a total of 947,795 packages addressed to specific individuals in Russia, only 9,657 were cancelled due to inability to locate, that is 1.03 per cent of the total volume of business. And this does not mean that the Food Draft failed to find 9,657 individuals, since often a single beneficiary had more than one package consigned to him.


Proving Identity

Delivery offered problems as difficult as notification. The Administration gave the consignee three alternatives in taking delivery of the package. He could receive it in person, authorize an agent to act for him, or have it shipped by parcel post. No matter what the form of delivery, the A.R.A. required the most complete identification to prevent mistakes or frauds, and to prove to the donor that his package had gone where he intended. On receiving his Food Remittance, consignee had to sign a card of acknowledgment addressed to purchaser as well as receipts in triplicate, one of which remained at the Delivery Station, the second in Moscow, and the third of which returned to New York. Should the purchaser discover the signature to be a forgery, he, of course, held the Relief Administration responsible for misdelivery. Where an agent received the package, he had to bring duplicate authorizations from the beneficiary, and consignees who elected to trust to the postal service had to mail such authorizations, so that in every case the A.R.A. could show the donor the signature of the beneficiary.

By way of identification, the Administration insisted on papers from the police or some other government department. Obviously, the beneficiary

RUSSIAN FOOD REMITTANCE DELIVERIES BY DISTRICTS

Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars



had to bring with him the notification card as well, which was in itself an identification. The new Division had not been long on its legs, however, before cases of wrong delivery made on the strength of false identity papers, came to light.

Investigation in Moscow in June, 1922, proved that in certain towns outside of the Capital, certificates from the militia could be bought for 2,000,000 rubles (about 50¢) and no questions asked. The chiefs of the bureaus concerned denied that such certificates had been issued. At all events the A.R.A. tightened its already strict regulations and required consignees to produce such additional identifications as documents from the housing committees. ** As a final test, Delivery stations asked applicants the name of the donor, which in nine cases out of ten the rightful consignee would know. If he did not and the A.R.A. had reason to be suspicious, it demanded further proof.

Graft and Theft

The Food Remittance Division could not be too strict. Graft and theft were nearly as common in famine struck Russia as hunger, and that was universal. To understand the breakdown in common standards of morality, the complete reversal to the primitive in ethics which took place in Russia, one must have seen the physical ruin which war, revolution and famine produced there. These phases are vague, and constant repetition has dulled their effect. They mean that wealth, - that is, houses, food, clothing, and the means of production thereof, - had been destroyed. Even with perfect distribution of what remained, giving everyone a famine norm, it is doubtful whether Russia had enough of the first necessities to insure life to all its citizens. Nothing could bring about perfect distribution; thousands of people were marked inevitably for death. That meant a struggle for life between men, the sort of a struggle which man grew out of when he left the jungle, and when necessity forced him back to it, he forgot much of the code which he had developed in the interim.

When such fundamental principles as "the sanctity of human life" cease to mean anything, what hope has a secondary shibboleth like the "sanctity of private property"? In the regions of severe famine, what we consider as crime flourished. No wonder, for what is a man not capable of when he himself is starving and his children die under his eyes? Robberies, even murders for theft occurred nightly, in such hard hit centers as Ufa, Orenburg, Kiev and Odessa. The American personnel went armed for self protection. In February, 1922, thieves killed twelve people in one night in Ufa, five of whom were the wife and children of a Russian employee of the A.R.A. Nearly every morning revealed the stripped corpse of some victim of thieves in Kiev. No measures whatever could stop this, not even capital punishment inflicted within 24 hours. People had no alternative; if they didn't rob, death was certain; if they robbed they might live. Even highly educated people, innately honest, could not refrain sometimes from stealing food if the opportunity offered.

** In Soviet Russia where all property was nationalized houses ceased to be in the control of private people. Consequently every dwelling had its committee of control which ran the house and represented the government in the collection of lodging taxes, et cetera.

Deposing Faiths and Principles

It was not only the pitiless economic situation which helped scrap the moral conventions of the public. The Russian Revolution was social, and only political to gain a social end; it discarded the fundamental ideas by which a nation had been living for centuries, and by that very fact it shook every other idea which had been living alongside those cast away; it questioned everything which had been simply because it had been. Only the very strong minded came through this mental and moral earthquake with old certainties still certain. Specifically, the Communist Government dealt a heavy blow to ordinary property morals by abolishing private property and confiscating the all of the former bourgeoisie without compensation. These theories and their application demoralized the proletariat and gave that class of the population which is generally considered the guardian of public morals a sense of injury which overrode the precepts of conscience. The large body of offenders, of course, were not the average citizens, but the criminally minded who, like looters after a fire, jumped to take advantage of the relaxed moral standards and the disorganized police forces.

A.R.A. Contact with Theft

An American relief worker ignorant of the background could not at first grasp this situation. In his eyes a thief was a thief and it took considerable association with the tragedies of the Russian famine before he could bring himself to judge pilfering of food and fraudulent dealing with that leniency to which in Soviet Russia it was entitled. It cannot be denied that he had sufficient occasion to judge it. From the time a food ship entered a Russian port till the food package had found the hearth for which it was intended, it stood in danger of partial or complete disappearance. The stevedores at the port wore curious Dutch trousers, the legs of which would hold almost a sack of flour. The stevedores, themselves, were masters at dropping a crate of milk so as to split it enough for one or two cans to be extracted. Freight cars suffered at the hands of refugees and possibly of hungry trainmen. The slightest crack proved sufficient to allow of some pilfering, and the unfortunate packages which had to be transshipped en route due to a hot box could not be expected to escape whole. Once at the Moscow repacking room, Food Remittance shipments faced a new order of dangers; in making up postal parcels, for instance, the laborers developed a talent for substituting three pounds of tin foil for three pounds of tea, sand for sugar, and even of emptying milk cans and refilling them with water. The ingenuity of the food thief knew no bounds.

When the food package reached the district the Supervisor knew that he could look for attempted theft and fraud from every quarter. Every delivery station had its quota of misdeliveries due to forged documents of identification. Kharkov District reported the case of a consignee who was robbed of all his personal documents as well as of the A.R.A. notification card. He failed to notify the Food Remittance office before the thief had taken delivery of the package. In this as in all other cases the Relief Administration compensated the rightful beneficiary at its own expense. The same district also suffered at the hands of dishonest postal officials who extracted notification cards from the mails and turned them over to a woman confederate. She forged documents of identity on the strength of which she received packages. Happily she terminated her career in jail. Kazan district reported cases of the same nature in which the post office was also implicated and in which the thief had access

to government stamps. These frauds were not discovered until the receipts bearing signatures of the recipients reached the donors in America who recognized them as false. Forging documents of identity did not present any extraordinary difficulties to the Russian, thanks to the connivance of dishonest officials and to the carelessness with which defunct Government departments had disposed of their papers and stamps.

Easy Money for the Inside Worker

The real opportunities for illegitimate receipt of food packages, of course, fell to those on the inside, - employees of the Delivery Stations whom scruples did not restrain. The office force knew, for instance, for whom packages had come, what beneficiaries could not be found and such other information as cried to be used. Vitebsk District had an employee who stole notice cards addressed to people in outlying districts. He had in his possession the official stamp of some government institution which he used to forge documents which named him as agent of the beneficiary. Growing overbold with too much success he made the mistake of forging the signature of a beneficiary who lived in Vitebsk, and he also went to jail. Several districts had employees whom they suspected of giving information to confederates outside by which packages were falsely delivered. Minsk station discovered a gang of five, one of whom worked in the office, which collected some twenty packages illegally before they were caught. Doubtful employees soon fell by the wayside, however, and delivery stations generally boasted of the loyalty of their personnel.

Subtle Graft

Other methods of defrauding the A.R.A. besides forging documents existed. Kiev District had several complaints from consignees who claimed to have left Russia before packages were delivered and who asked that money be refunded to purchaser. Upon investigation it generally developed that delivery of the packages in question had been made to agents. The obvious conclusion was to suppose that the agents had forged authorization papers, but such tests as comparison of signature of the rightful beneficiary with that of the authorization papers indicated in practically every case that they were not forgeries. Apparently the trick was to sell the package rights for cash, and then after crossing the border, to lodge complaint of non-delivery in the hope of swindling the A.R.A.

Occasionally beneficiaries attempted to take delivery of the same package twice. A Lipsa Shurman appeared at the Moscow delivery station in June, 1922, and stated that he had been expecting a draft for a long period but had had no word of it from the A.R.A. The clerks discovered that a package had already been delivered to one Lipsa Shurman; the applicant stoutly declared that he had not received it and prepared to charge the A.R.A. with delivering his property to someone else. A copy of his signature was obtained and it proved to be identical with that on the original receipt. The caller thereupon explained that he had received letters from America stating that more than one package had been sent, but on the whole he seemed willing to let the matter drop.

Misdeliveries by Error

Error, which the peculiarities of Russian orthography rendered common, accounted for its share of misdelliveries. In spite of the fact that sales offices abroad caused names of consignees to be written in Russian as well as in English, mistakes occurred. Morkko Rabinovitch in Russia became Meyer Rabriner in America; Lewa Belensky changed to Leon White across the Atlantic, and Aron Zlatousky reappeared as Harry Feingold. Kiev District delivered a food draft to Girsh Aizenberg at 12, Mar-Blagoveshenskaya, Apt. 16, although the address given was 14 Mar-Blagoveshenskaya. Later, another Girsh Aizenberg, living at 41 Mar-Blagoveshenskaya, Apt. 16, turned up in quest of a package. He proved to be the rightful beneficiary and the A.R.A. sought reimbursement from the first Aizenberg. It found the man in such poor circumstances, however, as to be unable to make reparation. Since he had received the package in all innocence the District satisfied his namesake with a package from its reserve funds.

Wherever a misdellivery came to light the Station brought what pressure it could to force reimbursement of the package. The Administration had of course the pressure of the Soviet courts behind it and those guilty of fraudulent dealing paid the legal penalty. However, only in the minority of cases were packages recovered.

Forged documents, carelessness and dishonesty of postal authorities and similarity of names accounted for all misdelliveries made in Russia. In all, only 272 food packages and 16 clothing packages went astray during the entire operation, - an infinitesimal percentage of a million packages. The districts accounted for these as follows:

<u>District</u>	<u>Food Packages</u>	<u>Clothing Packages</u>
Gomel	10	14
Vitebsk	10	
Ufa	8	
Elizabethgrad	15	
Kiev	14	
Simferopol	3	
Rostov/Don	10	
Samara	2	
Saratov	20	
Kazan	4	
Odessa	30	
Kharkov	6	
Orenburg	0	
Simbirsk	0	
Petrograd	30	2
Minsk	61	
Moscow	49	
	<u>272</u>	<u>16</u>

Heavyhanded Grafters

The beneficiary went from the Delivery Station office where he had proved his identity and signed the necessary receipts, to the warehouse, which

was generally in another part of the same building, bearing orders for his food. However exultant he may have felt to be so near the attainment of the treasured package from America, those packages were not yet out of danger. Victimized helpless consignees of a part of their products offered scope for the ingenuity of a good many of the warehouse employees. Kiev District had scarcely begun its operations before the Supervisor discovered three of his warehouse men grafting on beneficiaries. The young inefficiency of the delivery machinery kept people waiting in line in the early days for rather long periods. The Kiev employees took advantage of this to serve beneficiaries out of turn for a consideration, - usually some sugar, milk or tea. Such practices had their fling in practically every district, but the same trio in Kiev evolved another form of graft which was unique. As consignees took delivery they were covertly informed that they must give a part of their package to the warehouse employees, then the latter called at the consignee's home later. It is extraordinary that so bold faced a bit of bullying could succeed. It did so because of the complete moral subjection to which the civil war and the revolutionary terror had reduced a population accustomed through centuries to unquestioning submission.

Moscow District reported the case of a Jewish woman who made a practice of calling on beneficiaries to whom notification cards were about to be mailed. She gave them news of the package and informed them that she could simplify and expedite delivery for them - obviously for a consideration. The woman posed as an A.R.A. employee, and she undoubtedly had colleagues in the office who gave her information on beneficiaries and who expedited delivery in the cases of her victims.

Agents Who Succumbed

Consignees who entrusted the collection of their packages to agents frequently complained to the A.R.A. that the commodities they received did not correspond with amounts listed on the delivery order. Since the agent had receipted for the amount listed suspicion naturally fell on him - probably with justice. The German villages in the Saratov district had a habit of commissioning their pastors to collect all packages due the village, a system which generally proved irreproachable. However, one man succumbed to temptation and levied surreptitiously a regular tax on all packages he delivered. After a time rumor of this spread even to America and caused the Saratov office to take steps for the culprit's punishment.

"Economizing" Packages

Cases of outright theft by warehouse employees of a few ounces of flour from individual beneficiaries at moment of delivery were probably not infrequent though extremely difficult to establish. Kiev found one of its warehouse managers guilty of this. His defense indicates an attitude of mind not uncommon among laboring people in Russia.

"If we issue one thousand packages a day," he said, "and at the end of the day one package is missing it will make one-thousandth part, or one-tenth of one percent. It is just as if I had bought half a ton of coal and dropped a lump weighing one pound. Is there anything wrong in that?"

This same manager came under suspicion of a more serious offense. A peasant girl came to the office and learned that in addition to the order for which she had received a notification card another receipt had arrived. Exultation at this great good fortune drove all thought of detail out of the poor girl's head and she did not notice that the second order was for two packages. She understood only that she was to receive more than one package, and clutching the precious delivery orders to her breast she rushed to the warehouse, where the confusion increased her excitement. The controller called out her receipt number several times. "No. 385!" She did not answer, failing to understand that this call referred to her. "Beyla Schectman from Talnoye!" shouted at last, the controller, losing patience. That she understood. "Here! Here I am!" "How many packages?" asks the controller, who knew perfectly well, but saw that she did not. "How am I to know?" she replied. "Two!" he called promptly to his assistants and in a moment the workmen had carried her food-stuffs out into the yard, where her sole care was to prevent them from being stolen. And then the controller satisfied with his success, issued the package "economized" to a trusted speculator to be sold on the market. There was no way of proving this, of course, and the controller could only be discharged on suspicion, but the disgruntled recipient who later realized that she had been swindled of a package, could not be made to believe in the honesty of the A.R.A.

Theft and abuse generally decreased visibly as the Food Remittance operation carried on; the Delivery stations weeded out doubtful employees and built barriers against frauds with equal care. It is an illuminating fact that 75 per cent of the cases of fraudulent delivery occurred in the first four or five months of the Food Remittance business.

MORE DISTRICT PROBLEMS

Chapter XIV

The necessity of fighting dishonesty enormously increased the red tape in the District Food Remittance offices, which in turn necessitated increased personnel. The routine through which the beneficiary had to pass was pretty severe. His papers from the State and from the housing commission required careful perusal to establish their authenticity. Frequently the suggestion of suspicion behind the requirements offended his dignity, and the clerk fell a victim to his rage. Once his identity was established to the satisfaction of the clerk, the beneficiary had to sign three receipts with his name and address, and the acknowledgment card addressed to the donor abroad, as well. All this meant a vast amount of explaining and haranguing and arguing, which made of the Food Draft offices Babylons of irritated, excited, dazed people, pushing, grumbling, begging, sometimes even hysterical with joy at the receipt of a package.

The Food Remittance clerk had every conceivable situation to deal with. There was the disappointed applicant who hoped that tenacity would win him a package and who passed from clerk to clerk during a whole day. The old woman who had insufficient papers of identity wasted an hour of her own and a clerk's time in an amiable but fruitless effort to get her package at once. A peasant from Jmerinka in Kiev province labored for two hours to sign five receipts. The clerk protested that he took too much time:

"What is the hurry?" he asked. "We country people are not used to hurry; we do everything slowly in order to live longer."

Overstepping The Limit

There were the very ignorant who had to have everything done for them; there were the officious and insolent who endeavored to upset the regime of the office. One of these pushed his way into the Vitebsk office out of line and was rebuked by the American in charge. He spat in the American's face, which of course, resulted in the thrashing he deserved. There were the people who came in response to advertisements of undelivered packages. Each claimed to bear the missing beneficiary's name and each was certain that he alone in the entire province bore such a name. These people could never be convinced that the package was not for them even though it had already been delivered to the rightful consignee.

The issuing of orders for packages was only part of the day's work of the office staff. Each day the report of deliveries by Remittance numbers had to be made up and checked with the report of deliveries from the warehouse; receipts newly arrived from Moscow had to be listed and checked, notification cards written and delivery orders and acknowledgment cards prepared for the signature of the beneficiary. Remittances intended for people who had removed to other districts required transferring and Remittances definitely undeliverable had to be cancelled.

Cancellation Of Orders

The question of cancellation was at all times a sore point in the Districts. The agreement with the purchaser bound the Administration to refund money if the package had not been delivered at the end of ninety days. Since sales had begun at the end of October, 1921, first refunds should have been made at the end of January. The situation at that period has already been described. Had the A.R.A. begun refunds then and continued refunding each remittance the moment the ninety day time limit was reached, the Food Remittance would have come to an abrupt and rapid end. Fortunately, the purchaser wanted above everything else the A.R.A. to succeed in delivering the package, and although he complained if the Administration overran the time limit, he had no thought of demanding his money back. Nevertheless, the New York office felt that the reputation for integrity of the A.R.A. required that all early sales not delivered by the end of March, 1922, should be cancelled and the money refunded. Accordingly Moscow wired the Districts to cancel all November and December sales undelivered in the Districts at the end of March. Kiev responded with a letter which typified the position of the Delivery Stations on the subject of cancellation. It bore the date of March 26, 1922.

The Burden On The Districts

"In reference to your wire 149 we refer to our 102 and 104. We have been unable to make even an attempt to deliver most of the receipts sold November, December and January, much less to go into the matter thoroughly and comb out those which we cannot locate. You have actually shipped only about 6,000 packages to Kiev, whereas there are 4,000 November receipts alone calling for about 6,000 packages, and a total number of packages to deliver of about 25,000.

"Packages for post did not arrive until February 12th, and we sent no notice cards to province consignees until that date, when we sent cards for 1,000 packages. We did not know how many would want shipments by post. Answers to these cards are still coming in, and we have no packages to fill them, as they are mostly counter deliveries. We can send no more cards to provinces until food is actually here, for if we send cards some consignees will comply at once, spend money to come to Kiev, and then find no foodstuffs here.

"Then comes word you are shipping 1,200 packages. This helps in no way, as we can only send out enough cards to cover this amount. Such a small number of cards will come in slowly, meaning a delivery of only about 100 packages daily, loss of time and waste of money in overhead, when we should be delivering about 400. But we cannot send more cards out, for if we do, we will have a howling mob raising "Cain" at our doors every day. We have already had the front door pushed in, and had to have a new one made.

"For this next shipment of 1,200 packages we will send only cards to provinces, but this will be for only part of November sales.

"Receipts for December and January must wait until we have the foodstuffs. Cards for Kiev have been sent up to 8,900; these are for receipts sold December. January sales for the city of Kiev not yet touched.

"How then can we cancel and mark 'not deliverable account failure locate consignee'? Why, we have not even tried to locate!

"Before we can make such a statement you must ship us enough packages to protect us in our efforts to locate consignees. It would appear wise on the surface to have New York stop sales for a month until we, in Russia, get caught up on deliveries. It's easy for you all, to sit at a desk and say cancel, but the district is the goat, for here is where the crying women, sick and

dying invalids, destitute orphans, all with letters from America describing the wonderful package which has been sent, come to inquire and ask for their gift, and it is not so easy for us to sit calmly back at our desk and say 'Cancelled'."

A Removable Cause

The root of the difficulty was of course lack of food supplies to make deliveries, and back of that, as has been explained in Chapter VII, was lack of internal transportation, lack of government cooperation, et cetera. The Administration hoped that once this difficulty was removed, it would be removed for good and all. Consequently it extended the time limit for cancellations at the beginning of the operation until each district had been protected with an adequate number of packages to effect delivery of the major portion of orders on hand. Thereafter Moscow evolved a general rule for cancellation which it explained to the Delivery Stations in a Circular letter.

"We guarantee to the purchaser of a Remittance that we will deliver within ninety days. At the expiration of ninety days he is therefore entitled to demand cancellation of the remittance and to request refund of the purchase money. If, however, he fails to request cancellation, we allow ourselves an additional sixty days in which to locate the beneficiary, and at the end of this period cancellation and refund are automatic and obligatory. Our chief aim is therefore to effect all deliveries within ninety days per our agreement with the purchaser, and the success of the Food Remittance operation depends on our ability to do this. The extra sixty days is an afterthought, and we believe we will not need it if sufficient supplies can be kept on hand in the districts to meet all obligations."

Periodically throughout the operation Moscow reminded the Districts to cancel all remittances 150 days old and kept a check to insure that this was done. An astonishingly large number of cancellations were reinstated at the request of purchaser who received word giving a clue to beneficiary's whereabouts, or of the District which succeeded eventually in routing him out. By July, 1922, the Food Remittance Division had become so efficient as to reach 85 per cent of beneficiaries within the 90 day limit, and 95 per cent in 150 days. It improved continuously so that in 1923 it regularly got packages to 93 per cent of beneficiaries within 90 days from date of sale.

Statistics on cancellation are as follows:

		<u>% of total volume of business</u>
1. a)	Total of advices cancelled at Moscow Headquarters and ordered refunded without attempting delivery, e.g., remittances addressed to Siberia, Cis-Caucasia.....	\$11,790.00 0.12
b)	Marked cancelled on bordereaux when original received.....	5,240.00 0.05
2.	Total of advices cancelled after delivery attempted.....	
	At request of purchaser.....	\$ 18,770.00 0.20
	At request of beneficiary.....	2,180.00 0.02
	Beneficiary deceased or left	
	Russia.....	8,610.00 0.09
	Unable locate beneficiary.....	96,570.00 1.03
	Remittances calling for delivery outside European Russia.....	540.00 0.01
	Liquidation cancellations.....	13,240.00 0.14
	Cancelled at request Soviet Govt.	190.00 -
	Miscellaneous.....	140.00 -
		<u>140,240.000</u>
	TOTAL CANCELLATIONS	\$157,270.00 1.66%

Speculation In Food Packages

The Food Remittance Districts began their operations very strongly impressed with the necessity of preventing speculation in foodstuffs imported into Russia for packages. The Government had made objection to the Food Remittance plan on the ground that it offered a field for speculators, and the Administration felt under obligation to prevent trafficking in packages. To this end it made the beneficiary sign a statement declaring that he would not sell the commodities, and in all Warehouses notices warned the public that the penalty for speculation in the food packages was arrest.

Apparently the penalty did not hold out any very great terrors to the Russian or else he felt that the chances of getting caught were small enough to make speculation worth while, for no Delivery station issued many packages before some A.R.A. commodities began to appear on the market, - white flour, obviously American, and tins of evaporated milk of the various brands issued by the Food Remittance. The Americans called the attention of the police to the situation. Occasionally this resulted in raids on the market and on the stores displaying American wares, but the effect never lasted and milk and flour and tea reappeared in short order.

Where Sale Was Justified

It is doubtful whether the most stringent measures would have effectively prevented some sale of package commodities. Reasons for sale were too

legitimate and pressing. Many of the people who received food drafts were as destitute of other essentials such as clothing and fuel as they were of food. Naturally it seemed better to them to do without milk, for instance, and have an overcoat, than to keep the milk and freeze. Beneficiaries who came from out of town often had not a cent to pay for their journey home with the package, so they sold a small share of it to obtain travelling expenses. In the spring the peasants had some milk from their cows and goats, so that it was a much wiser scheme to sell the American milk and buy a needed tool for the farm. Furthermore the white American flour could be exchanged for twice as much black flour, and the man interested in keeping himself and his family alive till the coming harvest did not waste any regrets over the superior quality nor did he suffer any qualms of conscience over his broken agreement with the A.R.A. As a matter of fact the majority of consignees in all probability scarcely understood that they had agreed not to sell their foodstuffs. Also, it must be remembered that these Food Remittances were not public charity, they were direct gifts from friends and relatives in America. Certainly thousands of them did sell. In the summer of 1922, not a food shop in Moscow failed to display a few tins of evaporated milk. The percentage on the whole, of course, was small.


After their first more or less fruitless appeals to the authorities, the Americans felt that they had discharged their obligation and left the responsibility for stopping the sale of foodstuffs to the Government. The Administration felt the legitimacy of the desire of many beneficiaries to exchange part of their Food packages for more needed articles. In fact it tacitly permitted the use of the Food Remittance as a channel of money remittance, since no reliable agency existed in Russia for such transmission. For its part, the Government seemed willing enough to close its eyes to the prevalence of American products on the market and did nothing of its own accord.

The Public Benefits

There can be no doubt that the appearance on the market of Food Remittance supplies worked for the general good rather than otherwise. Without exception, the arrival of American products brought prices of all foodstuffs down, and the opportunity to buy them spread their benefit over a much larger surface. Undoubtedly one of the great secondary effects of the Food Remittance operation was the lowering of prices, especially in large centers like Odessa, Kiev, etc. The importance of this effect gives it a prominent place in the accomplishments of the Food Remittance Division, and as such it is treated at length, later. Suffice it to say here that the A.R.A. never regretted the larger share of the dealing in food packages.

The Black Sheep In Speculation

All dealing in foodstuffs, however, could not claim the innocence of that described above. Until the harvest of 1922 the Food Remittance package which sold for \$10.00 abroad could command from twenty to sixty dollars in Russia. Obviously this situation offered tempting possibilities to the horde of speculators who made up a numerous class in post-revolutionary Russian towns. It was these people who bought from the beneficiaries and sold at a profit on the market. Their real ambition, however, was to receive packages from abroad themselves. A group of profiteers in Saratov transmitted by secret



means to Riga considerable sums for the purchase of Food Remittances, and undoubtedly people in other districts did the same thing. On each package received they made from two to three hundred per cent profit.

However, two very serious obstacles prevented activities of this sort on a large scale. The Warehouse Agreement obligated the A.R.A. to submit all orders for more than five packages to the Representative Plenipotentiary, who, if he had reason to suspect speculation could forbid delivery of the Remittance. Secondly the difficulties of transmitting money abroad were so great as to render constant activities of this sort impossible. Those who had friends abroad who could finance large remittances had the Representative Plenipotentiary's office to balk them. Furthermore, wherever too frequent and too large orders were delivered to the same people the District Supervisors grew suspicious and investigated, thus nipping occasional attempts to make profit out of the A.R.A. scheme. During the first year, speculation did not develop into a serious problem and afterwards the fall in the value of the package made it cease to be a problem at all.

Official Sale of Packages in Russia

Many Russians, speculators and others, attempted to buy packages from the A.R.A. locally. However, the Administration refused baldly to sell in Russia except to Americans and for American money. It made one exception in favor of the Representative Plenipotentiary, who bought a considerable number of packages for his employees and others.

The problems of delivery stations were small and great and never ending, like the waves of the sea. They made the District operation difficult but they also made it interesting. The district Americans endured greater hardships than the men at headquarters, but they enjoyed the intense satisfaction of seeing the results of their work. It is flattering to be the General, but it is more exciting to thrust the bayonet; the District thrust the bayonet in the Russian relief operation.

RELIEF TO THE VALUED INDIVIDUAL

Chapter XV

The suspicion of commercialism hung like a shadow over the Food Remittance Division in Russia during a large part of its lifetime. Nothing did more toward dissipating this shadow and proving to even the ill-willed that it was a chimera projected by their own cynicism than the so-called General Relief program. This phase of the Food Remittance operation could with reason lay claim to being the most altruistic and effective relief activity in the entire Russian undertaking. In terms of dollars it involved the disbursement of a relatively small fraction of the total expended in Russian relief, roughly about \$1,200,000. In terms of results accomplished it will probably continue to pay interest to the human race long after the corn program and childfeeding have been forgotten.

The term "General Relief" does not satisfactorily describe the program to which it applied. It suggests indiscriminate aid to masses, whereas the program really consisted in relief most carefully limited. The purpose of the Administration in establishing it was to meet the need of isolated cases, particularly among the educated classes who were considered especially valuable members of the body politic. Either "Individual" or "Specific" relief would have been a more exact nomenclature. For the sake of clarity in this story, the term "General Relief" will be dropped and "Special Relief" substituted, to describe this program of aid to picked individuals.

Nations and Individuals?

The prime objective of the A.R.A. was to succor nations; the gigantic scale of its operations would seem to have precluded attention to individuals. It gave a balance ration daily for the mass feeding of children in kitchens; it issued corn by the carload as supplementary feeding to millions of adults; it provided medicines and equipment to reestablish and keep the entire hospital systems of nations going. Could it afford in addition to seek out the isolated individual case for aid?

During the years of its operation in Central Europe it had been the effort of the American Relief Administration to provide constructive aid to the countries helped, not merely to relieve a transient suffering. It attempted to give an intelligent impetus upward as well as to save life. With this end in mind it recognized the essential value to the community of the educated and trained citizen, and it had singled him out for particular attention. It carried the same purposes and the same opinions into Russia; consequently it could not avoid doing its utmost to sustain life among the decimated leaders of Russian thought in every branch - teachers, scientists, engineers, the medical and nursing professions, the liberal arts, etc., etc.

Never numerous in the best of times in Russia, the Americans found that the war and the revolution had taken its heaviest toll from the educated classes and that the famine threatened their complete extermination. It is impossible here to give a complete picture of the condition of the intelligentsia generally in Russia. However, the following excerpts from a description of conditions in Petrograd by a Russian writer will indicate what suffering they endured.

The Death Toll Among Brain-Workers

"Death was now more in evidence than life. Before my eyes there died Feodor Batiushkov, the famous professor of philology, poisoned from eating uneatably filthy cabbage. Another one to die from hunger was S. Bengerov, professor of history and literature, he who gave to the Russian people entire editions of Shakespeare, of Schiller, and of Pushkin. I saw him quivering and limping about the bazaar, coveting an apple which his means could not provide him. I saw that talented critic, A. A. Ismailov, die of hunger. At the same period the philosopher, V. V. Rosanov, succumbed to starvation in Moscow. Before his death the latter roamed the streets in search of cigarette ends with which to appease his hunger. But even these could not be found. Try to visualize your own Emerson in tatters, wandering about the streets of Boston, snatching with frozen fingers some crumb from the highway mud. Those of us who remained alive ceased to create and mourned the loss of these powers. We all suffered. Painters ceased to draw, poets could not compose, dramatists directed funeral processions and sculptors formed slippers from matting."

Food Remittance to the Fore

Intellectual life had stopped in Russia, for in the kingdom of hunger there is no place for thoughts which do not concern food and how to get it. The situation of the educated classes called everywhere imperatively for relief. How to answer this call presented the problem. The Riga agreement foresaw only mass feeding, first for children and secondarily for adults. The machinery required for such relief did not allow for the selection and support of individuals. But when the Food Remittance Division appeared on the horizon, the outlook changed. The Remittance scheme offered a perfect channel for the distribution of specific relief. Since the essence of the Warehouse plan was the delivery of packages to private persons designated by people in America, it could certainly deliver packages to individuals designated by itself with special funds provided for the purpose. In addition, the existing delivery stations could be utilized without increasing overhead; the package unit offered a perfect form of relief since it contained sufficient food to carry an entire family along for months under famine conditions; and its distribution carried no taint of charity, since the Food Remittance functioned like a post office and people ate the food privately at home.

There could be no question of the adaptability of Food Remittance machinery to the issuing of Special Relief. Once the Division was established the difficulties simmered down to three, two major and one minor. Special Relief would have to be financed, the consent of the Soviet Government to the program would have to be obtained, and systems of selecting beneficiaries would have to be developed.

As for finances, the limitations of the Riga Agreement, which stated that the Administration's relief should be distributed solely on the basis of need, and to masses, prevented it from employing any of its publicly subscribed funds toward the helping of special categories. Furthermore, at that time, that is in the fall of 1921, it was preparing to ask for American support for child and adult feeding through Congress, and it couldn't afford to confuse the issue by asking for funds for other purposes.

Aid to an Ideal

The people whom it was desired to help principally were not individuals as much as they were the representatives and caretakers of creative thought. Common humanity alone stood at the base of mass relief to starving children and peasants. Interests in a common culture stood at the basis of the relief to intellectuals. This fact suggested to the Relief Administration the idea which solved the question of financing Special Relief, without compromising the A.R.A. in any way. There are philanthropic individuals and foundations in America whose avowed purpose is the support and encouragement of intellectual life throughout the world. The A.R.A. had already served as the channel for the aid of such foundations in Central Europe. It appealed to them from Russia, with results which will justify attention in detail, later.

Reasoning along the same lines, the Administration felt that intellectual groups held together by a common profession in America, would have an interest in sister groups in Russia. That is to say, the artists of New York could not but feel a particular sympathy with the artists of Moscow, the doctors of America with the doctors of Russia. If the tragic situation of the Russian groups and the menace to a common culture which that situation involved could be brought to the attention of American groups, it was felt that the latter could not but respond with aid. To attain this end the Administration in Russia devised the group appeal plan.

At the same time that District Delivery stations began their post card appeal campaign, overworked Supervisors canvassed all manner of professional and artistic groups for petitions to be transmitted to America. The cost to Russian pride of these appeals was enormous and only the assurance that they would be understood as attempts to salvage a common culture and not as private begging induced the Russians to formulate them.

Doctors First

The first large donations for Special Relief which these methods produced came in December and January of 1921-22, simultaneously with the effective establishment of the Food Remittance organization throughout Russia. The donations answered a special appeal for doctors. On going into the provinces to open kitchens for children the Americans soon discovered that the ravages of disease on the population were as much to be dreaded as, and in fact indistinguishable from, those of famine. Epidemics threatened to render the relief food useless. Russia's defensive force for sanitation had always been small, and the famine threatened to exterminate it altogether. The organization of physicians of Samara Gubernia reported in a letter dated January 14, 1922, that the per cent of exanthematic typhus was six to eight for the whole population and twenty-five to thirty for doctors. Obviously, effective aid to Russia demanded that the A.R.A. support this most fundamental weapon of counter attack. In response to its petitions the Administration received initial donations of \$35,000 from Wm. Bingham, 2nd, of Bethel, Maine, and Santa Barbara, California; of \$25,000 from the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, of \$5,000 from the Rochester Community Fund, and of others which brought the total to \$67,500.

What Would the Government Say?

The arrival of Remittances for these first Special Relief packages, earmarked for Doctors, precipitated the question of the Government reaction to

their distribution. As the child of a social revolution aimed against the social faiths and political theories in which the educated classes generally believed, the Soviet Government could not be expected to look with favor on these classes nor consequently on aid brought to them. It was not that the Communists opposed intelligence and education as such; it was the chance that the educated people of Russia were their political enemies.

The American Relief Administration sensed this delicate situation. It understood perfectly that an aggressive expression on its part of its desire to give relief to the Intelligentsia would frighten off the Soviets as effectively as a gun shot frightens a hare. While foreseeing its Special Relief program, it carefully avoided any mention thereof during the negotiations for the signing of the Warehouse agreement. The germ of the Food Remittance plan was the same as the germ of Special Relief, - namely, specific relief. The Americans hoped, therefore, that if they could obtain Soviet consent to the Food Remittance work, they would eventually be able to demonstrate that specific relief contained no bombshells for the Soviet Government and thus win the practically unconscious consent of the Bolsheviks to Special Relief.

No Attempt to Deceive

It may be felt that this scheme savoured of an attempt to deceive the Soviet Government. The Relief Administration, however, knew perfectly well that its purposes were honorable, were untainted with partizanship, and contained no danger for the Soviet Government as a Government, while they did contain a large amount of good for the Russian people. All it strove to avoid was arousing the over sensitive wariness of the Government.

When the packages for the relief of doctors arrived, the Food Remittance Division did not submit them to the Government Representative for approval. It did not, of course, attempt to make a secret of them, but it entrusted their allocation to the Medical Division of the Administration. This Division distributed them largely among doctors who were working in collaboration with it in the famine districts and in the big cities. Consequently the packages had somewhat the air of salaries. At all events they called forth no action from the Government Representative.

This fact, fortunate as it was, did not greatly reassure the Food Remittance Division. In January the arrival of donations of a more controversial nature moved Mr. Burland to send a memorandum to the Delivery Stations instructing them to make use of General Committees in the allocation of Special Relief packages. This memorandum was meant as a sop to forestall possible opposition from the Government Representative to the Special Relief program in general and the group appeal campaign which was launched at this time, in particular. To obtain these appeals, the Administration had to assemble groups, such as professors, actors, musicians, upon which the Government looked with a suspicious and inimical eye. The terror of the groups themselves was such as to prevent them from taking any action without the expressed approval of the Government.

Approval of Mr. Kamenev

The Americans felt the uselessness of soliciting the approval of Mr. Eiduk, wherefore they turned at once to a higher authority, Mr. Leo Kamenev, member of the Central Executive Committee and head of the Moscow Soviet, who

was also particularly responsible for government relations with the A.R.A. The Administration did not ask outright for his approval of the group appeal plan; it requested his good offices in obtaining an appeal from the Moscow Professional Workers Union, on the theory that such intervention would amount to tacit approval of the plan generally. Mr. Kamenev readily promised his support and expressed himself as favorable to the idea of help to professional groups. Fortified with this approval the American Supervisor of Moscow District went out to get appeals.

He experienced no difficulties until he approached or attempted to approach the students of the First and Second Moscow Universities. The Rector of the First University greeted the plan with cold suspicion and refused under any circumstances to permit a mass meeting of the student body. The Rector of the Second University showed the best of good will and volunteered to do everything possible. He intimated, however, that there would be difficulties. The following day the District Supervisor was called to Relief Administration headquarters to learn that the Government Representative had protested against his dealing with the head of the Cadet Party in the person of the Rector of the Second Moscow University. No official appeal was obtained from either University.

The Initial Struggle for Control

Mr. Eiduk continued to follow the activities of the Food Remittance Division with a disconcerting and hampering suspiciousness. His attempt to check all Receipts in the headquarters office has already been touched upon. Not succeeding in this, he sent a special representative to the local Moscow District delivery office to go through all receipts as they arrived there. A complaint came from the Kharkov district that the Chekka was registering all notice post cards as they went through the post office. In several instances orders had come through consigning a large number of packages to one individual for distribution among an entire village. Mr. Eiduk refused to give his sanction to delivery of such orders unless the local Soviet relief committees were given what amounted practically to control of the distribution.

A case in point was that of the village Svonarefkut, in the Volga German communes. A donor in America had consigned 50 packages to Kaspar Krutsch, a leading German-Russian citizen, for delivery among the poor of the village. With reference to this case which had been submitted to Mr. Eiduk under the \$50.00 clause of the Warehouse Agreement, the Government Representative wrote on February 16, 1922 as follows:

"Please be advised that I have no objection to 50 food packages being delivered to Mr. Kaspar Krutsch, Village Svonarefkut, on the following basis: That these packages be delivered to Mr. Krutsch under the control of the Markstadt Ouyezd Relief Committee. I shall instruct that the donor Mr. Stahl has apparently entrusted distribution to Mr. Krutsch, for which reason the latter's wishes should as far as possible be respected.

"If you are of the same understanding I have no objection to the packages being delivered at once. I am forwarding copy of this letter to my representative for the German Communes, Comrade Beerman, as well as to the President of the Markstadt Relief Committee.

"I agree to the above arrangement only because I wish to assist the Food Remittance Division of the A.R.A. and facilitate its work, as the Soviet Government is decidedly opposed to having large quantities of foodstuffs handed over to individuals or organizations for distribution at their own jurisdiction.

"All such deliveries in accordance with the Agreement, should be so made that I have full guarantee that the foodstuffs will not be used for profiteering purposes to the gain of individuals or groups of the population, or for any tendentious movement."

Unjustified Interpretations

The two clauses underlined in the above letter represent interpretations of the Warehouse Agreement which had no justification than the will of the Government Representative. That remittances of any sort, whether for Special Relief or private individuals, should be delivered under the control of a Government body, was no part of the plan of the American Relief Administration. To permit it would involve failure of the Administration's responsibility before the donor.

As for the phrase which implied the Government's right to prevent delivery of packages for reasons other than speculation, the Administration perceived in it an unwarranted disregard of the Agreement which threatened disaster to the entire operation and to the Special Relief program in particular. Subsection (f) of the Fourth section of the Warehouse Agreement states:

"For the exclusive purpose of preventing speculation or misuse of foodstuffs imported by the American Relief Administration, the Soviet Government, acting through its representative with the A.R.A., has the right to forbid delivery in whole or in part of any consignment of commodities of any quantity, to any person, organizations or institutions, on which it has good and sufficient proof of misuse or speculation ---."

The clarity of this phrasing gave the Soviet Government no justification for halting delivery on any other count than speculation. That it intended to do so, however, Mr. Burland learned from Mr. Popoff, Mr. Eiduk's special representative with the Food Remittance Division. In conversation with Mr. Burland, this functionary stated that the requirements of the Soviet Government, according to his instructions from Mr. Eiduk, were: 1, that the recipient not be so rich as to be tempted to sell the food he would receive; 2, that the recipient be loyal to Communism.

If Mr. Burland had not had the advantage of several months' experience with Commissars, and if he had taken all words at their face value, this second condition would probably have precipitated an argument which would have put a close to the work of the Food Remittance Division. He confined himself in the present case to stating that the American Relief Administration would consider such a condition as without significance and disregard it. In fact the Food Remittance Division might have gone on disregarding the attempts of the Government Representative to interfere with its activities and his threats to interfere (which were much more fearful) had not a large donation for Special Relief loomed up, the contribution of which depended upon Government sanction.

A TEST CASE FOR SPECIAL RELIEF

Chapter XVI

The relief of the Intelligentsia in Central Europe continued long after the mass childfeeding operations had ceased, and this particular work was generously supported by special grants particularly from one of the larger foundations. When the A.R.A. proved beyond doubt its ability to cope with the famine problem in Russia, the chief supporter of our Intelligentsia relief in Central Europe intimated that they would consider supplying funds for similar work in Russia to the extent of \$50,000 a month providing that we could offer the same protection in distribution, as secured in the Central European work. The Foundation stipulated as essential conditions of its gift; one, that the Soviet Government should undertake in writing to guarantee freedom in the selection of beneficiaries; two, that beneficiaries once selected should be allowed to receive and consume their donations without interference; and three, that the Government should give specific assurance that there would be no repetition of an episode which occurred in the A.R.A. Tzaritzin District in the fall of 1921: the arrest of persons hostile to Communism for receiving benefits from the A.R.A.

These conditions forced the Food Remittance Division to bring the matter directly to the attention of the Soviet Representative and thus force its hand on several questions which it had been willing to let ride in the hope that the Government would eventually find its work innocuous and thus let it alone. Mr. Burland therefore assembled the various cases which represented misreadings by the Soviet Representative of the Warehouse Agreement. He hoped by showing Mr. Eiduk the error of his interpretations to reaffirm certain principles which would serve to check possible future interferences in the Division's work. And he hoped above all to get an agreement in principle to the A.R.A.'s right to accept and distribute donations for Special Relief without hindrance, before submitting the offer of \$50,000 monthly for action.

Cards on the Table

On March 15, 1922, Mr. Burland laid the American Relief Administration cards on the table in a conference with Mr. Eiduk. He reviewed the Warehouse Agreement point by point, defining clearly what it only implied, and indicating to Mr. Eiduk the manner in which his interpretations of the Agreement differed from the Text. Mr. Eiduk's conscious obtuseness or his baffling refusal to acknowledge facts disagreeable to him prevented the conference from clearing the air in any way. In fact, it only increased the obscurity. Mr. Burland determined to pin the Government Representative down in pen and ink.

Returning from the Conference, he drafted the following letter stating in clear and unequivocal terms the position as the American Relief Administration understood it and as the Warehouse Agreement expressed it.

"The Representative Plenipotentiary of the
R.S.F.S.R. with the A.R.A.
M o s c o w.

"Dear Mr. Eiduk:

Confirming my conversation with you of even date on the subject of ways

and means of distribution of foodstuffs in the form of Food Remittances, I beg herewith to note the following points for your consideration:

1. "That the Food Package Agreement contemplates delivery of food packages to named recipients; that is to say, specific relief, to which you, as representative of the Soviet Government, have indicated your complete agreement in principle and in fact; that in order to avoid speculation you request that you be notified of deliveries to individuals over fifty dollars and to organizations over five hundred dollars.
2. "That the donor of any specific lot of food packages has the right specifically to select that person or persons or organizations to whom he wishes the food packages to be delivered; that it is within the donor's competence to nominate any person or group of persons he may choose in Russia, who in turn may select individual beneficiaries; that this selection may be carried on without any interference on the part of the Soviet Government and that the A.R.A. District Supervisor, if in his opinion the wishes of the donors are fulfilled, may deliver packages to said selected beneficiaries within the terms of the Food Package Agreement, who will be allowed to receive and consume them without further formality.
3. "That the information furnished you by the Food Remittance Division of contemplated deliveries to individuals for more than fifty dollars or to organizations for more than five hundred dollars is given solely for the purpose of avoiding speculation - barter, exchange or sale - of American foodstuffs and for no other purpose whatsoever, and that no other use will be made of such information.
4. "That when the donor in America consigns packages to 'Special Relief' and thereby designates the A.R.A. to select the recipients the A.R.A. may then arrange for distribution to individuals within the Food Package agreement in connection with its regularly constituted Special Relief Committees existing in each district; that these Special Relief Committees are competent to select such beneficiaries as they may see fit, accepting such counsel and information from government authorities as they may deem useful, but without any control or interference on the part of 'Eukom', or any other government relief committees or government officials.
5. "That the A.R.A. may accept large sums of money from donors outside Russia for group relief to any specific group such as professors, doctors, et cetera, that said donors may designate the A.R.A. to select individuals in such groups as beneficiaries of food packages, these beneficiaries to receive and consume packages within terms of the Food Package Agreement without any interference whatsoever.

"Not inconsiderable sums of money may be forthcoming from interested donors in America if your government will take a definite stand of approval on the foregoing questions. We would request, therefore, that you indicate to us in writing your attitude in order that we may properly communicate with our London and New York Offices."

A Straight Issue

This letter would seem to have stated the issues with a businesslike frankness which would admit of no diplomatic sidestepping. It put the principle of Specific Relief squarely before the Government Representative indicating that by signing the Warehouse Agreement the Soviet Government had acknowledged this principle. Did it now intend to deny this principle? Did it now intend to refuse the A.R.A. the right already granted of delivering packages to any beneficiary in Russia as long as said beneficiary did not speculate therewith? Did it intend to interfere with the free use by the beneficiary of packages consigned to him? Did it intend to prevent or interfere with distribution by the A.R.A. of packages consigned to the organization to be given out at its discretion? That is, did it deny the right of the A.R.A. to give Special Relief?

A Devious Response

The response of the Soviet Government which arrived after a delay of two weeks represented the highpoint of devious evasiveness to which the Soviet Representative attained. In one breath it denied flatly the right of the donor to freely choose beneficiary or beneficiaries and affirmed its intention of abiding by the Warehouse Agreement which gave the donor that right. It sidestepped the issue of control of distribution for other purposes than speculation by reaffirming the Government's right to that control as given it by the Agreement wherein the right of control was limited specifically to prevention of speculation. It indicated its flat disapproval of Special Relief except through Soviet Government channels, and closed by stating that since there had been no conflicts in the past (which was baldly untrue) there wouldn't be any in the future.

Herewith follows the letter. It illustrates perfectly the constant uncertainty under which the Soviet Representative forced the Relief Administration to work.

Moscow,
29 March, 1922.

Attention Mr. E. G. Burland,
Chief Food Remittance Division,
American Relief Administration.

"Dear Sir:

"In reply to your esteemed favor of the 15th instant No. 1199 I beg to inform as follows:

"1. The manner of delivering individual remittances to individual persons is specifically fixed by the Special Supplemental Agreement between the American Relief Administration and the Government I represent and up to the present there has been no friction or difference between us in this connection and there is no reason for anything of the kind in the future.

"2. The Government I represent cannot agree with such a general formulation and considers it even superfluous to find another formulation beyond the one given in the above Supplementary Agreement. Essentially I cannot take

your view of the matter that within the territory of the R.S.F.S.R. any American contributor should be granted the right to create in Russia a committee or organization on the only ground that such contributor has at his disposition a stated number of dollars for which he wishes to send foodstuffs to Russia for a certain group. We cannot agree in any way to such a proposition stated in such bald terms, and so I propose as a way out that in each given case the matter should be taken up with me about the possibility of granting specific rights dictated by the specific requirements of the contributor in question.

"3. All information and so forth furnished by your Division as well as the control of the Soviet Government must be carried out as provided in the above Supplementary Agreement.

"4. Nor can I agree to this point because I believe that if the contributor furnishes facilities for the general famine relief in Russia, these must go, as provided by the Riga Agreement for relief to the starving children and adults in the Volga Territory.

"5. As for the special remittances for extending relief to stated groups, such as professors, doctors, the Soviet Government cannot agree that the selection should rest exclusively with the A.R.A. as the groups cited by you, such as professors and doctors, are just the ones which have their own organizations for improving their conditions, i.e., there is the Central Committee for Improving the conditions of the Scientists headed by the professors themselves and by Coms. Semashko and Lunatcharsky on the part of the Soviet Government, and I must say that it is just this committee which knows best who of the scientists has a prior claim to relief. Of course, as is always the case in distributing food coming to Russia through the A.R.A. you are entitled to the first control, so that the food intended for the relief of stated persons should not be used for any other groups; - if it is for professors, then it is exclusively for them; the same is true in the case of doctors, et cetera."

Up to now your Division has distributed, if I am not mistaken, 100,000 remittances without arousing any misunderstandings and there is no reason to doubt that none will arise in the future in distributing parcels as provided by the Agreement. And so I have no doubt that your Division will daily develop the scale of its operations, as those who send parcels from America have the opportunity of satisfying themselves that their remittances were duly received by the addressees, which, as you say, was at first hardly believed in America. In closing, I must say that the questions touched upon in your letter are for the most part already settled by our agreement, and as to specific cases, separate groups, we shall, as pointed out above, always manage to come to terms.

Yours faithfully,

A. EIDUK,

Representative Plenipotentiary of
the R.S.F.S.R. with all Foreign
Relief Organizations.

Tacit Disregard

The Relief Administration officials did not throw up their hands on the receipt of this letter, as they might have done had they lacked several

months' experience with the Government Representative. They determined to totally disregard it in so far as it dealt with matters not concerned with Special Relief. The necessity of getting written consent from the Government to the conditions fixed by the philanthropic organization referred to above, however, still existed. Eiduk's letter plainly indicated that he intended to tie up group distribution in his own office. This forced the Administration again to appeal to the higher authority of Mr. Kamenev.

The head of the Moscow Soviet had already indicated his desire to see the Intelligentsia helped. He had given signal proof of his good will in a matter of distribution of Special Relief to professors. The Food Remittance Division had asked the Professors' Union to submit a list of needy professors in Moscow to whom the Division could distribute packages. The head of the Union compiled the list, but fear of the possible ill will of the Government restrained him from submitting it to the A.R.A. Mr. Kamenev heard of this. "Give me the list", he said, and signed "L. Kamenev" at the bottom, thus accepting all responsibility for the distribution of packages to these men.

Further Negotiations with Mr. Kamenev

Encouraged by this proof of good will, the Director of the A.R.A. in Russia outlined the A.R.A. plan for delivery of Special Relief in a letter to Mr. Kamenev, dated April 3, 1922. In addition, he alluded to the \$50,000 monthly offer of a certain American organization and urged the necessity of agreement on principles of distribution before it could be accepted. Mr. Kamenev reacted favorably and asked the A.R.A. to negotiate the details of distribution with Mr. Eiduk. In accordance with this request Mr. Burland held conferences with the Government Representative and submitted the following principles of distribution:

Moscow, Russia,
April 24th, 1922.

Dear Mr. Eiduk:

Following our conversation in Mr. Quinn's office on April 22nd, I beg to submit herewith certain specific points which were expressed in a recent letter to Mr. Kamenev and to which he has fully agreed in principle. For the sake of clarity and, in order that all details of the arrangements may be fully understood, I request your specific agreement on the following:

1. "That A.R.A. Special Relief Committees formed in each District are competent to select beneficiaries and distribute group remittances within Soviet Russia within territorial or other limits according to the wishes of the donor.
2. "That the composition of A.R.A. District Special Relief Committees shall include (1) the American District Supervisor or his assistant as chairman ex-officio; (2) a representative of the Soviet Government, in order that the government be fully informed on all deliberations, and in order that the Committee may benefit by the Government's information on local conditions; (3) such other local Americans or Russians or local government or private organizations as may be selected by the District Supervisor in order to properly carry out its functions.

3. "That the right of ultimate decision in all matters rests with the A.R.A. District Supervisor.

4. "That the Soviet Government guarantees the A.R.A. and authorizes the A.R.A. to in turn guarantee American benefactors its full cooperation, in locating the neediest individuals in any category or in any part of Russia as herein described, and guarantees that individuals so selected, will be allowed to receive, and consume and enjoy the packages allotted them to the fullest extent without any interference or hindrance on the part of the Soviet Government or its organs.

5. "That the A.R.A. guarantees that no more than five parcels will be delivered to any one person and his immediate family during a period of one month, in accordance with the limitations expressed in the Food Remittance Agreement and that the A.R.A. will deliver no foodstuffs whatsoever to committees or organization for further distribution, but will instead deliver the food direct to the beneficiary selected by the Special Relief Committee, as above described, with the further assistance and advice of such other Government or private persons or organizations, as it may choose to call upon, or as may be expressly stipulated by the donor.

6. "That the Soviet Government agrees and recognizes that the foregoing points must necessarily be firmly established and mutually agreed upon and clearly understood in order to carry out specific wishes of donors of considerable sums of money in the form of Special Relief packages, whose donations will otherwise not be forthcoming.

"Upon receipt of an affirmative reply from you, we will immediately advise our New York office of your agreement specifically to our requests and in turn interested American donors will be informed of the situation. If there are any points that are not absolutely clear, or, on which you are unable to give a specific and unequivocal answer, we request that these be drawn to our attention in order that we may completely settle all questions before taking definite steps to secure further relief for famine stricken Russia under the contemplated arrangement."

The Approach of Disaster

From this period on, events moved with a slow inevitability to their disastrous end. A short letter dated May 4th from Mr. Eiduk carried the first rumble of calamity. He objected to paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5 of Mr. Burland's letter, and promised to transmit counter proposals from Mr. Kamenev. These arrived on May 12th and effectively killed the \$50,000 monthly project. They gave: one, the government four representatives on a Distribution Committee of six; two, the Government Representative or his delegates the right to stop distribution to any individual, which meant of course complete control of distribution; three, the Government the right to suspend the activities of the Distribution Committee whenever it saw fit.

Nothing remained for the Relief Administration to do but to notify all concerned of its refusal of the offer in question. It had cost the Administration two solid months of bickering to arrive at this decision. Whenever it presented the matter to Mr. Eiduk the A.R.A. was given to understand that the

Soviet Government stood unalterably opposed to specific relief to the Intelligentsia. Mr. Kamenev, however, whenever the matter was appealed to him, assured the Administration that support of the principle of relief to this class of the population and hearty cooperation in distribution could be counted upon from the Government. A contradiction which lifted a corner of the curtain on the backstage of the community of Commissars.

Division Among the Communists

Neither Kamenev nor Eiduk meant to deceive the American Relief Administration officials. They represented a division of opinion among the Bolsheviks. The latter could never free himself from the psychology of the revolutionary battlefield. Compromise and peaceful conciliation were no part of his conception of Communist ideals. He could not fall in with the necessity for reconstruction and the consequent concessions to one's political enemies. The Intelligentsia of Russia meant nothing to Mr. Eiduk except as enemies. He represented a powerful faction of opinion in the Communist party, - the narrow, fanatical group of the Left Wing, which, while it had been the main factor presiding at the birth of the Bolshevik Government, since it wielded the sword, was now proving rather a handicap to its proper growth.

The Communism of Mr. Kamenev, on the other hand, was a rounded-out theory which foresaw a revolution only as the beginning, and was more concerned with the reconstruction of the State after the revolution. A man of training and intelligence himself, he understood the value of training and intelligence, and he therefore spoke with all sincerity when he assured Mr. Burland that the Soviet Government favored relief to its Intelligentsia.

As an individual factor in the Government, Kamenev was far stronger than Eiduk, as the man of brains is always stronger than the man of force in times of peace. However, two things worked to effect the ascendancy of the Eiduk attitude over the Kamenev attitude in the matter of accepting the \$50,000 monthly for Intelligentsia.

In the first place, Eiduk was not alone, but represented a very potent factor in the Communist party, which the Kamenev factor could not afford openly to defy, and without which the Bolshevik Government could not maintain its seat in the Kremlin. Whenever the Eiduk group appealed to the "first principles of revolution" as it frequently did, the Kamenev group had to acquiesce on pain of being charged with treason. They ignored these "first principles" where they could do so quietly - in fact rather than in name - and even where they openly stated that they were relinquishing certain principles, they covered themselves by qualifying their acts as temporary and for the safety of the state, "a strategic retreat". The adoption of the New Economic Policy is a case in point.

In the second place, Mr. Eiduk's position as Representative Plenipotentiary of the Government with all Foreign Relief Organizations rendered his good will necessary to the effective accomplishment of anything by the Foreign organizations. Where he opposed any act of these organizations his opposition proved more deadly than the approval of his superiors.

Resurrection

But whatever the reason the fact remained that the A.R.A. had had to refuse a very substantial donation for Special Relief. The Administration had definitely categorized the subject as dead and believed that Mr. Eiduk was only too glad to have it so. He surprised the Director of the A.R.A. in Russia very much, therefore, when he reopened the whole matter at a conference held on May 30th. That he should do so indicated either that he hoped to obtain the gift on his own conditions, or that strong pressure was being applied from above.

Colonel Haskell took formal notice of the Plenipotentiary Representative's action by a letter written after the conference, in which he stated that the matter had been definitely closed and the Fund which made the offer notified that it had been impossible to make satisfactory arrangements for the distribution of this relief. Pointing out that the A.R.A. had no assurance that further negotiations would be any more fruitful, Colonel Haskell outlined certain conditions that must be agreed to by the Soviet Government and confirmed in writing before he could feel justified in reopening the case.

These terms were practically identical with those set forth in Mr. Burland's letter of April 24, except that the following was substituted for paragraph 6 in Mr. Burland's draft: "Local Americans or Russians selected by the District Supervisor under b, 3 (paragraph describing the committee) would naturally include representatives of the class of intellectuals to be assisted and it goes without saying that only unprejudiced and fair minded would be selected."

Reburial

With admirable but irritating consistency Mr. Eiduk replied on June 5th that he regretted that the terms were not acceptable to his government. Even this did not finally close the subject, for Mr. Kamenev was again reminded that American funds were available in a conference with Colonel Haskell on July 3. Negotiations very much resembling the earlier ones dragged over a period of three weeks, but the government remained intransigent in its claim to share equally in control of distribution, so that nothing came of them.

Mr. Kamenev informed Mr. Quinn, Acting Director in the absence of Colonel Haskell, personally on July 26 that certain departments of the Government were definitely opposed to giving the A.R.A. the right of final decision in the choice of the individual beneficiary. They insisted that if the A.R.A. was to have the right to veto any selection, the Soviet Government should have the same right. This in reality meant that by exercising this right the Soviet Government could by elimination dictate just who should receive the food packages.

The interesting fact about this conference with Mr. Kamenev was his obvious irritation at Mr. Quinn's refusal to accept his implied assurance that he would see that the letter of the agreement would remain a dead letter and that the A.R.A. would be allowed to control selection and distribution of packages as it saw fit. Mr. Kamenev broadly hinted that the written agreement would be merely a form to satisfy the recalcitrant left wing of the party and that it was possible to do many things quietly in Soviet Russia which were contrary to the formal statements of policy, the sole aim of which was to keep the party peace.

A Hint for the Future

Though Mr. Quinn appreciated the hint and determined to act upon it in future distributions of Special Relief packages, he felt that the negotiations on the \$50,000 monthly offer had been too prolonged and heated to justify the A.R.A. in accepting it for distribution without obtaining a satisfactory written agreement from the Soviet Government. He therefore buried all hope of obtaining the gift and cabled recommending that negotiations be definitely dropped.

SPECIAL RELIEF ON A CLEAR TRACK

Chapter XVII

Mr. Kamenev's hint did not fall on barren ground. It accorded too closely with the opinions of the A.R.A. officials, born of past experience. The Administration, therefore, determined to invest \$35,000 of its own unallocated funds in Special Relief as a test case. That is, it decided to donate 3,500 Special Relief packages to be distributed entirely at the discretion of American District Supervisors without asking the Government's consent or calling the gift in any way to its attention. Should the Government raise any objection to the case, it could make no charge against the A.R.A. since the Warehouse Agreement expressly granted the Administration the right to deliver packages to anyone in Russia, as long as not more than five packages were delivered at a time.

Mr. Kamenev proved a true prophet. The District Supervisors issued the packages to whom they saw fit and not a word came from the Government Representative. Thereafter the Relief Administration accepted all Special Relief donations and allocated them to districts without referring them to the Representative's office except as help was needed to find classes of beneficiaries. In point of fact this method was far from being entirely new. All during the winter and spring the Food Remittance had received comparatively small donations, some of which were earmarked for particular groups such as the Artists of the Moscow Ballet, while the distribution of others was left to the District Supervisors. Many of these were not submitted to the Government Representative at all and no objections were made to their distribution. To the great majority of those upon which Mr. Eiduk for one reason or another was asked to pass, he offered no objection.

The Preservation of Genius

The beneficiaries of these gifts were engaged in every conceivable occupation - medicine, engineering, law, the arts and crafts; they included professors, students, nurses, scientists, writers, musicians, et cetera. The common bond of great need united them. In many cases the packages proved to be the hand that pulled them back from starvation. In January, 1922, Moscow District allocated fourteen packages to the most needy professors of the Second University, ten of whom physical weakness induced by hunger, prevented from leaving their beds. During the same period the District aided Victor Vasnyetsov, who did the interior of the famous Vladimirovsky Cathedral in Kiev, and who ranks with the greatest of Russian painters; Alexander Gretchaninoff, composer of religious music played in all the Cathedrals of Russia; and Schrehtel, once President of the Moscow Architects and friend and fellow worker of Count Witte. These intellectual leaders and their families were existing on a ration of black bread and fish when the A.R.A. brought them aid through its Special Relief.

The total number of Special Relief packages issued during those first months was not great, but each one of them met a vital need. In April, 1922, the District Supervisors reported unanimously that by far the most successful feature of the Food Remittance Division had been its General Relief, and they implored an increase in its volume.



Special Relief Packages are given to the Priests of the Russian Orthodox
Church at Ufa in February of Nineteen twenty-two

The Tihkon Case

To return again to the cases in which the Government offered objection to the delivery of Special Relief.

In January, 1922, various American sympathizers with the distressed priests of the Russian church began sending bulk sales to their relief. They addressed these donations to the head of the Church in Russia, Patriarch Tihkon, who was to select the ultimate beneficiaries. In an interview with Mr. Burland, the Patriarch divided the first 300 packages among seven bishops in the famine region for further distribution. Since the Bishops submitted names to the District Supervisors, thus enabling the latter to deliver to individuals, Mr. Eiduk raised no objection.

Similar orders in small lots kept coming through until March and were dealt with in the same way without interference from the Government Representative. Meanwhile the Soviet Government determined to confiscate church treasures, with the ostensible purpose of converting them to the benefit of famine relief. Patriarch Tihkon opposed this as a violation of the sanctity of the church. He immediately became persona non grata to the Government. A letter from Mr. Eiduk to Mr. Burland dated March 23, 1922 reflected this changed attitude.

"I beg to inform you that in view of my doubts that the parcels arriving to the address of Patriarch Tihkon are intended exclusively for distribution among the clergy, I request you kindly to apply to Patriarch Tihkon for a list of the persons among whom the sixty-one (61) parcels mentioned in your letter are to be distributed.

"Only after examination of this list shall I be able to decide if the above parcels should be delivered or not."

Opposition Crystallizes

This proved merely a mild first rumor of the Government's new position. As further remittances addressed to the Patriarch came in, the Administration submitted them to Mr. Eiduk for sanction. The latter allowed these to pile up without taking action. Finally, the number of remittances having become large, Mr. Burland notified Mr. Eiduk of his intention to cancel all outstanding delivery advices for Patriarch Tihkon unless Mr. Eiduk gave his approval at once. The official replied categorically as follows:

"Referring to your letter of June 20th, I regret to have to inform you that I cannot give my approval for delivery of food packages to Patriarch Tihkon, on account of the latter's disloyalty and manifestly inimical attitude towards the Government of the Republic, which found expression in an open violation of her laws and precepts."

That the Soviet Government should look upon Patriarch Tihkon as a dangerous enemy is readily understandable, no matter with which side of the dispute justice lay. However, in refusing permission to the A.R.A. to deliver packages to the Patriarch or to individuals designated by him, the Government Representative was opposing in practice what had been guaranteed by both the Riga and

Food Remittance Agreements in principle, namely: that the A.R.A. would be allowed free distribution of relief supplies in Russia without discrimination on account of race, creed or political belief.

Moderation Succeeds

The Relief Administration did not, however, make a stand or fall issue of this case. It felt that the hostility of the Government was due to the association of these distributions with the name of Patriarch Tihkon. He had been deposed as head of the Orthodox Church, being succeeded by Bishop Anthony. The administration, therefore, renewed the discussion in July, 1922, suggesting that the new head of the Church be used as a channel of distribution in place of the former Patriarch. It explained the intent of the donors that the packages should go to the Russian clergy generally and referred to Patriarch Tihkon's habit of submitting lists of his subordinates to whom the A.R.A. delivered packages. It referred to the manifest need among the clergy and to the bad effect which the cancellation of packages intended for them would produce in America. In his reply Mr. Lander, who by this time had succeeded Mr. Eiduk, fully agreed with the Administration's stand and gave his consent to delivery of the packages as suggested.

This Tihkon incident indicates how inextricably insinuated into all phases of the national life of Revolutionary and famine-struck Russia was this A.R.A., a foreign private relief organization. It met the Government and the people inevitably on all sides; its influence was enormous; it was undoubtedly the most important single factor in Russia of 1922.

Special Relief to Religious Groups

In addition to groups divided according to professions, Special Relief packages were consigned to religious communities as well. The most important of these were the Jewish settlements in the Ukraine and White Russia, and the Lutheran and other protestant villages along the Volga. By the very fact of their having a religious bond to tie them together, these groups were not in the favor of the avowedly atheistic Communist Government, so that it never smiled upon the consignment of relief packages to them. In point of fact, such consignment did not find approval in the Riga agreement which definitely stated that relief was to be given without regard to race, religion or political creed. However, the Warehouse agreement nullified this clause as far as the Food Remittance Division was concerned by admitting the principle of specific relief.

The donors of packages consigned to the relief of communities differentiated on racial or religious grounds generally designated individual citizens of the community to chose beneficiaries in conjunction with the American District Supervisor. This method did not always meet with the approval of the Central Government authorities and quite frequently caused friction with the local Soviet officials, particularly in the Ukraine and White Russia.

In view of the fact that it intended to deliver packages direct to the final beneficiaries, which would never mean the delivery of more than five packages to an individual, the Moscow Food Remittance Office did not consider itself bound to submit such Special Relief Bulk sales to the Representative Plenipotentiary for approval. Unfortunately, however, the overworked District Supervisor

of Orenburg district committed the error of turning over a lot of two hundred packages to a committee of Baptists for further distribution in the spring of 1922. The local representative of Mr. Eiduk immediately telegraphed his chief, who at once scented a plot, and wrote caustic letters to the A.R.A. Here was an obvious breach of the Warehouse Agreement, and Mr. Eiduk made full use of it. The Food Remittance Division, of course, had no choice but to admit its fault and express its regret as well as to furnish proof of the proper final distribution of the packages by the committee. Peace was eventually reestablished.

Hardships of the Pastors

Among the Lutheran villages on the Volga, to which the National Lutheran Council of America consigned during the worst period of the famine 2,000 packages a month, the village pastor generally headed the distribution committee. Sporadically the Saratov office of the A.R.A. would receive a telegram announcing the arrest of a pastor for not having submitted his list of beneficiaries to the local government relief committee. Strenuous protest on the part of the District Supervisor generally effected the release of the pastor. On one occasion a local Commissar threatened to shoot a Catholic priest, who had been designated to distribute a bulk sale among the needy of his parish, unless he turned the packages over to the Commissar. These were typical minor incidents which did not greatly hinder the successful administration of several hundred thousand dollars in this type of Special Relief.

Fear of Pogroms

The authorities of Vitebsk and Minsk stubbornly opposed distribution of group relief among the Jews on the ground that such distribution would give rise to pogroms. The local representatives of Mr. Eiduk at both places insisted on their right to pick beneficiaries. This attitude caused constant friction and much acrid correspondence between the representatives and the District Supervisors. Occasionally Bulk Sales had to be cancelled. In 95 per cent of the cases, however, the packages found beneficiaries according to the will of the donor, and the result was neither a pogrom nor the liquidation of the Food Remittance Operation.

In the Ukraine the Government supported an official Jewish Relief Committee called the Evabcom, which did a Food Remittance business of its own, and insisted as well upon its right to contral distribution of A.R.A. packages intended for relief of Jewish communities. This organization's method of operation was to intimidate the committees designated by donors. When the A.R.A. became aware of this, it stopped delivery, in some cases cancelling remittances. Fortunately the Evabcom confined its activities largely to the region of Elizabethgrad, and though friction in this region continued until the end of the operation, the big Ukrainian distribution points of Odessa and Kiev had practically no difficulty in delivering their Special Relief.

A Helpful Government

Except for the offer of \$50,000 for Intelligentsia, the Government did not seriously hinder the Special Relief program. In many instances it cooperated to increase the efficiency of distribution. What intransigence there was

in its attitude of opposition to relief of intellectuals vanished with the departure of Mr. Eiduk from the office of Representative Plenipotentiary in June, 1922. He was succeeded by Mr. Karl Lander, an ex-professor of folklore at the University of Riga and author of several volumes on his subject. Mr. Lander displayed at all times an intelligent sympathy in the A.R.A.'s program.

Technique of Distribution

Aside from the difficulties with the Government that the Special Relief program caused, distribution - that is to say, the business of finding the most needy and deserving beneficiaries - of Special Relief packages presented the third general problem which the Food Remittance Division had to meet. Once more drawing on his experience in Austria, Mr. Burland endeavored to forestall this problem for the districts by the publication of a memorandum on January 24, 1922. The essence of this memorandum, which outlined the General Distribution Committee plan may be gleaned from the following extracts:

"In the distribution of Special Relief, the main fact to be kept in mind is that the people or groups indicated must be reached in a disinterested manner by means which would inspire confidence in the donor in America. That is to say, we must assure the donor that we have based our selections on the best available information in Russia.

"To do this, districts will form committees of distribution, so constituted as to include all political factions in the district so as to insure access to the best possible information on local needs. At the head of this committee should be the District Supervisor or such of his assistants as he may indicate, all of his assistants being ex-officio members of the committee.

"The District Supervisor's chief task is to watch very carefully the deliberations of the committee and to satisfy himself that no trace of partiality, either racial, religious, or political, is creeping into decisions. In other countries men of eminence have been on these committees; for example, in Austria the President of the Republic assumed the leading role in the Committee work and actually sat as chairman and guided its meetings.

"Of course, we face a different situation in Russia. District Supervisors must always be active Chairmen and must exercise a much more careful supervision than has been necessary in other countries. On the other hand, the committee in order to inspire confidence in its distribution, should contain some important people in the district. For example in the Moscow district, probably Mr. Kamenev or Mrs. Kamenev could be persuaded to sit.

"In distributing packages to chosen beneficiaries, remember always that the A.R.A. had its own means for doing this. It has been found well to avoid giving large quantities of foodstuffs to other organizations for further distribution. A list of names of the prospective recipients and deliveries by the A.R.A. direct to these people against their signatures assure the District Supervisor that his food is actually going to the number of people that he desires to reach.

"Distribution committees should in no case be large, and their policy should be very forcefully dictated by the A.R.A. In addition to the personnel of the committee suggested above, probably a member of the church and a member

prominent in educational circles would provide a sufficient number of people to avoid hasty decisions and at the same time permit decisions to be speedily arrived at."

Disillusionments of Experience

As Mr. Burland said, this plan of General Committees had been tried with success in Austria. It was the sort of a plan which would naturally suggest itself to an American. It is a lugubrious truth which the Americans in Russia did not at first realize, that this very fact should have been enough to discredit it in Revolutionary Russia. Experience in several districts soon proved that animosities were too keen and personal judgments too warped by famine and suffering to permit of fair dealing in committee. The member of a profession saw the needs of his own group and circle in too sharp a light to enable him to be just to other groups; the representative of the Government on the committee was at times of the type in whom some years of unrestricted brow-beating had killed the instinct for impartial consideration. His very presence frequently so cowed the other members of the committee as to render them mere echoes of his opinions and wishes. He held the whip of the Chekka in his hand and now and then cracked it warningly in their ears, though the American Chairman might hear nothing.

In addition, a love of harangue and procrastination are so deepseated in the Russian character as to exasperate the quick-deciding American for whom time in Russia was not only money but life. These committee meetings were often more than he could bear. Finally the famine and the revolution had disorganized life in every city and section of Russia and had reduced all interest to the elemental problem of survival to such an extent that no man or organization knew anything of conditions outside his own family or his own group. General Committees were not efficient. District Supervisors found themselves, therefore, pretty generally forced to abandon the committee system.

Fitting the Method to Conditions

In lieu of it, they developed various systems which answered more effectively to the need in their districts. In the first place intensive tours of inspection and constant investigation of famine conditions conducted without bias of any sort by the Americans soon put them in closer touch with the need than any Russian probably was. With such backgrounds, they came more and more to rely on their own judgments and decisions in awarding Special Relief. In the case of "ear-marked" donations, the most reliable members of the groups designated as beneficiary were asked to furnish lists of the needy. In some cases the Supervisors accepted these as final and made distribution accordingly. In others they checked them by lists from other sources or by the use of special Russian investigators.

Where need was so terrific and feeling so intense the work of these native investigators could only be described as ticklish in the highest degree. They were in all cases most carefully chosen. Of course, the entire Russian personnel in the districts were to a certain extent ex-officio assistants of the District Supervisor in the distribution of Special Relief. Coming as they did inevitably from the most intelligent and reliable classes in the community their advice and recommendations could not be overlooked.

Applying in Person

It goes without saying that beneficiaries of Special Relief did not always wait to be sought out. As soon as the wave of hope engendered by the dropping of the American Relief Administration in the center of hungry Russia had spread across the country, applicants for help besieged the office of the organization in person and in writing. In the early days especially, these people constituted a very serious problem. The common humanity of the Americans prevented them from ignoring their appeals. On the other hand, time was far too precious to permit of personal attention. The individual districts solved the problem in various ways, a typical and effective one being the development of a questionnaire which each applicant was required to fill out. Where the questionnaires justified relief beyond a doubt, it was immediately given; in other cases the special investigators took charge of the applications.

The Reward of Effort

A year of struggle recompensed by occasional failure but more frequent success had given the A.R.A. confidence in its ability to deliver practically any form of Special Relief without obstruction from the Government, and had taught the districts the best methods of getting packages to worthy recipients. True, the Government Representative had never formally acknowledged the right of the Administration to deliver packages to groups of the community as it saw fit, and even occasionally put his veto on bulk sales addressed to groups such as political prisoners, on grounds not admitted in the Warehouse Agreement. However, the Administration recognized a certain justice in the Governmental point of view in these vetoes and generally accepted them in order to put over larger programs. All in all the outlook for the distribution of Special Relief was at its brightest when the Relief Administration received the largest single donation for this purpose, namely the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund gift of \$830,000. This came at the end of 1922 and the beginning of 1923.

THE CLIMAX OF THE SPECIAL RELIEF PROGRAM

Chapter XVIII

The size of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund contribution effectively assured it the place of first importance in the Russian Special Relief program, and its efficient distribution stamped that program as one of the most successful in the entire Russian relief operation. All that has gone before, all experience gained in obtaining government consent and cooperation, and in perfecting methods of distribution proved to have been training for the handling of this overshadowing donation.

The donor foundation did not give the entire sum to the Relief Administration outright. It divided it into two parts and made the gift of the second dependent on the success in distribution of the first. The first sum amounted to \$230,000 and was given in December, 1922, without any specific conditions being attached, but with the general understanding that it was to go in the main to intellectual groups such as professors, teachers, artists, musicians, engineers, doctors, clergymen and similar categories. Made wary by its experience with the proposed gift of \$50,000 monthly, the Relief Administration refused to give written assurance that distribution would be made in exact accord with the wishes of the Rockefeller Memorial Fund.

While it made no effort to conceal knowledge of the gift from the Soviet Government, the Moscow office of the A.R.A. did not submit it to Mr. Lander's office for approval. It divided the gift among the districts according to information on hand of the need among the intelligentsia, and advised Supervisors to distribute their proportion to categories indicated, at their own discretion. It then, with considerable anxiety, awaited results. Not passively, however. It put the Government under obligation by acceding to a request for the distribution of 800 food packages among 1,600 needy Moscow students, chosen jointly by the A.R.A. and a committee of students.

Probably no single donation was ever distributed with less difficulty than this \$230,000. Judging by letters from every District Supervisor the sole problem which confronted them was that of choosing the most needy among the suffering Intelligentsia. The Administration was, in short, able to produce documentary proof which fully satisfied the Rockefeller Memorial Fund that its initial gift had gone to the right people. In February, therefore, the donors transmitted to the Administration the second part of the gift amounting to \$600,000.

Support for Teachers

The donors divided this sum into two parts, one of \$75,000 to be used as a supplement to the original \$230,000 for needy which that distribution had unearthed but had not been able to help, and the remaining \$525,000 to be distributed during the months of March, April and May to Secondary Teachers. "Secondary Teachers" is the Russian classification for those employed in technical schools and schools preparatory to universities. This group was chosen because it comprised only a small class which the available funds would be able to take care of substantially until the summer of 1923 when local food supplies would become available. Furthermore its importance to the community was great

and it had previously received but little help due to the greater claims of university professors.

None of the results of the revolution and the famine was more pathetic in its evidences nor more tragic in its consequences than the sudden breakdown in the mental and moral discipline of Russia's children. Millions of them at the most impressionable age were suddenly cast loose upon the world. Answering their physical needs and instincts, they lived, for a period at least, the life of young savages. Death by starvation and disease orphaned hundreds of thousands; and discipline of school was lost to them by the enforced closing of the schools. Hunger drove teachers out of the class rooms in search of bread. Suffering broke the native faith and idealism of childhood, rent the veil which shields the eyes of children from the hard and cynical facts of life. What havoc this wrought in the meagre preserves of beauty which each individual harbors within himself as a retreat for black days, will only be gauged by the cynicism of Russia's cadet generation.

Much of the damage was beyond repair. To stop its progress the rehabilitation of the schools became one of crying needs of the Russian state. The Government put forth its best efforts to collect the children into schools, furnish teachers and equipment, but the task was too much for its limited resources. It was for this reason that the Rockefeller Memorial Foundation, at the advice of the A.R.A., directed its gift to be used for Secondary Teachers. No beneficiaries could have been more wisely chosen.

The Government Commissariat of Education and the Teachers Professional Union, presented the sole channels for getting into touch with Secondary Teachers, so that the A.R.A. had no choice but to submit this \$525,000 program to the Government for approval. Fortunately from the start Mr. Lander and the government organizations showed the strongest desire to cooperate in this distribution. The objections made to the earlier offer were not repeated. Evidently faith in the honesty of the A.R.A.'s intention had grown. Perhaps also the Soviet remembered that bickering before had cost Russia the gift altogether. Speedy negotiations resulted in agreement on the following points of distribution:

- (1) That distribution is to be made without regard to race, religion, or politics, but solely on the basis of need.
- (2) That the A.R.A. reserves the right to reject any deliveries not falling clearly within the above definition.
- (3) That the names of needy secondary teachers are to be selected by a committee of three, which shall be composed of a member of Mr. Lander's office, the Teachers Professional Union and a member of the A.R.A.
- (4) That packages are to be delivered direct to the selected beneficiaries by the A.R.A. from their own warehouses where practicable or through local agencies where no A.R.A. warehouses exist.
- (5) That no more than one standard food or clothing package or less than one-half package will be given to a beneficiary or his family at one time.

- (6) That beneficiaries shall not receive package donations oftener than once in 30 days.
- (7) That the Soviet Government declares the teachers in the secondary schools of Russia to be in great need of foodstuffs and clothing and agrees to make suitable public acknowledgment for any gifts received from American donors through the A.R.A.

The only recommendation made by the Government was that extremely needy cases among primary school teachers should not be overlooked, especially where they worked hand in hand with secondary teachers. In accordance with this, Mr. Burland agreed that Districts might extend aid to primary teachers up to 20 per cent of the District allocation and to administrative personnel up to 2 per cent of the allocation, the decision in all cases to rest with the District Supervisor. Final reports indicated that considerably less than these percentages were diverted from the Secondary Teachers.

Aided by the Teachers Professional Union and Mr. Lander's office, Mr. Burland allocated the packages by Gubernias by months. In all, the gift permitted the distribution of 42,000 food and clothing packages, given out as follows:

	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>
Food Packages	14,000	10,000	7,500
Clothing Packages	-	6,000	10,000

This division was made on the ground that as far as categories such as the secondary teachers were concerned food relief was more important than clothing during the winter of 1922-23, and it was only after the former had been attended to that the Districts could give time to the latter.

Picking the Beneficiary

Once the broad allocations had been made to the districts, it fell to the lot of these latter to obtain lists of the final beneficiaries and make distribution. In order that the local branches of the Teachers Professional Union should cooperate fully with the American Supervisors, the Central Teachers Professional Union circulated strict instructions outlining the duties they would be called upon to perform in furnishing lists and so on, and emphasizing the necessity of speed and good will. It was evident from these instructions that the Government's intentions were to give wholehearted aid in effecting a fair and efficient distribution.

Generally speaking the local branches and the local Government Representatives accepted these instructions and did cooperate, and where they failed it was generally from inefficiency rather than from a want of good will. There were some exceptions, such as Saratov District, where the Government Representative failed to provide transport for the outer district packages or provided it in so halfhearted a way as almost to halt the distribution. A sharp telegram from Moscow righted this situation. Then the District Supervisor of Elizabetgrad reported that the lists furnished contained mainly janitors and scrub women, and added that he was not delivering packages. This also was straightened out. The following indicates the difficulties which Moscow District experienced:

Minor Hitches

In regard to the Secondary Teachers' Relief we might point out one or two occurrences of more or less disagreeable nature which took place. First, one or two teachers reported to us from the Baumonofsky Rayon that they had received instructions from the Mono (Moscow Gubernia Educational Department) to turn over their packages after signing for them to the Mono officials, who would make a redistribution including certain of the administrative personnel.

The teachers wanted to know for whom the packages were intended and we explained to them that they were exclusively for those teachers named on the lists, and that if their names were on the list the packages most certainly belonged solely to them. We immediately got in touch with the Union and had them set the Baumonofsky Rayon straight on the matter.

Second, a teacher from a school in the Sokolniki Rayon, reported that the teachers there had received instructions to sign for the packages and then deliver them to the Sokolniki officials, who, in view of the protests from those teachers who had not been named on the lists, would make a redistribution, dividing the packages up into small quantities. This was a bit too glaring a breach, so we immediately stopped delivery of all teachers' relief packages, got the representative of the Teachers' Union over here and informed him that if it was impossible for the Union and the Central Committee to properly control the Rayon officials so that our understandings and agreements in regard to the distribution of teachers' packages would be conformed to, we would be compelled to stop deliveries until we would be assured that they could. We then demanded an investigation and report by the following morning. The next morning the Union representative reported that his investigation had discovered that the Sokolniki people had issued the instructions mentioned above. He added that he was very sorry, that the guilty had been severely reprimanded, and assured us that no further violations would take place. This Sokolniki matter did not go far enough, however, to prevent delivery to the proper persons.

Aside from the details it gives of the difficulties encountered in the handling of the Secondary Teachers allocation, the above is of value as illustrating the petty difficulties which some Russian officials occasionally put in the way of the Special Relief program, and, indeed, of the entire American Relief Operation.

Successful Aid to Russian Education

In spite of minor discords, however, the distribution of the \$525,000 to teachers stands out as the great success of the Special Relief Program. It was accomplished in record time. It relieved the misery of a most important element of the population and it kept them at their posts. Above all, its magnitude permitted the effect of it to be felt all over Russia. What it meant to the country cannot be judged by units of measure, but it supplied a vital energy at a critical period to an essential part of the line which transmits Russian culture from generation to generation and prevents it from perishing.

The best guide to the importance to Russia of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller gift and of Special Relief as a whole are the letters of thanks which flowed in from beneficiaries of Special Relief packages to Delivery Stations in thousands. Every one of them signalized the restoration, frequently of

life itself, and always of hope, and the renewal of energy to work. These letters told of doctors kept at their posts in the famine region; of teachers given energy to hold their undisciplined, homeless pupils together, to make citizens and not criminals out of them; of thinkers and artists freed of the fear of starvation for their families, enabled to return to their creative labors; of students inspired to fight on to their intellectual goal; of widowed mothers encouraged to live for their children; of priests strengthened to labor among their demoralized and disheartened flocks; of sensitive, thinking people generally, reassured of the existence of human sympathy and friendliness.

The Summum Bonum

Nothing in the entire Russian relief operation gave the Administration so much satisfaction as the distribution of Special Relief packages. It is impossible for people who have never known hunger to conceive of the joy which 117 pounds of nourishing food may give to a starving family. No gift in the power of man no matter how magnificent can mean more than that food. It is for the time being the summum bonum, the gift of life itself.

As for specific incidents of the influence of Special Relief parcels, the Director of the Odessa Opera House declared that his artists would have been forced to abandon their work, and scatter into the wilds to look for food had they not received packages from the A.R.A. A leading professor of the University of Kiev stated at the liquidation of the A.R.A. that he and his colleagues had been enabled to continue their university work thanks solely to the support of Special Relief packages.

A Pasteur Institute Saved

The District Supervisor at Samara reported on the work of a medical research laboratory in the following terms: "-----twelve Special Relief packages were turned over to the Roux Laboratory. This exotic flicker of scientific research in a famine ridden Gubernia was reopened last year by the A.R.A. and supplied with the necessary instruments and medicines for biological and medical research. Its employees are supported entirely by Special Relief food packages." The physicians of Samara wrote to the Rochester Community Chest, donors of packages for relief of physicians, to say, "Your help to the families of perished physicians is for us a moral support; we have now the assurance that in case of death or disability, our families will not be left without bread, that there are kind people who will help them; and this consciousness gives us the force to carry on the fight with disease."

The full table of larger Special Relief Donations showing the variety of professions and groups which benefited is given on the following page. How thoroughly the program covered the field of intellectual endeavor is very well indicated by this table. In short there can be no doubt that the support which the Special Relief program gave to those on whom the rehabilitation of Russia inevitably rests, placed it in the forefront of importance in the Russian operation.

APPROXIMATE SUMS DONATED FOR SPECIAL RELIEF PACKAGES DIVIDED
ACCORDING TO PRINCIPAL CATEGORIES OF RECIPIENTS

1. Professors and teachers	\$527,659
2. Physicians, Nurses and helpers	123,587
3. Artists and musicians	13,791
4. Ballet schools	2,900
5. Writers	4,100
6. Religious bodies	10,000
7. Intelligentsia generally	330,000
8. Special Relief not earmarked, but majority of which went to needy educated classes.	<u>194,000</u>
	\$1,216,037

In addition to the above clearly defined Special Relief contributions, hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of Food Remittance packages were distributed by organizations affiliated with the A.R.A., on such principles as to be classable as Special Relief.

CLOTHING REMITTANCES ADDED

Chapter XIX

Drought decimated the food crop of Soviet Russia in 1921, but war and revolution had already practically put an end to the production of clothing in the country. Along with all other property of capital, the big textile mills which circumscribed Moscow and particularly Petrograd, fell victims to requisition by the new State and suffered from inefficient management and lack of raw materials. One by one the looms stilled until by 1921 the mills had ceased to count as instruments of production. The home industry of Russia suffered in the same way. The peasant had eaten his sheep himself or had had them taken from him; Turkestan produced no cotton, and the country's frontiers were closed to import; the harvest in flax had fallen to a fraction of its prewar size. When the A.R.A. took food into Russia in 1921 it found the population wearing clothes four and five years old, and with no prospects of renewing the national wardrobe. The situation was so bad as to jeopardize the health and lives of those whom the A.R.A. was saving from the clutch of starvation. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Administration considered the advisability of instituting a clothing remittance operation as early as November, 1921.

Three Main Needs

After their preliminary investigation of Russian conditions, the American officials in Moscow determined that the needs of the country were first food, second medicine, and third clothing. Could the Administration undertake to increase the clothing supply of the country by handling remittances? Thousands of Russians living abroad wished the A.R.A. to do so. Very serious difficulties presented themselves, however, the first of which concerned the nature of the remittance. Should ready made clothing be sent, how could the beneficiary be fitted? The latter might be man, woman or child, and in order to meet his or her requirements the Administration would have to have enormous stocks in all parts of the country. The determining consideration was, however, the already top-heavy program of relief undertaken by the Administration. The addition of a Clothing Remittance Division to the Child and Adult feeding programs, the Food Remittance and Medical Relief, might very easily have toppled the whole structure over. Aside from the strain on the American organization, it seemed hardly possible that the Russian railroads would be able to distribute over the land all the supplies already headed for the country's ports. As a result, the Administration abandoned the idea, as it supposed, for good.

Clothing for Children

Still, during the winter 1921-22 hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of shoes, stockings, suits, overcoats and blankets went to children eating in A.R.A. kitchens in Russia, but these of course represented an outright gift from the organization. The revival of the Clothing Remittance project did not occur until the Administration had pledged itself to continue relief after the 1922 harvest. Then Moscow headquarters broached the subject to New York on the ground that the reduction of the A.R.A. program might find valuable compensation in an expansion of its phases, and that the harvest had shifted attention from food to clothing shortage. New York approved the suggestion and attention

was concentrated on the nature of the package and on negotiating an agreement with the Soviet Government.

From the very beginning the Administration dropped the idea of remitting ready made clothes. It determined on a package which would include first, material and accessories (including needles and thread) for either one man's suit of clothes or one woman's tailored suit (jacket and skirt); second, cotton cloth and accessories for two suits of underclothing. Russians needed shoes nearly as badly as they needed clothes, and the A.R.A. would have liked to arrange for their inclusion in a package, but the problem of fitting offered too many difficulties. As for making up the clothing materials into suits, the abundance of tailors all over Russia forestalled any difficulties and it was important to furnish employment to the population.

Friendly Attitude of Government

Once it had decided tentatively on a package, the Administration submitted the project to the Soviet Government. Mr. Burland drew up an agreement similar to that covering the Food Remittance operation and presented it to Mr. Lander, Representative Plenipotentiary with Foreign Relief Organizations, at the end of September, 1922. It did not meet with immediate approval. Inspired undoubtedly by the Russian Textile Trust, a Government organization, the Soviet authorities objected to the plan on the ground that it would offer unfair competition to the Russian textile industry. The A.R.A. pointed out the inability of the Russian industry to supply the needs of Russia, and insisted on the relief nature of the Remittance scheme. The Government acknowledged this inability and admitted that the danger of competition to the Trusts was slight as long as Remittances did not become the objects of speculation.

The Government gave no suggestion during these negotiations of suspicion of the honest intentions of the American Relief Administration, such as had characterized all the discussions in the early days of the relief and especially over the Food Remittance Agreement a year earlier. The objections it offered were straightforward and reasonable, and there can be no doubt that it honestly feared speculation. Obviously, the Relief Administration desired to prevent this as keenly as did the Government and it agreed to the Government's right to forbid delivery where the latter could give proof of misdealing.

The Russians felt that since Clothing Remittances would come from friends and relatives in America and would benefit a comparatively select few of its citizens, the State could not be expected to bear the cost of transporting in Russia, nor to waive entirely the normal customs duties on imported manufactured articles. The negotiations soon sifted down, therefore, to a discussion over the method by which the Government might be reimbursed for transportation costs and customs. On this point the two parties found it difficult to agree. The approach of winter made time precious; people needed the clothing for the cold weather, and besides the A.R.A. anticipated withdrawing from Russia in the spring. The Administration offered to pay the Government \$1.00 on each package, worth approximately \$20.00. In return the clothing would receive free entry into Russia and free rail transportation to the distributing station. The Soviet authorities argued over this for three weeks. Finally New York cabled that if immediate agreement could not be reached, the project would have to be definitely abandoned. This spurred the Russians to a decision and



How a \$20.00 Clothing Remittance looked to a ragged Russian

It Contained:

4 $\frac{2}{3}$ Yds. 54 Inch 20 ounce

Dark Wool Cloth

4 Yds. 36 Inch Cotton Lining

8 Yds. 27 Inch Flannelette

16 Yds. Muslin

Necessary Buttons and Thread

on October 26, 1922, a year and a day after the signing of the Warehouse Agreement, Mr. Lander signed the birth certificate of the Clothing Remittance Division for the Russian Government, while Mr. Burland signed for the A.R.A.

In addition to the payment to the Government of a premium on each package, the new agreement differed essentially from the Food Remittance pact in one other particular. Food Packages could be sold only to people abroad or to Americans in Russia, but needy individuals and organizations in Russia such as children's homes, could purchase clothing packages provided they obtained the consent of the Representative Plenipotentiary, and provided no more than one package went to one individual.

As for shipments by post, the clothing packages were to receive the same dispensations accorded to food packages, that is to say the minimum tariff for all shipments and the 2 per cent gold insurance rate.

A Heavy Burden

New York had made tentative plans to purchase material for 80,000 standard packages, and the deal was effected at the end of October. The Administration had no index of the probable number of sales, and in buying so much it leaped in the dark. However it could not do otherwise because of the time limit. Each package was to contain the following materials:

Woolens	4 2/3	yards
Lining	4	"
Muslin	16	"
Flannelette	8	"
Thread	4	spools
Buttons No.1.	8	pieces
" No.2.	16	"
" No.3.	24	"

The make up of the clothing remittance tells the story of the utter destitution of Russia. The A.R.A. included buttons and thread, not because Russian beneficiaries would be too poor to buy them, but because they couldn't if they would. The country had used up the most common necessities of life and was producing scarcely anything new.

The suiting material in the package successfully passed every test given woolens. The Administration stuck to a uniform dark blue serge to forestall complaints, and all the material in the package was chosen primarily on the strength of its durability. Similar materials could not be purchased retail in America for less than \$21.50. Transportation plus customs would have added \$6.00, bringing the cost of the package in Russia to \$27.50. During the period of the delivery of clothing remittances the market value of the draft varied from \$30.00 to \$40.00. At the same time the value of the \$10.00 food package had fallen from \$8.00 to \$4.00, according to location, which indicates clearly to what extent the need had shifted from food to clothing. A year earlier clothing would have brought one-fourth as much, while the price of food actually had been ten times greater.

Cutting and Packing

The handling of Clothing Remittances offered Moscow headquarters a much more difficult technical problem than did Food packages. Ordinary laborers could do the work of repacking flour and rice and sugar, but it required experienced tailors with suitable equipment to make up clothing packages. The Administration determined to have this done in Moscow for all the districts, which meant the establishment of a large cutting and packing room. Russia could furnish none of the specialized equipment needed, so that the Administration had to send abroad for tailor's shears, chalk, measuring sticks, 200,000 yards of wrapping paper, et cetera. As for the personnel, Mr. Burland gathered a large staff of trained employees and held them in readiness for the arrival of the first clothing shipments. These did not come till January and in order to catch up with lost time three shifts of workers kept the cutting room going to capacity twenty-four hours a day.

While Moscow prepared its warehouse, the districts concentrated their efforts on giving the new clothing remittance scheme publicity and urging the Russians to appeal to their relatives and friends abroad as had been done for the Food Remittance a year earlier. The Americans introduced the Russians to the most modern and approved methods of publicity. Announcements of the Clothing Remittance plan appeared on the screen in moving picture theatres, on the sides of A.R.A. trucks and automobiles, stared the traveller in the face in railway stations, and appeared on his doorstep in the nature of handbills. Beneficiaries of food packages were circularized by mail; newspapers carried advertisements, and sample displays of the clothing package tempted those who passed by the A.R.A. offices. Insufficient time, however, prevented the full effect of this publicity from being felt. Sales of both Food and Clothing Remittances ceased in America on March 15th, and in Europe on April 1st. All in all 42,674 clothing remittances were sold, of which 19,250 were given away as Special Relief.

Since the New York office had made an initial purchase of 80,000 packages, the Administration was left with some 37,000 packages on its hands. This material fortunately was all in bulk. During the process of liquidation Moscow headquarters distributed a portion of it among children's homes for clothing, while that which had not yet reached Russia was disposed of by sale.

Clothes to Empty Wardrobes

When the first clothing shipments reached Moscow in January, special couriers carried ten initial packages to each delivery station. The crisis of a year earlier had passed, and beneficiaries were inclined to be more critical. However the fact that the package would have cost twice as much on the Russian market silenced effectively all complaints, and the Clothing Remittances received a warm welcome. What these packages meant to the average recipient may be understood from a description of the wardrobes of the first beneficiaries in Kiev, as recorded by the District Supervisor.

"Consignee of Remittance 21 Serial No. Kiev 8, has no overcoat and is wearing one belonging to her niece. The last clothing of any kind which she received was in 1921, when the office where she worked issued her seven yards of flannelette.

"Consignee of remittance 135, had no underwear at all. The overcoat he wore he had had for 23 years. His trousers, he claimed were eight years old.

"Recipient of remittance 107, has no winter clothes, but came to receive package in summer dress."

The clothing packages which did the greatest good, however, were undoubtedly the thousands given away in Special Relief, thanks to the generosity of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund and other donors. Teachers and students and brain workers generally, whose work could not command a living wage, made up the majority of such beneficiaries, and the good done was incalculable both as regards their physical well being and the restoration of their self respect.

Complete Cooperation

In the distribution of Clothing Remittances the Administration encountered nothing but good will on the part of the Government. The Representative Plenipotentiary, furthermore, took every step which would prevent speculation. In this, of course, the A.R.A. cooperated with him fully, particularly as the Textile Trusts were lying in wait for an opportunity to point out the existence of speculation. The Administration enclosed in each package a notice informing beneficiary of the penalty for selling a whole or part of his package and warning him that any part of an A.R.A. Clothing Remittance found on the market would be confiscated. In addition, a tacit agreement existed with Mr. Lander by which all packages after the first addressed to one beneficiary would be submitted to him for approval. He scrutinized such orders carefully and refused permission to deliver for several. The Moscow Office warned sales offices abroad to have purchasers specify more than one beneficiary if more than one package was ordered.

The Districts handled their Clothing Remittances through their Food Remittance departments, so that they required neither special personnel nor extra space for warehousing and delivery. Handling and accounting resembled so closely the systems worked out for Food Remittances as to offer none of the difficulties experienced a year earlier by the infant districts. In fact the facility with which delivery stations distributed and accounted for clothing packages proved effectively the efficiency which the entire Food Remittance Division had developed.

Time and other conditions prevented the clothing program from attaining to more than a fraction of the stature of the Food Remittance. However, it rendered a very real service to some 60,000 Russian families and that alone is sufficient justification for its existence.

FULFILLMENT

Chapter XX

The Food Remittance Division made deliveries in Russia over a period of twenty months from November, 1921 to June, 1923. During that time it rose from the obscurity of a side show to the sunlight of a major activity, and it transformed the ill-will and suspicion of the Russians into profound respect and gratitude. In considering the achievements of the operation it is not to be supposed that they consisted solely in saving so many people from starvation and so many more from extreme hunger. The operation accomplished these things, but it also shared with the other A.R.A. activities in reviving the commercial and economic machinery of Russia; it did an immeasurable service in inspiring the morale of a depressed people; it opened communications between the Russian people and the world at large; in conjunction with the A.R.A. child and mass feeding it was largely instrumental in the re-establishment of newspaper press relations between Russia, Europe and America; it gave confidence to foreign business anxious to deal with Russia, and it accomplished much toward conciliating the intransigent attitude of the Soviet Government toward things foreign and capitalistic. No history of the Food Remittance which failed to include these results would be complete.

The achievements of the Division fall most naturally into the categories of "material" and "moral", both of which subdivide into direct and indirect. In launching the scheme the American Relief Administration intended primarily to increase Russia's food supply, a direct benefit to the country which may be accurately gauged by the figures of remittances sold and tons shipped. Remittances sold totalled \$12,025,640, of which \$11,724,010 worth were delivered. These 1,172,401 packages represented 75,000 tons of nourishing foodstuffs.

The Feeding of Millions

One standard 117 pound package meant a normal ration for three persons for one month. The 1,172,401 Remittances, therefore, contained sufficient supplies to feed 3,600,000 people as much as they needed for thirty days. In other words the Food Remittance operation did a job equivalent to the feeding of the entire city of Berlin for one month. The difference is that Berlin is a compact unit served by the most up to date transportation facilities, while that part of Russia over which the Food Remittance operated included some million square miles tied together by inadequate and half destroyed railways and roads. [It must constantly be kept in mind that the distribution of packages by the A.R.A. was in addition to the mass feeding of millions of children and adults.]

But the 1,172,401 Food Remittances meant much more than the adequate upkeep of 3,600,000 persons for one month. People faced with famine and who have known sustained hunger learn to economize food. What would formerly have been eaten in a week now serves very well for a month, and substitutes mixed judiciously with a little wheat flour reinforce the larder fourfold. He who foresees the danger of death regrets but mildly the daily feeling of satiety. It would be more near the truth to estimate that the 75,000 tons of Food Remittance supplies accomplished the equivalent of nourishing twelve rather than four million people for a month.

Food For Fifty Saves a Hundred

However, the material benefits of the Food Remittance operation were not limited to those who ate the American food, whatever the number of these may have been. In supporting some millions with supplies from abroad the A.R.A. released the local supplies for millions of others. If in a community of a hundred souls there is only food enough to keep fifty people alive for a year, the whole hundred will die if the food is evenly distributed. Should fifty of the community receive their sustenance from outside, however, all the local supply can be released for the other fifty, so that no one will die. That is why the Food Remittance brought relief to Russia as a whole and not only to immediate beneficiaries. Undoubtedly not all consignees of A.R.A. packages were personally threatened with starvation or extreme hunger, perhaps not even the majority, but if they had had to compete on the local market for their food, they would have boosted prices out of the reach of those poorer than themselves and these latter must have died. There can be no doubt of the truth of this, for wherever the Food Remittance Division opened a delivery station prices on the local market dropped immediately and continued to drop in proportion as the community received more packages from America. The Districts began keeping track of local food prices in the month of February, 1922. Observe how the average for all of Russia drops sharply at the exact period at which the Food Remittance Division began large deliveries.


Average value on Russian market of commodities in A.R.A. \$10 packages

<u>1922</u>		<u>1922</u>	
February	\$45.61	June	\$17.81
March	25.82	July	16.78
April	20.77	August	20.04
May	21.84	September	18.86
		October	10.77

The slight fluctuations upward in May and in August were due to manipulation of the ruble exchange by the Soviet Government, which falsely sustained the ruble for short periods.

Spreading the Benefits

Had no food come in from abroad this table would have been reversed and February would have been to September more nearly as 45 to 90 and not as 45 to 18. Local sources could add nothing to the supply until the new harvest, and increasing scarcity must have increased prices. Every food package consigned to Russia benefited the country even if the consignee had no need of it personally. In such cases he generally sold it in whole or in part on the market so that it caused a general price reduction directly instead of by the indirect means of removing him from among competing buyers. The general destitution in all the other essentials of life beside food, such as clothing and implements which existed in Russia caused the direct benefits of the Food Remittance business to be spread over the broadest possible surface. The man who could forego a few tins of milk exchanged them on the market for the pair of shoes which his neighbor needed less than the milk. Such was the history of the food package in every section of Russia.



What the material relief which the Food Remittance brought to Russia meant becomes clearer when seen through the eyes of the average beneficiary. A consignee of Kiev district wrote the District Supervisor a letter of thanks for his package, in which he said: "How important this relief is to me can be understood only by those who during three years have seen nothing except millet, potatoes, and rye bread, and who now suddenly become the possessors of three poods of white flour, sugar and rice. Only those who during three years were deprived of any fats in their meals, can fully appreciate the value of ten pounds of lard, and of twenty cans of evaporated milk. I know of cases where one package has literally saved and restored to life an entire family. Several weeks of proper nourishment revived the energy about to flicker out, rebuilt strength wasted in the struggle, enabled people to acquire the necessary life resistance." The occasionally uncertain phrasing of this message will not hide the sincerity and concreteness of its thought.

The Gift Incomparable

An author living in Petrograd describes the situation of himself and his family and of the city in general before the A.R.A. arrived, and then of the change effected by the arrival of food packages. "I received a letter from a Berlin editor informing me that he would publish an old manuscript of mine and that as advance payment he was sending me, through the A.R.A., three food parcels. Think, three A.R.A. food parcels!

"Do you know what these three A.R.A. packages meant to me, my dear Rockefeller? Do you realize how thankful I am to Columbus that he one day discovered America? Thank you, old mariner! Thank you, old vagabond! Those three packages meant more to me than simply a reprieve from death. They made possible a return to my literary work. I felt myself again a writer. But how long the packages were in arriving. My children every day ran to the A.R.A. office on the Morskaya, and every day they returned with bare hands. I doubt if any American will ever understand our poetical happiness on the great day when, dusted with flour, my whole family dragged home the cart with the long awaited A.R.A. packages and carried them up to our lodgings on the third floor."

A Qualitative Job

The childfeeding and adultfeeding activities of the Relief Administration fed ten million people a day during the month of August, 1922, the number having increased from two million a month at the beginning of the year. Here was a mass relief job, astounding and unparalleled in its magnitude. By this very magnitude it would seem to dwarf the Food Remittance operation into insignificance, to make of it but a drop in the bucket. Yet the Food Remittance never lost by comparison. By its character it performed a service which the mass relief activities could never hope to accomplish. It picked out the individual in greatest need all over the country whether he was isolated in comparative plenty or not. If some individual abroad did not address a specific package to him, the A.R.A. included him in its Special Relief lists. It was this characteristic of specific relief which gave the Food Remittance its importance. It was a qualitative rather than a quantitative job. Mass relief went to the starving country districts and to children. It missed inevitably the trained and educated adult of the city, the intellectual of the type of the Petrograd author, quoted above. Him the Food Remittance picked out to help and so per-

formed for Russia a service, judged abstractly, greater than the feeding of a thousand children.

Special Relief Again

The Special Relief program has been dealt with in a previous chapter, and the results accomplished categorized. However, the tremendous good achieved by that program will bear repetition and emphasis. American District Supervisors agreed unanimously that it was by far the most successful feature of the Food Remittance operation, and the most satisfactory of their activities as a whole. According to the statements of Russians themselves, "it was due solely to A.R.A. Special Relief that so many of the scanty educational forces of Russia were saved". "I do not know what the attitude of the American nation is now towards Russia", wrote a Kiev Professor. "But it is sure that for the Russian Intelligentsia, the American Nation is ALL. In these last hard years, we have had sympathy only from America, help only from the States. In spite of their many faults the educated Russians are idealists, and arrive what may they will keep their gratitude for generations for all that America and only America has done for them." "The devil!" exclaimed a Russian doctor when told that the A.R.A. was liquidating. Then we are all done for.

An Enormous Income for Charity

The greatest of the indirect material achievements of the Food Remittance Division was the support given to childfeeding. Of the \$12,000,000 handled by the Division, profit amounted roughly to \$3,600,000. This sum more than paid for the entire overhead of the American Relief Administration, for the offices in America and Europe which collected money and handled shipments, for the American personnel in and out of Russia; it paid the freight for the hundreds of steamer loads of supplies which crossed the Atlantic; and in addition it gave a surplus which permitted the purchase of more supplies. It made possible the application of every cent obtained by charity for child and adult-feeding relief to the purchase of stocks. That is to say, it increased the amount of such relief \$3,600,000, or enough to feed 3,600,000 children for one month. That in itself would have justified the operation.

Comfort to the Isolated

Such were the obvious material benefits which the Food Remittance operation conferred upon Russia. Because they are tangible and can be measured by figures, it is easy for the man who has never been in Russia to get an impression of their importance. It is not so easy for one ignorant of the destitution and hopelessness of the Russian in 1921 to visualize the moral significance of the operation, or to appreciate its influence on the economic life of the country. At best, these are intangible things. The whole of the A.R.A. and particularly the Food Remittance Division meant to the Russian the comfort which a living spirit, no matter how feeble, means to one on a lonely and treacherous night. In moments of terror and uncertainty, nothing is so terrible as isolation. The A.R.A. represented the rest of the world, and rejoined the Russian to the solid and comforting mass of humanity, with which he had lost touch during seven years of suffering. After an earthquake, one experiences an ecstatic joy in flat and solid, unmoving earth. To the sufferer from the prolonged moral earthquake of the Soviet Revolution the A.R.A. was

solid, reposeful ground. It symbolized permanence and surety, something definite and sane. It renewed hope and the possibility of happiness.

It was not alone the tangible connection between purchaser and consignee which the food package established; it was the feeling which those who never received nor expected a Remittance shared, that there existed a comforting and sympathetic world abroad which knew of and wished to relieve Russia's suffering. Here again the special beneficiaries were the Intelligentsia, the individuals who because of their higher attainments and greater spiritual needs suffered tenfold more intensely from the moral darkness and isolation in which they lived, and who because of their position were the particular victims of the revolution. To them the Food Remittance Division was the hand of those abroad who understood and sympathized; it was the encouragement to carry on; it was the reviver of faith in their own usefulness and abilities.

As for the tangible connection, an appreciative Russian wrote: "For the citizens of Soviet Russia the A.R.A. was almost the only mediator in their communication with the outside world. This mediation was necessarily limited to the transmission of food and clothing, but even that, besides its material importance, had a great moral one. The care and remembrance of relatives separated from us by far distances, of friends and colleagues, cut off from us by the will of fate, simply human sympathy, the sign and token of which were the packages we received, - what a moral support were they to us!"

Lifting the Curtain

After the inspiring of the morale of the population comes the impetus which the A.R.A. and the Warehouse Operation (it is hard to separate the two at this point) gave toward the development of business and official contacts between the Soviet Government and the rest of the world. Unquestionably the Relief Administration unlocked Soviet Russia to foreigners. Other foreign relief organizations aided in this of course, but the widespread character of the A.R.A. operation gives it first place. The American personnel spread like a great many-eyed Argus over the whole of European Russia. Nothing was nor could be hid from them; they saw the political, social, and economic life of the country in its most intimate details. Through the medium of their eyes Europe and America saw Soviet Russia as something concrete and understandable, a fact and not a myth. This in itself was an enormous step toward making relations between the Communist power and other countries at least intelligible, and intelligent, things which they had not been up to 1922. For the first time since the revolution, foreigners could know just what the situation in Russia was and could decide their attitude by this knowledge.

A Truce to Suspicion

As for its influence on Russian officials, the A.R.A. called a truce to the active enmity and suspicion of all things foreign and capitalistic which, comprehensibly enough, had actuated the Communists. Frequently permanent peace has begun with a truce, and the Soviet agreement with the A.R.A. was a truce to the moral and material war between Russia and the rest of the world. The Administration accomplished the most difficult and important step in any understanding, - the initial one. The moment of tension and fear is the kick-off; after that the game is easy.

Isolation and struggle had so distorted the Communist opinion of every thing foreign as to render friendly contact almost impossible. By twenty-two months of straightforward dealing and disinterested philanthropy the A.R.A. forced the Soviet leaders in spite of themselves to correct their judgments, which has resulted unavoidably in a greater willingness to live in the family of nations.

An Impetus toward Moderation

By the magnitude of its relief and because of the fact that it represented America as a whole, the Relief Administration had almost an official position in Soviet Russia. It was the first mission of any size and importance which had come into the Revolutionary State bearing this character. By their admission of it the Soviet leaders shouldered a responsibility which very much restricted their unlimited freedom of action. Before the arrival of the A.R.A. the Government had recognized no responsibility other than that to the Communist Party and Communist ideals. It was checked by no agreements which it considered important, and it admitted no control from the Russian people. If one will grant that absolute freedom, complete despotism, renders Governments, like individuals, callous, dangerous and selfish, the A.R.A. may be very gratefully thanked for imposing upon the Soviets some of the obligations of normal human relationships. That the responsibilities toward the Administration which the Russians shouldered and carried faithfully did much to sober them and to rationalize them in some of the ideas in which they were irrational seems an admissible thesis. One thing is certain, namely that foreign governments or foreign business men will find the Soviet Government very considerably more reasonable and easier to approach and deal with thanks to the American Relief operation of twenty-two months.

Paving the Way for Business

As a gauge of business possibilities in Soviet Russia, the Food Remittance operation definitely proved that a foreign business concern could carry on under something approaching acceptable conditions in Russia. Obviously it had the whole prestige of the A.R.A. behind it, the enormous leverage of the child, adult and medical programs. It carried the prestige of more than seven years large scale relief operations in twenty-one countries of Central and Eastern Europe without one iota of suspicion of any ulterior commercial motives. It received exceptional privileges on the strength of its relief nature, and it was recognized as having an extra-territorial standing. All these facts tend to minimize its value as an indication of what foreigners might expect in Russia, yet it forced the new rulers of Russia, central and local, to accustom themselves to the free operation of a foreign business organization.

It may be believed, therefore, that succeeding businesses will not need all the prestige and leverage which the Food Remittance had behind it. There can be no doubt that the establishment and success of the Division hastened perhaps by years the reopening of old channels of money remittances. Since the fall of 1922, several means of transmission have been recreated. No foreign bank or express company would have thought of undertaking the responsibility of transmission so soon if the A.R.A. and its Food Remittance had not paved the way and given confidence. It is also perhaps a fact of some significance that business contracts entered into with the Russian Government by Americans bear dates subsequent to the entry of the A.R.A. into Russia.

But far more tangible and more important to Russia than the impetus it gave to foreign business, was the revival of the country's public service utilities and the general economic regeneration accomplished by the A.R.A. and the Food Remittance Division.

New Life to National Utilities

To repeat what has been said so often in these chapters, the economic life of Russia had come to a standstill, and the machinery of production and commerce not already destroyed by the revolution was decaying from disuse. The A.R.A. entered Russia with a comparatively modest relief program, but the degenerated port and transportation facilities of the country at first prevented the realization even of that. When the Food Remittance and the adult corn relief supplies were added, the railroads threatened to fall down completely. It was the menace of this with the consequent disaster and disgrace, which galvanized the Soviet Government into Herculean action. By a marvelous effort and concentration of energy it revived its railroads and gave them a tremendous impetus toward reconstruction. In December, 1921, freights to Kiev from Moscow took a month en route and seldom arrived intact. By June the railroads had reduced freight time to one week and passenger trains ran regularly in twenty-four hours instead of four days. They did not fall back from this advance even when winter brought its snows. Every other line in Russia, practically all of which the A.R.A. used, recorded the same story. Repair began on roads, engines were overhauled and freight cars rebuilt. It would have been impossible to effect this improvement in the Railway service without the incentive of actual service which it was forced to perform.

Telegraph Service Revived

Responding to the same pressure, the nearly defunct telegraph service of the country took a new lease on life, and in the short space of a few months could be depended upon to get a message through as quickly and accurately as our own Western Union. When Mr. Hynes first went to Odessa in December, 1921, he received many telegrams from Moscow as late as ten days after their dispatch. Some he did not receive at all, and frequently the message was garbled out of all significance. The service was completely disorganized. Moscow headquarters placed a sharp complaint with the central government. Unless it could be in immediate and constant touch with all its districts and ports, it could not hope to operate successfully. The Government reacted to this as it did to the pressure for improved train service. As early as April messages dispatched in the evening from Moscow to any of the districts reached their destination in legible form by the following morning.

Adding Speed to the Russian Vocabulary

The vast and widespread activities of the A.R.A. touched the life of Russia on every side and in every section of the country. As Americans the Administration personnel brought with them their native energy; as administrators of an emergency relief operation effective in proportion to the speed with which it was applied they increased that energy manyfold. "Sichas" is the Russian word for presently, and shares the vague indefiniteness of the Spanish "manana". Soon after the arrival of the Americans, Russians began differentiating between the unqualified "sichas" and the "Americansky sichas" which

meant literally "at once". That symbolized the activity of the American everywhere. They imparted their own energy to everything with which they came in contact, and in the spring of 1922 they came in contact with practically everything in Russia.

At that time, Saratov District desired to move corn up and down the Volga river for the relief of starving adults. It requested a regular supply of barges, and received promises thereof from the river transportation department. For some days these promises failed to materialize. The Americans stormed everyone who had any conceivable connection with river transportation, and within a short time barges began appearing so fast that the Americans could not load them all. After that they had not a single complaint to make on that score.

At every point along the line of the relief operation the Americans worked under pressure and forced the Russians to follow suit. At the ports they pushed the stevedores to halve their unloading time; they hammered the railroads to keep empties rolling in and loaded trains rolling out; they hounded the local governments to supply equipment and warehouses; they gave their personnel a time limit for every job.

Surmounting the Insurmountable

In July, 1922, the American in charge of Food Remittance work in Saratov District ordered a complete set of accounting records ready for a certain date. Some days before the term set he investigated progress. The Russian office manager declared that his demands were out of the question, that it was humanly impossible to have the records ready. The American said they would have to be done anyway and smiled away the exasperation of the Russian. He ordered overtime to be instituted, regulated the work himself, and for three nights in succession sat up with his entire force until 3 and 4 in the morning completing the records. He supplied tea to keep them awake, inspired them with his own energy and shamed their complaints. On the day set, the job was finished. The Russians forgot their irritation in their pride in achieving the inachievable, and insisted upon a group photograph with the American to signalize the event.

Transforming Stagnation to Activity

The activity, the spirit of reconstruction which the A.R.A. inspired in the national utilities and in the individuals with whom it came in contact, bred a new spirit of life in the stagnant land, which spread to everyone. And with the new stirring, came new hope, new desire. The A.R.A. represented an enormous concrete aid, but it also symbolized the efficacy of work. Wherever the Administration went in 1921 and 22 it found an inert despondency, a listlessness without hope, or an indifferent inefficiency. Within six months these characteristics had changed; there was life in the air, bustle, a very definite struggle against famine and disease. The moral recuperation of the country was marvelous; without it physical recuperation would have been impossible. Of course, it is impossible to attribute exclusively to the A.R.A. this nationwide revival of life and hope. The New Economic Policy of the Soviets and the good harvest of 1922 both contributed. But the connection between the A.R.A. and this recuperation stands out too clearly, too definitely, to permit of doubt that the Administration began it and kept it alive.

Influencing the National Character

Aside from the abnormal stagnation and decay resulting from the revolution and the famine, a Russian characteristic is a proneness to inactivity and to an easy going attitude foreign to the American. It is, of course, too much to suppose that the American Relief operation permanently influenced a change in the national character; it would be presumptuous to suppose that it is desirable. We are an efficient people, but are we any better for that? Perhaps the efficacy and magnitude of our relief to Russia proves that we are. However, it is quite probable that Russian business has taken a lesson from the American Relief operation which will bear fruit, at least during the lifetime of the 120,000 Russians who worked directly for the A.R.A. These people received a training in business efficiency, which, though they resented it at times, they eventually recognized as justifiable. At the end of the operation an employee of one district commented on this.

"All this heterogeneous public", he said, "was tied together by an iron discipline, which was supported by an almost mysterious fear of the Supervisor. No negligence or neglect in regard to one's duties, so common even in old times in Russia, were to be noted in the A.R.A."

It may very well be that these people will forget the strictness of the personal relations, but they will not forget the thousand and one hints in improved office management which they learned from the A.R.A. They will not forget that they were part of an organization which achieved the supposedly impossible in Russia, nor the means by which it did so.

Great Expectations and Great Realizations

The Food Remittance Division delivered packages in Russia for nineteen months. It accomplished all and more than its sponsors had hoped for it. It brought relief to millions and helped to revive hope in millions more. It won the gratitude and respect of the Russians. Though it wore the mask of Mammon, it came to symbolize straightforward dealing and tangible effective sympathy. It was a truly American operation in every sense of the word, bloodlessly impersonal in operation, yet noble and human in its purposes and accomplishments. In it were constantly contrasted the most hard-headed commercial methods with the most delicate and kindly benevolence.

So huge a machine could not avoid the defects of its qualities, yet the sum total of its history is sincerely gratifying. Like great men, the good it did lives after it, and the bad is interred with its bones. In American history the Food Remittance operation fills a brighter page than the Mexican War of 1848 or our diplomatic activities since 1919. It was an action of international humanity which brightens a black era in world affairs. It will bear fruit when the men who administered it are dead.

"Is it not a miracle, this," said a Russian Food Remittance beneficiary, "that from the other side of the world some sort of Yankees whom I had heard referred to all my life as hard-hearted worshippers of Mammon and people vowed to Commercialism, should come thousands of miles to feed and make me happy? I felt in this the beginning of a new era, the commencement of great and good epoch. Kiev suffers and New York feels it keenly. The sorrows of Petrograd

grieve Boston. It is as though all cities were being brought together. Moscow becomes the neighbor of Chicago, oceans and hills which served as separating barriers now do not exist. Is it the beginning of the epoch predicted by an American poet:

Are all nations communing?
Is there to be but one heart
to the Globe?"

APPENDIX

Moscow, Russia,
December 1, 1921.

FOOD REMITTANCE MEMORANDUM NO. 2.

1. In order to purchase a Food Remittance in America an APPLICATION FORM must be obtained from the Russian Food Remittance Department of the American Relief Administration, 42 Broadway, New York City. In Europe all purchases must be made by application to the American Relief Administration, 67 Eaton Square, London, S.W.1, England.

These APPLICATION FORMS must be filled out and returned to the New York or London Offices accompanied by Money Order, Draft or Certified Check for dollars. On receipt of the completed Application Form a "FOOD REMITTANCE RECEIPT" is issued which has a special number and contains in addition to the applicant's name and address, the consignee's name and address in both English and Russian, as well as the necessary data concerning the amount in dollars which indicates the number of packages to be delivered.

2. Two Copies of this "Food Remittance Receipt", viz.: a BLUE COPY for permanent retention in MOSCOW HEADQUARTERS, and a WHITE COPY for signature and return to New York by the Delivery Station, are forwarded to Russia.

3. These Food Remittance Receipts upon arrival at Moscow are sorted according to geographic location and the WHITE Copy is sent to the DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS from which the delivery of food can most easily be effected, accompanied by a "FOOD REMITTANCE REGISTER" listing the receipts.

This Food Remittance Register contains:

- (a) A special DISTRICT SERIAL NUMBER which is given each remittance in Moscow, and
- (b) The ORIGINAL Food Remittance Receipt number.
- (c) The amount in Dollars.

It also contains headings under which notations concerning the delivery or non-delivery of the package should be made.

4. Upon receipt from Moscow of the Food Remittance Receipt the Districts will notify the Consignee by Post Card that a package is being held at the local A.R.A. Food Remittance Warehouse subject to his disposition, and asking him to take delivery in one of three ways. It is very important that the Receipt number be noted on all three sections of the Post Card Notice in order that on return of any section the Food Remittance Receipt, which should be kept filed by Receipt number, can be readily located.

5. Delivery of packages to Consignee may be effected in three ways:

- (A) BY ACTUAL DELIVERY TO THE CONSIGNEE OVER THE COUNTER.

A.R.A. Food Remittance Depots have been or are to be established at the following points, viz.:

Petrograd
Moscow
Kazan
Simbirsk
Ufa
Samara
Saratov
Orenburg
Tzaritzin
Odessa
Kiev
Minsk

Consignees must call at these depots for their packages. No deliveries beyond such points will be made by the A.R.A. except by Post which will be described below.

The method to be followed in Counter Deliveries will be as follows:

1. The Consignee will call at the local A.R.A. Food Remittance Depot and present the Post Card Notice, together with documentary evidence to prove that he is the person named in the Food Remittance Receipt. If such evidence is satisfactory the Consignee will sign "DELIVERY ORDERS" in duplicate, and the FOOD REMITTANCE RECEIPT. (This may be done in a single operation by insertion of the Food Remittance Receipt and a piece of carbon paper between the Delivery Orders.) The date of delivery and the District (Food Station) should be filled in in the Food Remittance Receipt. The District, the Receipt and serial numbers, date of delivery, and method of delivery, as well as the amount in dollars and the list of commodities should be filled in the Delivery orders, the duplicate copy of which goes to the consignee, and the original copy of which remains in District Headquarters as a permanent record. Rubber stamps will be furnished for the list of commodities.
2. The Consignee will also sign (giving both his name and correct address) a Post Card addressed to the ORIGINAL PURCHASER of the Receipt acknowledging receipt of the foodstuffs.

This will complete the operation as far as the Consignee is concerned. The Food Remittance Receipt will then be ready to return to Moscow, in connection with the Food Station Delivery Report, to be described below, the transaction having been noted on the Food Remittance Register.

(B) BY ACTUAL DELIVERY TO CONSIGNEE'S AGENT.

1. In cases where the Consignee is unable to take personal delivery and desires the package delivered to an AGENT, the Agent must present the appropriate section of the Post Card Notice, duly signed by the Consignee, together with the Consignee's IDENTIFICATION PAPERS.

The Agent will then follow the procedure outlined above, except that he will sign the Food Remittance Receipt, the Delivery Orders and the Acknowledgment Post Card as Agent of the Consignee, giving both his own and the Consignee's name.

2. The Agent's authorization from the Consignee should be attached to the back of the Food Remittance Receipt, together with the Post Card acknowledgment, stamped "AGENT", for forwarding to Moscow, with the Food Station Delivery Report.

(C) BY RUSSIAN POST AND TELEGRAPH SERVICE.

In cases where the Consignee is unable to take personal delivery or to send an Agent, and desires the package sent by post, the following procedure should be followed:

1. Upon receipt of that section of the Post Card which requests that the package be sent by post at the Consignee's risk, the foodstuffs, properly packed, will be turned over to the local RUSSIAN POST & TELEGRAPH SERVICE for shipment.
2. Postage and insurance will be borne by the A.R.A. but after making delivery of the package to the Post Office and securing their receipt, A.R.A. liability ceases. This is understood by the Consignee.
3. The Consignee will be notified by Post Card that the package has been shipped. This Post Card will be in two sections, one indicating that the food packages have been consigned per post, and the other in the form of a post card acknowledgment to be returned to the purchaser. This section of the card should bear the purchaser's address already written in its proper place, and when signed by the Consignee after receipt of package will be detached from the rest of the card, placed in an envelope and mailed to the A.R.A. distribution point, for transmission to Moscow the same as ordinary acknowledgment cards intended for the purchaser. Obviously in this case no duplicate Delivery Order need be made.
4. The Food Remittance Receipt will be stamped "Shipped per post", dated, and attached to
 - (a) The Post Card received from the Consignee authorizing shipment of the package at his risk, and
 - (b) The Post Office Receipt, for return to Moscow in connection with the Food Station Delivery Report.
5. No package should be sent by post until Post Card authorization to ship has been received from the Consignee. As arrangements for transmission and insurance of packages have not been completed, no post consignments will for the present be made.
6. FOOD STATION DELIVERY REPORT (Details omitted)

7. "DAILY DELIVERY LISTS" have been printed for use in the warehouse where the packages are to be actually delivered. These can be made out daily as deliveries occur, in pencil, and later sent to District Headquarters offices where the Food Station Delivery Report can be typed.

8. UNDELIVERED PACKAGES (REFUNDS)

In the Food Remittance Receipts sold by the American Relief Administration in New York is a clause providing for a refund to the Purchaser in the event of the package not being delivered in ninety (90) days. This clause means ninety (90) days from date Food Remittance Receipt arrives in Moscow, and the ninety days will be considered to start from the date appearing in the upper right hand corner of the Food Remittance Register.

Every effort should be made to get into touch with the Consignee and each District should work out a system in cooperation with the local Russian Post & Telegraph Service to insure the most careful handling of Post Card Notices.

There undoubtedly will be many cases where the Consignee while still in the City or District will have moved from the address given in the Food Remittance Receipt. In such cases the Post Office Department and local Government Address Information Bureaus should be called upon to assist in locating the Consignee.

A follow-up checking system on the Post Card notifications should be instituted.

If, at the end of thirty (30) days no reply is received from the Consignee, a second Post Card should be mailed. The Post Office authorities should at the same time be given the name and address of the Consignee and asked to locate.

If, at the end of another thirty days no reply is received and the Post Office Department has not located the Consignee, a third Post Card should be mailed, at the same time the Address or Information Bureaus of the local Government should be asked to assist.

If, at the expiration of ninety (90) days all efforts to locate the Consignee have been unsuccessful, the Food Remittance Receipt should be stamped "REFUND" and returned to Moscow together with "REPORT ON PACKAGES UNDELIVERED".

This form should be made out monthly in duplicate (one copy for the local files and one copy for Moscow) and should give the District Serial Number, Food Remittance Receipt Number and, in addition, indicate the reason the package was not delivered.

9. UNDELIVERED PACKAGES (TRANSFERS)

Due to various causes, such as change of address, mistakes in listing, Consignee wishing someone else to receive package, postal communication, transportation, et cetera, it will probably be found necessary to transfer Food Remittance Receipts from one District to another in order to effect delivery.

This will be accomplished by direct communication between the Districts and not through the Central Office, Moscow.

Care should be taken that no unnecessary transfer on account of postal connections be made. Likewise, in case of transfers made at the request of Consignees, signed statement to that effect should be attached to the Food Remittance Receipt. Change of address should be definitely ascertained from reliable sources before a transfer on that account is made. When the District finds it necessary to transfer Food Remittance Receipts to another District, the District making the transfer will use the following procedure:

(1) Form No. MW-10 will be made out in triplicate addressed to the District where delivery is to be effected. The original is to accompany the Food Remittance Receipt, which has been stamped "TRANSFERRED TO", one copy is to be forwarded to Moscow for information and the third copy is to be retained for file locally and should be filed in the file of accomplished Food Remittance Receipts to replace the Food Remittance Receipt. It is to be emphasized that the copy for Central Office, Moscow must be forwarded as soon as possible.

(2) Enter the transaction on Food Remittance Register received from Moscow, Column "Transferred to" after the proper receipt number, date and place to which transferred. The District receiving the Food Remittance Receipt transferred from some other point will enter same on a blank Food Remittance Register marked "Transfers Received", and kept specially for the purpose, giving the original serial number, e.g., Moscow, 30, Simbirsk, 31, et cetera. Food Remittance Registers for transfers received should be made out from time to time as transfers accumulate, and must be in duplicate - one copy for local use, and one copy to be forwarded Moscow. Thus, Moscow is notified of the transfer and it also appears on the records of the District and is ready to be handled the same as an ordinary case except that the serial number bears its original prefix.

10. Packages are sold only in units of \$10 or multiples of \$10. The contents of a package are as follows:

49 pounds of Flour
25 pounds of Rice
10 pounds of Sugar
10 pounds of Lard
3 pounds of Tea
20 tins of Milk

While the contents of all packages are the same, there may be a difference in the method in which foodstuffs for counter delivery and foodstuffs for postal delivery will be packed.

(a) Foodstuffs for counter delivery will as far as practicable be packed as follows:

Each Consignee will,
therefore, receive:

Flour in 24½ pound sacks	2 sacks
Rice " 25 " "	1 sack
Sugar " 10 " "	1 "
Lard " 10 " pails	1 pail
Tea " ½ or 1½ pound packets	6 or 2 packets
Milk " tins	20 tins

(b) Foodstuffs for delivery by Post will be packed in two equal and identical boxes and each box will contain one-half the total quantity of each commodity, i.e.,

Flour - 24½ pound sack
Rice - 12½ " "
Sugar - 5 " "
Lard - 5 " pail
Tea - 3½ " packets, or 1-1½ pound packet.

Two boxes must, therefore, be shipped to Consignee in order to make up a \$10 food package. Due to cost of boxes and packing expenses, under no circumstances will commodities boxed for shipment per post be delivered over the counter.

For the present, all packages, both for counter and postal deliveries, will be made up at Moscow. The boxes for postal delivery will be forwarded from Moscow ready for reshipment to the Consignee. No shipment of foodstuffs in bulk will be made to the Districts.


11. PUBLICITY.

The success of the Food Remittance Division will depend on the ability of the A.R.A. to locate persons in Russia and to put Russians in touch with their relatives and friends in America. To this end a campaign of publicity is being prepared to consist of newspaper stories and dispatches sent out through Central News Agencies and printed in local papers, placards and appeal Post Cards. The placards are to be posted in cities where food remittance distributing points are established. Appeal Post Cards will be distributed from information bureaus opened in connection with each delivery depot and can be sent to persons in more remote parts of the country through the post. When the Appeal Post Cards are signed, addressed and stamped by the sender, they are to be collected and returned to Moscow for transmission to America. Mr. Farmer Murphy is preparing newspaper notices which will be sent to all Districts for publication in local papers.

Elmer Burland,
Chief Food Remittance Division.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20250

TO: [illegible]
FROM: [illegible]
SUBJECT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]
RE: [illegible]



APPROVED: [illegible]
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

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Am 3
26339

MHL SOUTH WING,

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One who served.
The carriage of
philanthropy

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